Section 5.  No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry. [Ren and am Const Con 1978 and election Nov 7, 1978]


Attorney General Opinions


  See also notes to U.S. Const. Amend. 14.

  Equal protection--extra tax on liquid fuel imposed only in city and county of Honolulu would not be invalid.  Att. Gen. Op. 63-23.

  Student regulations at state universities are subject to the vagueness standard but do not require the same specificity required of criminal statutes.  Att. Gen. Op. 71-9.

  The State's retention of any funds in excess of what is deemed necessary and proper to administer the county surcharge on state tax under §248-2.6 does not violate the equal protection clause or due process clause of the United States Constitution or the Hawaii State Constitution.  Att. Gen. Op. 15-1.

  Where land passes to the State by erosion or sea level rise, this result does not violate private owners' due process rights and does not constitute a taking of private property.  Att. Gen. Op. 17-1.


Law Journals and Reviews


  The Hawaii Supreme Court's Criminal Law Decisions 1997-1998:  Fair Use of the Doctrine of Plain Error?  II HBJ No. 13, at pg. 49.

  Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Hawaii:  One of These Things is Not Like The Other.  III HBJ No. 13, at pg. 1.

  Sandy Beach Defense Fund v. City and County of Honolulu:  The Sufficiency of Legislative Hearings in an Administrative Setting.  12 UH L. Rev. 499.

  State v. Levinson:  Limitations on a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges.  13 UH L. Rev. 279.

  Employee Rights Under Judicial Scrutiny:  Prevalent Policy Discourse and the Hawai`i Supreme Court.  14 UH L. Rev. 189.

  Burdick v. Takushi:  Yes to Equal Voice in Voting, No to a Fundamental Right to Vote for Any Particular Candidate.  14 UH L. Rev. 715.

  Hawai`i's New Administrative Driver's License Revocation Law:  A Preliminary Due Process Inquiry.  14 UH L. Rev. 853.

  For Better or for Worse, in Sickness and in Health, Until Death Do Us Part:  A Look at Same Sex Marriage in Hawaii.  16 UH L. Rev. 447.

  The Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate and the Constitution.  17 UH L. Rev. 413.

  Criminal Procedure Rights Under the Hawaii Constitution Since 1992.  18 UH L. Rev. 683.

  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg And Gender Discrimination.  20 UH L. Rev. 699.

  Re-Identifying American State Democracy:  Implications for Same-Sex Marriage and the Nonfungibility of Hawai`i in the Exotic 1950 Statehood Constitution.  22 UH L. Rev. 1.

  The Defense of Marriage Act:  Sex and the Citizen.  24 UH L. Rev. 279.

  Prudent Use of Judicial Minimalism:  Why Minimalism May Not be Appropriate in the Context of Same-Sex Marriage.  27 UH L. Rev. 501.

  Baehr v. Lewin and the Long Road to Marriage Equality.  33 UH L. Rev. 705 (2011).

  A Modest Proposal for Determining Class Member Damages:  Aggregation and Extrapolation in the Kalima v. State Breach of Homelands Trust Class Action.  34 UH L. Rev. 1 (2012).

  Homeless Property Rights:  An Analysis of Homelessness, Honolulu's "Sidewalk Law," and Whether Real Property is a Condition Precedent to the Full Enjoyment of Rights under the U.S. Constitution.  35 UH L. Rev. 197 (2013).

  Hamilton v. Lethem:  The Parental Right to Discipline One's Child Trumps a Child's Right to Grow Up Free from Harm.  36 UH L. Rev. 347 (2014).

  A New Narrative:  Native Hawaiian Law.  39 UH L. Rev. 233 (2016).


Case Notes


  See also notes to U.S. Const. Amends. 5, 14.


Civil rights.

  Employer's policy of denying any extended leave during employee's first year of employment violated Hawaii administrative rule §12-46-108, which was adopted to enforce the legislative mandate of §378-2(1)(A) and Hawaii's constitutional prohibition against sex discrimination in the exercise of a person's civil rights in employment.  89 H. 269, 971 P.2d 1104.


Due process.

  Where landowners argued that ordinance creating mechanism through which condominium owners could convert their leasehold interests into fee simple interests was arbitrary and irrational, landowners could not meet burden of showing irrationality.  124 F.3d 1150.

