§291C-102 Noncompliance with speed limit prohibited. (a) A person violates this section if the person drives:
(1) A motor vehicle at a speed greater than the maximum speed limit other than provided in section 291C‑105; or
(2) A motor vehicle at a speed less than the minimum speed limit,
where the maximum or minimum speed limit is established by county ordinance or by official signs placed by the director of transportation on highways under the director's jurisdiction.
(b) If the maximum speed limit is exceeded by more than ten miles per hour, a surcharge of $10 shall be imposed, in addition to any other penalties, and shall be deposited into the neurotrauma special fund. [L 1971, c 150, pt of §1; am L 1984, c 273, §8; gen ch 1985; am L 2002, c 160, §10; am L 2004, c 102, §2; am L 2006, c 129, §3]
Speeding law not criminal, therefore, not assimilated under the Assimilative Crimes Act. 900 F.2d 1346 (1990).
Traffic citation issued to defendant on a military installation, referencing only Hawaii state law (this section) and reciting the facts of defendant's speeding violation, provided insufficient notice to defendant that defendant faced a criminal violation of federal law. 537 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (2008).
In prosecution under this section, prosecutor has burden of proving that speed limit was established in one of ways specified in this section. 57 H. 277, 554 P.2d 767 (1976).
Tuning fork used to calibrate radar gun was itself accurately calibrated. 70 H. 580, 779 P.2d 11 (1989).
Where trial court properly took judicial notice of the speed limit, as required by HRE rule 202(b), there was sufficient evidence to find motorist guilty of violating subsection (a). 95 H. 22, 18 P.3d 884 (2001).
The State failed to lay an adequate foundation for the introduction of the laser gun reading, and thus the trial court erred in admitting the speed reading into evidence. 132 H. 170, 319 P.3d 1178 (2014).
Defendant was effectively put on notice of allegedly exceeding speed limit established by county ordinance. 9 H. App. 73, 823 P.2d 154 (1992).
State's mere showing that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that defendant committed the lesser included regular speeding infraction (RSI) under subsection (a)(1) was not enough, by itself, to warrant the entry of judgment on the RSI; such a showing would be sufficient to justify remanding defendant's case for retrial on the lesser included RSI; to warrant remand for entry of judgment on the RSI, the State had to also show that the erroneous admission of the speed check evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the determination that defendant committed the RSI. 124 H. 270 (App.), 241 P.3d 562 (2010).
Where there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneous admission of the speed check card might have affected the district court's finding that defendant drove defendant's car in excess of the maximum fifty-five miles per hour speed limit, the erroneous admission was harmless reasonable doubt with respect to the lesser included regular speeding infraction. 124 H. 270 (App.), 241 P.3d 562 (2010).