Section 2. Persons in public employment shall have the right to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining as provided by law. [Am Const Con 1968 and election Nov 5, 1968; ren and am Const Con 1978 and election Nov 7, 1978]
Collective bargaining in public employment, see chapter 89.
Attorney General Opinions
Scope of right of collective bargaining is for the legislature to decide. Att. Gen. Op. 68-27.
Bargained for random drug testing program for public school teachers with appropriate procedural protections is constitutional and would not violate either the federal or state Constitution. If a court were to find such a program to violate either the federal or state Constitution, the doctrine of qualified immunity would bar personal liability for any state official; if a court were to impose personal liability, based upon past history and practice, the legislature would fund payment of the claims. Att. Gen. Op. 08-1.
Section 2 of Act 100, L 1999 violated the rights of public employees under this section by amending §89-9 to prohibit public employers and public employees' unions from collectively bargaining over cost items for the biennium 1999 to 2001. 100 H. 138, 58 P.3d 649.
Section 2 of Act 100, L 1999 (which amended §89-9(a)) violated this section because it withdrew from the collective bargaining process core subjects such as wages, hours, and other conditions of employment that the voters contemplated would be part of the bargaining process when they ratified this section. 101 H. 46, 62 P.3d 189.
The Act 355, L 1997 amendment to §78-13, which essentially altered the dates when public employees are to be paid, did not violate this section nor chapter 89 inasmuch as they did not prohibit a state employer from changing the pay dates of its employees; thus, the Act 355 amendment was not unconstitutional. 111 H. 168, 140 P.3d 401.
Where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that bargaining over pay dates was one of the core subjects of collective bargaining that triggers a violation of this section, and failed to provide the supreme court with their collective bargaining agreement to support their contention that pay dates are bargainable, and these pay dates were not specifically incorporated into their contract, the Act 355, L 1997 amendment to §78-13 to unilaterally alter the "traditional practice" of being paid on the fifteenth day and last day of the month did not violate their right to collectively bargain pay periods. 111 H. 168, 140 P.3d 401.