  Count alleging violations of the state constitution failed to state a claim in a 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights lawsuit brought by a former state prisoner and other allegedly similarly-situated plaintiffs primarily seeking damages for "over detention".  678 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (2010).

  Applicable only to state action not private action.  698 F. Supp. 1496.

  Where plaintiff alleged that condominium lease-to-fee ordinance violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights, ordinance was a rational exercise of legislative power.  832 F. Supp. 1404.

  Plaintiff fireworks company was unlikely to succeed on the merits in alleging that a Honolulu city ordinance, prohibiting the importation of consumer fireworks into Honolulu, was overbroad because the ordinance only punished the importing and supplying of consumer fireworks in the city and county of Honolulu and not to the neighbor islands.  796 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (2011).

  Plaintiff fireworks company was unlikely to succeed on the merits in alleging that a Honolulu city ordinance, prohibiting the importation of consumer fireworks into Honolulu, was void for vagueness because the prohibitions set forth in the ordinance were clearly defined, the choice of enforcement of the ordinance by the city did not render the law unconstitutionally vague, and the ordinance did not vest the city with "virtually complete discretion" to determine whether the ordinance has been violated.  796 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (2011).

  Plaintiff, a graduate student, was likely to succeed on the merits of plaintiff's due process claim where, among other things, amended letter from defendant, the university director of judicial affairs, deprived plaintiff of a meaningful opportunity to respond to allegations against plaintiff and plaintiff did attempt to respond to the allegations or to otherwise participate in the process.  927 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (2013).

  Ordinance proscribing "presence" at cockfight is too vague to satisfy requirement of due process.  50 H. 384, 441 P.2d 333.

  Section 634-69 providing for service of summons on motorist by publication does not violate due process clause.  50 H. 484, 443 P.2d 155.

  Public employees seeking accidental disability retirement benefits are entitled to hearing on contested issues before the board of trustees.  52 H. 212, 473 P.2d 866.

  Section 772-1 making criminal one's wandering about at night without visible business was unconstitutional for vagueness.  52 H. 527, 480 P.2d 148.

  Section 709-33, together with other sections of part II, chapter 709, was invalid for failing to require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  53 H. 40, 487 P.2d 283.

  Section 621-22, allowing introduction of prior convictions to impeach credibility of defendant in criminal case was unconstitutional.  53 H. 254, 492 P.2d 657.

  Section 712-1214(1)(a), with definitions in §712-1210(5), was not void for vagueness.  58 H. 440, 573 P.2d 945.

  Procedure followed did not deprive defendant of defendant's right not to be tried while incompetent.  60 H. 17, 586 P.2d 1028.

  Hearings on applications for staff privileges at hospitals.  63 H. 430, 629 P.2d 1116.

  Irrebuttable presumption created by compulsory retirement age has a rational basis and therefore does not violate due process.  63 H. 501, 630 P.2d 629.

  Notice provisions of tax lien statute failed to meet minimum standards of due process.  64 H. 4, 635 P.2d 938.

  Ordinance prohibiting distribution of commercial handbills in Waikiki was void for vagueness.  64 H. 148, 637 P.2d 1117.

  No violation in denial by trial court of defendant's request to examine witnesses where claim was impermissibly suggestive identification.  64 H. 217, 638 P.2d 324.

  Portion of election fraud law void for vagueness.  67 H. 398, 688 P.2d 1152.

  Due process denied where lessee's property seized without proper service of process, time to answer, evidence presented by lessor, and opportunity to contest case.  68 H. 466, 719 P.2d 397.

  Violated by court's failure to inform defendant of penalties for offense to which defendant pled guilty.  68 H. 498, 720 P.2d 1010.

  Defendant denied fair trial when prosecutor expressed personal view to jury that defendant was guilty and defendant's witnesses were not credible.  68 H. 659, 728 P.2d 1301.

  One year limitation on right to former spouse's property does not violate due process.  69 H. 1, 730 P.2d 338.

  Not violated by proceedings conducted by city council when acting upon Shoreline Management Act permit.  70 H. 361, 773 P.2d 250.

  Judge who lodges complaint for criminal contempt may not decide the outcome if there is no jury trial.  70 H. 459, 776 P.2d 1182.

  HRE rule 412 cannot override the constitutional rights of the accused.  71 H. 115, 785 P.2d 157.

  Rape victim's clothing was not crucial evidence as to result in an unfair trial.  71 H. 183, 787 P.2d 671.

