520-4 Liability of owner limited. (a) Except as specifically recognized by or provided in section 520-6, an owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use the property for recreational purposes does not:

(1) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose;

(2) Confer upon the person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed;

(3) Assume responsibility for, or incur liability for, any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission or commission of such persons; and

(4) Assume responsibility for, or incur liability for, any injury to person or persons who enter the premises in response to an injured recreational user.

(b) An owner of land who is required or compelled to provide access or parking for such access through or across the owner's property because of state or county land use, zoning, or planning law, ordinance, rule, ruling, or order, to reach property used for recreation purposes, or as part of a habitat conservation plan, or safe harbor agreement, shall be afforded the same protection as to such access, including parking for such access, as an owner of land who invites or permits any person to use that owner's property for recreational purposes under subsection (a). [L 1969, c 186, 4; am L 1996, c 151, 2; am L 1997, c 272, 3 and c 380, 9]

 

Case Notes

 

U.S. government immune from negligence liability under Hawaii recreational use statute (HRUS) for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff while plaintiff was using a military recreational facility, where (1) because the government did not impose a "charge" or "fee" for plaintiff to enter upon and use the recreational facility, plaintiff's use of the government's property was "without charge" under the statute; (2) the fact that dock on which plaintiff was injured was closed to everyone except the instructors and students of the sailing course on day of plaintiff's injury did not strip the government of its HRUS immunity; (3) plaintiff argued that legislative history indicated that HRUS was not intended to immunize businesses from liability to their business invitees, there was no need to resort to statute's legislative history in search of an exception that was clearly not included; and (4) although plaintiff may have had professional as well as personal reasons for taking the sailing course, plaintiff's alleged "professional" motivation did not convert plaintiff into a "nonrecreational" user; plaintiff's subjective intent was, in the situation, immaterial. 181 F.3d 1064 (1999).

Cited: 902 F. Supp. 1207 (1995); 916 F. Supp. 1511 (1996).

 

 

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