  Ethnical exclusion by prosecution.  71 H. 300, 788 P.2d 841.

  Defendant's right to a fair trial was denied due to State's suppression of evidence.  71 H. 347, 791 P.2d 392.

  Mandatory sentences are not unconstitutional; there is no constitutional right to probation.  71 H. 485, 795 P.2d 842.

  In criminal cases, peremptory challenges cannot be based solely on race, religion, sex, or ancestry.  71 H. 492, 795 P.2d 845.

  Violated where there were unreasonable delays by administrative malfunctions of prosecutor's office and loss of tapes by police.  71 H. 537, 797 P.2d 1312.

  Right to fair trial denied where sum of prosecutor's conduct was prejudicial.  72 H. 278, 815 P.2d 428.

  Police tactics designed to detect drug-related offenses, including officer posing as drug dealer and supplying and selling drugs in "reverse buy" operation, were not so outrageous as to deprive defendant of right to due process.  73 H. 179, 830 P.2d 492.

  Claim for relief against state officials based on alleged illegality of exchange of ceded lands was barred by State's sovereign immunity.  73 H. 578, 837 P.2d 1247.

  Right not violated by defendant's absence from conference settling jury instructions as conference does not involve jury's presence or witness testimony.  74 H. 141, 838 P.2d 1374.

  Requires unbiased administrative adjudicators; no violation where §88-77 trustees not shown to have pecuniary or institutional disqualifying interest in adjudication.  74 H. 181, 840 P.2d 367.

  Written notice of specific charges not required for §710-1077(1)(a) direct summary criminal contempt case; contemnor's misconduct and judge's response did not require contempt trial before different judge.  74 H. 267, 842 P.2d 255.

  Use at sentencing of statements previously obtained in violation of a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination violates that defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and right to due process.  74 H. 424, 848 P.2d 376.

  Third-party agreements homestead lessees entered into with third party non-Hawaiian farmers could not be considered property interests.  76 H. 128, 870 P.2d 1272.

  Appellant had a right under the due process clause, to be given reasonable notice of the circuit court's intention to apply §706-660.1(a) (1985) in sentencing appellant in connection with kidnapping conviction and to be afforded the opportunity to be heard with respect thereto.  76 H. 517, 880 P.2d 192.

  Coercive conduct of a private person may be sufficient to render a confession inadmissible based on this section and article I, §10 of Hawai`i constitution.  77 H. 51, 881 P.2d 538.

  Because appellants had been afforded an adequate opportunity to challenge the fine assessed by department of land utilization on appeal--at both administrative and judicial levels--before they incurred any obligation to pay it, the application of the procedural mechanism set forth in section of land use ordinance had not violated their right to due process of law.  77 H. 168, 883 P.2d 629.

  Supreme court declined to hold that State must tape record a custodial interrogation in order to establish a valid waiver of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights.  77 H. 403, 886 P.2d 740.

  Presumption of nonconsent imposed on appellant a burden of persuasion of the nonexistence of an essential element of the crime with which appellant was charged; so construed, the presumption would violate due process clauses of Fourteenth Amendment to U.S. Constitution and this section by virtue of improperly shifting burden of proof to appellant.  78 H. 262, 892 P.2d 455.

  To protect the right to testify under Hawai`i constitution, trial courts must advise criminal defendants of their right to testify and must obtain on-the-record waiver of that right in every case in which the defendant does not testify.  79 H. 226, 900 P.2d 1293.

  Reversible error where jury may have reached verdict by improperly shifting burden of proof from prosecution to defense by concluding that defendant had not established defendant's claim of extreme mental or emotional distress before considering whether prosecution had disproved that defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  80 H. 172, 907 P.2d 758.

  Defendant received adequate notice that consecutive sentences may be imposed by sentencing court where court had that discretion by statute, and plain language of §706-668.5 informed defendant that defendant may be sentenced to consecutive sentences.  81 H. 309, 916 P.2d 1210.

  The right of an accused to a unanimous verdict in a criminal prosecution, tried before a jury in a court of this State, is guaranteed by this section and §14 of this article of the Hawaii constitution.  84 H. 1, 928 P.2d 843.

  When separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a single count charging a sexual assault, the trial court must either (1) require the prosecution to elect the specific act upon which the prosecution is relying to establish the "conduct" element of the charged offense, or (2) give the jury a specific unanimity instruction.  84 H. 1, 928 P.2d 843.

  Section 704-415 does not violate due process principles; at release hearing, insanity acquittee bears burden of proving by preponderance of evidence freedom from mental illness and dangerous propensities.  84 H. 269, 933 P.2d 606.

  Where violation of misdemeanor offense under §712-1248(1)(d) also constituted violation of felony offense under §712-1247(1)(h), conviction of felony offense would have constituted violation of defendant's due process and equal protection rights.  86 H. 48, 947 P.2d 360.

  In products liability action, cumulative effect of three alleged errors by trial court did not deny defendants right to fair trial where overwhelming and substantial evidence supported jury's verdict.  86 H. 214, 948 P.2d 1055.

  Although appellant was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who had testified at a public hearing but not before the zoning board of appeals, error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  87 H. 217, 953 P.2d 1315.

  Director's exposure to materials outside the record constitutionally harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as director expressly declined to consider material in rendering decision.  87 H. 217, 953 P.2d 1315.

  A trial court must pass on a defendant's attempted withdrawal of the prior waiver of his or her right to testify, tendered before the commencement of closing arguments, pursuant to the "liberal approach", whereas such an attempted withdrawal tendered thereafter is subject to the "manifest injustice" standard.  88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

  Where defendant did not meet burden of establishing plausible and legitimate reasons for withdrawal of defendant's prior waiver of defendant's right to testify, defendant failed to present "fair and just reasons" for defendant's request to exercise defendant's right to testify in defendant's own behalf; thus trial court did not abuse discretion by ruling that it would not reopen case.  88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

  Where trial court's denial of defendant's post-verdict motion for a new trial--based on defendant's claim that defendant's attempt to withdraw defendant's waiver of right to testify in defendant's own behalf should have been allowed--was not "manifestly unjust", no abuse of discretion.  88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

  Where trial court failed to correct prosecution's erroneous interpretation of "remains unlawfully" under §708-810, defendant's constitutional rights to due process and a unanimous jury verdict violated.  89 H. 284, 972 P.2d 287.

  A vessel and its accompanying mooring and live-aboard permits are constitutionally protected "property", of which an individual may not be deprived without notice and an opportunity to be heard.  91 H. 1, 979 P.2d 586.

  Procedural due process violated where State informed boat owner by letter of impoundment and possible disposal of vessel, but made no mention of any procedures available for challenging that action, administrative or otherwise, and boat owner was never provided with an opportunity to be heard on matter of vessel's impoundment.  91 H. 1, 979 P.2d 586.

  Findings under §706-662(5) regarding (a) the age or handicapped status of the victim and (b) whether "such disability is known or reasonably should be known to the defendant" entail "intrinsic" facts; Hawaii constitution requires these findings to be made by the trier of fact, not the sentencing court.  91 H. 261, 982 P.2d 890.

  For purposes of this section, due process requires that an order for the nonemergency involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications to a criminal defendant must be based upon facts found by clear and convincing evidence.  91 H. 319, 984 P.2d 78.

  Three separate findings required by trial court before  criminal defendant may constitutionally be involuntarily medicated with antipsychotic drugs, where it is alleged that the medication is necessary because the defendant poses a danger to himself or herself or others.  91 H. 319, 984 P.2d 78.

  Out-of-state attorneys, who were granted pro hac vice status, not denied procedural due process prior to revocation of status and imposition of sanctions where three separate oral notices were given to one attorney and to local counsel.  91 H. 372, 984 P.2d 1198.

  Defendant's constitutional right to unanimous verdict not violated as §707-715 defines a single criminal offense; subsections (1) and (2) constitute alternative means of establishing the mens rea of the offense of terroristic threatening--either one giving rise to the same criminal culpability.  92 H. 577, 994 P.2d 509.

  Where evidence concerned only a single incident of culpable conduct, trial court was not required to read the jury a specific unanimity instruction; right to unanimous verdict thus not violated.  93 H. 199, 998 P.2d 479.

  In sex assault case, jury instruction as to ineffective consent prejudicially affected defendant's rights because (1) the jury was instructed that it could convict defendant based on the absence of consent under §702-233 or any of the four grounds of ineffective consent under §702-235, (2) there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict was based upon at least one of the four grounds of ineffective consent, and (3) there was legally insufficient evidence to support any of the four grounds of ineffective consent.  96 H. 161, 29 P.3d 351.

  Unanimity is not required where alternative means of establishing an element of an offense are submitted to the jury, provided that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was based on an alternative unsupported by sufficient evidence.  96 H. 161, 29 P.3d 351.

  Juror questioning of witnesses did not deprive defendant of fair and impartial trial where questions posed by jurors were carefully reviewed by the trial court and questions tending to elicit improper or inadmissible evidence were excluded.  97 H. 206, 35 P.3d 233.

  As §846E-3 operated to deprive defendant of a protected liberty interest and provided defendant with neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard prior to notifying the public of defendant's status as a convicted sex offender, §846E-3 denied defendant due process under this section; §846E-3 thus void and unenforceable.  97 H. 285, 36 P.3d 1255.

  As the registration requirements of chapter 846E do not interfere with any of a sex offender's protected liberty interests, the protections of procedural due process are not triggered.  97 H. 285, 36 P.3d 1255.

  Defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict not violated by trial court's refusal to give a specific unanimity instruction as defendant's actual and constructive possession of the methamphetamine comprised a continuing course of conduct.  99 H. 198, 53 P.3d 806.

  As an aspect of procedural due process, individuals must, as needed, be provided an interpreter at family court proceedings where their parental rights are substantially affected.  99 H. 522, 57 P.3d 447.

  Parents have a substantive liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children protected by the due process clause of this section.  99 H. 522, 57 P.3d 447.

  Where negativing of defendant's mitigating extreme mental or emotional distress defense by prosecution was a material element of the offense of first degree murder such that jury unanimity was a prerequisite to returning any verdict, and trial court's special instruction expressly directed the jury to convict defendant of manslaughter if a single juror believed that the prosecution had failed to negative the mitigating defense, right to unanimous jury verdict violated.  99 H. 542, 57 P.3d 467.

  Where family court conducted an in camera review of the complainant's child protection services records and produced the relevant portions to defense counsel, defendant's due process rights not violated; and family court's order to seal the remaining portions of the child protection services file for appellate review did not constitute an abuse of discretion.  101 H. 172, 65 P.3d 119.

  The alternative states of mind potentially requisite to the charged offense of second degree theft by shoplifting, as prescribed by the definition of "intent to defraud" set forth in §708-800, does not implicate a defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict, as guaranteed by article I, §14 and this section of the Hawaii constitution; a proper elements instruction, which sets forth the alternative states of mind prescribed by the "intent to defraud" component of second degree theft by shoplifting, does not violate defendant's constitutional right.  101 H. 389, 69 P.3d 517.

  Lost opportunities for concurrent sentencing, parole, and loss of parental rights do not affect a defendant's ability to present an effective defense, and thus do not constitute actual substantial prejudice to a defendant's due process right to a fair trial.  102 H. 183, 74 P.3d 6.

  Where there was no evidence that the trial court either reviewed the reasons for the preindictment delay prior to requiring a showing of actual substantial prejudice to the defendant or required a showing of something less than actual substantial prejudice, the trial court did not misapply the correct standard to be used to determine whether charges should be dismissed for preindictment delay.  102 H. 183, 74 P.3d 6.

  Vexatious litigant's due process right not impacted in present or future cases where litigant was only restrained from bringing unmeritorious litigation, which could be restricted in any event; as trial court held a hearing to review litigant's objections to prefiling order, order imposed on litigant under §634J-7 satisfied procedural due process because it afforded litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard.  102 H. 289, 75 P.3d 1180.

  Section 663-15.5 adequately protects a non-settling joint tortfeasor's right to procedural due process; subsections (b) and (c) afford a non-settling joint tortfeasor notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the determination whether a settlement has been given in good faith and, consequently, bars cross-claims for contribution against the settling joint tortfeasor.  102 H. 399, 77 P.3d 83.

  No prosecutorial misconduct by prosecutor's questions and remarks regarding defendant's failure to "explain away" the DNA evidence as questions and remarks were more analogous to legitimate prosecutorial comment on the state of the evidence and not the improper shifting of the burden of proof onto the defendant.  103 H. 38, 79 P.3d 131.

  Where defendant's statements were not the product of "interrogation", but, rather, were "volunteered confessions or admissions, obtained independent of express police questioning or its functional equivalent", defendant's constitutional rights against self-incrimination and due process of law not violated.  104 H. 224, 87 P.3d 893.

  The lifetime registration component of the Hawaii sex offender registration statute implicates a protected liberty interest under this section and requires that minimum requirements of due process--notice and opportunity to be heard--be afforded to convicted sex offenders; such a proceeding may be instituted by a sex offender in a special proceeding.  105 H. 222, 96 P.3d 242.

  Under this section, due process requires that a convicted sex offender under §846E-1 be afforded the right to a judicial hearing at which evidence may be offered to demonstrate that continuance of all or part of the lifetime registration requirements are not necessary in a particular case to fulfill the public need to which the sex offender act responded.  105 H. 222, 96 P.3d 242.

  Applying the covered loss deductible under §431:10C-301.5 to plaintiff's recovery of underinsured motorist benefits did not violate plaintiff's right to substantive due process as the legislature's policy determination to enact this section to reduce one of the costs of the motor vehicle insurance system was expressly within the constitutional purview of the legislature.  106 H. 511, 107 P.3d 440.

  Assuming that possession of leased premises and rent to be paid into the trust fund are property interests protected under the due process clause, §666-21 does not offend due process as tenants are afforded an opportunity to challenge summary possession and motions for the establishment of a rent trust fund.  107 H. 73, 110 P.3d 397.

  Right not violated by administrative driver's license revocation hearing procedure where defendant was afforded a hearing where witnesses were called and defendant was represented by counsel, and hearing office advised counsel of the procedure that hearing officer was going to follow.  108 H. 31, 116 P.3d 673.

  Where mother was denied an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner as to the termination of her parental rights--that is, without a trial concerning her substantive liberty interests in the care, custody, and control of her children--mother was deprived of the custody of her children without a fair hearing.  108 H. 144, 118 P.3d 54.

  Where effect of administrative driver's license revocation office's default decision was to deprive petitioner of driver's license, a constitutionally protected property interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures the office used was great, and outweighed the government's interest, including the function of the office and the fiscal and administrative burdens that any additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail, procedural due process right denied.  110 H. 407, 133 P.3d 1199.

  As §207(c)(1)(A) of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act does not provide a "statutory entitlement" to any entity which may be granted a license pursuant to it, plaintiff energy producer failed to establish that plaintiff's exclusive telecommunications service license issued under that section constituted "property" which would entitle plaintiff to due process protection.  110 H. 419, 134 P.3d 585.

  Where definition of "incapacitated person" in §560:5-101 (2003), when read as a whole, sufficiently apprised ward of the bases on which the court would review the guardianship petition and any ambiguity in the statute did not render it "substantially incomprehensible", so as to overcome the "presumption of constitutionality", definition was not unconstitutionally vague.  113 H. 236, 151 P.3d 717.

  Considerations of due process continue to require that the aggravating factors set forth in §291E-61(b) – all of which remain "attendant circumstances that are intrinsic to and 'enmeshed' in the hierarchy of offenses that §291E-61 as a whole describes" – be alleged in the charging instrument and proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.  114 H. 227, 160 P.3d 703.

  Landowner was not vested with a property interest--building a particular sized structure or building in a particular location--sufficient to implicate due process protection where landowner's deed related that the Kauai planning commission retained authority to amend the shoreline setback at the time of building permit review; landowner was nevertheless afforded due process by being given a full public hearing and the commission conducted a site inspection of the property before making its ruling.  115 H. 477, 168 P.3d 929.

  Defendant's right to have all elements of an offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt was statutorily protected under §701-114 and constitutionally protected under the Hawaii and federal constitutions; as only defendant personally could have waived such fundamental right and such right could not have been waived or stipulated to by defendant's counsel, stipulation by defendant's counsel of the fact that defendant committed defendant's crime within two years of a second or prior conviction of abuse for purposes of the §709-906(7) charge violated defendant's due process rights.  116 H. 3, 169 P.3d 955.

  County park camping ordinance and rule was unconstitutionally overbroad where rule stated that certain conduct, according to the definition of camping, constituted camping "regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of any other activities in which they may also be engaging", thus subjecting "innocent, constitutionally protected behavior as well as conduct which may be validly regulated", to a criminal penalty.  116 H. 146, 172 P.3d 458.

  County park camping ordinance and rule was unconstitutionally vague where rule stated that a camping without a permit violation occurs where "it reasonably appears, in light of the circumstances, that the participants in conducting certain listed activities were in fact using the area as a living accommodation regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of any activities in which they may also be engaging", as this standard was internally inconsistent and incomprehensible to a person of ordinary intelligence and vested virtually complete discretion to the police to determine whether a person had violated the regulation.  116 H. 146, 172 P.3d 458.

  A charging instrument, be it an indictment, complaint, or information, must include all "allegations, which if proved, would result in the application of a statute enhancing the penalty of the crime committed"; where the prosecution and the courts would be substantially prejudiced by the retroactive application of this new rule, it was accorded purely prospective application.  117 H. 381, 184 P.3d 133.

  A specific unanimity (jury) instruction is not required where (1) the offense is not defined in such a manner as to preclude it from being proved as a continuous offense and (2) the prosecution alleges, adduces evidence of, and argues that the defendant's action constituted a continuous course of conduct; thus, a specific unanimity instruction was not required where prosecution alleged a continuous course of conduct with respect to defendant's kidnapping charge under §707-720, but was required for defendant's attempted first degree sexual assault charge under §707-730.  121 H. 339, 219 P.3d 1126 (2009).

  Where jury was not given a specific unanimity instruction with respect to the first degree terroristic threatening offense under §707-716, was never informed which act committed by defendant coincided with the two terroristic threatening counts, and convicted defendant of one count and acquitted defendant of the other, there was a genuine possibility that different jurors concluded that defendant committed different acts; thus, to correct any potential confusion in the case, a specific unanimity jury instruction should have been given to insure that the jury understood its duty to unanimously agree to a particular set of facts.  121 H. 339, 219 P.3d 1126 (2009).

  Appeals court did not err in concluding that theft of state property by deception under §708-830(2) constituted a continuing offense where petitioner acted "under one general impulse" and had "but one intention and plan" to unlawfully procure public assistance from the government through a "series of acts" all directed towards the same overarching goal; thus, a specific unanimity instruction for the jury under the Hawaii constitution, article I, §14 and this section was unnecessary.  122 H. 271, 226 P.3d 441 (2010).

  Where prosecutor's comments that respondent had benefited from listening to all the other witnesses before testifying plainly conveyed to the jury that respondent's testimony therefore should be discredited were based solely on respondent's presence at trial, they were prohibited generic tailoring comments.  125 H. 271, 260 P.3d 350 (2011).

  The constitutional right to discipline is inherent in the right to care, custody, and control of one's children; due process requires the State provide meaningful standards to guide the application of its laws; the appropriate standard for family courts to apply in contested chapter 586 show cause hearings is whether the parent's discipline is reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor; in applying such a standard, circumstances, including factors such as the nature of the misbehavior, the child's age and size, and nature and propriety of the force used, should also guide the courts in this State.  126 H. 294, 270 P.3d 1024 (2012).

  Defendant's right against self-incrimination under article I, §10 and right to due process under this section violated by police practice of inviting an arrestee to make a statement and to give his or her "side of the story" or similar entreaties in a "pre-interview" before Miranda warnings were given; under the circumstances of the case, where the Mirandized statement offered into evidence at trial resulted from the exploitation of this pre-interview practice, the subsequent Miranda warnings given did not remove the "taint" of the practice; trial court's conviction and sentence vacated. 126 H. 510, 273 P.3d 1196 (2012).

  Where record did not reflect that the jury was informed of the act that corresponded to each count, and the family court was required to provide the jury with a specific unanimity instruction, and its failure to do so constituted error, because the one-to-one relationship between counts and acts was made clear to the jury, and the jury found defendant guilty on nineteen counts for which nineteen exhibits were presented at trial, there was no genuine possibility that different jurors concluded that the defendant committed different acts; thus, error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  127 H. 20, 276 P.3d 589 (2012).

  Court's ruling that evidence of defendant's juvenile proceedings could be admissible violated §571-84(h) and constituted reversible error, where ruling was a reason defendant decided not to testify, infringed on defendant's constitutional right to testify, and there was a reasonable possibility that the court's error might have contributed to defendant's conviction.  127 H. 432, 279 P.3d 1237 (2012).

  The Hawaii supreme court had appellate jurisdiction over, and petitioners had a due process right to a hearing and judicial review of the commission on water resource management's (CWRM) interim instream flow standards (IIFS) determination where: (1) the analysis that the CWRM had to undertake in setting IIFS was complex and involved significant and thorough analysis and factfinding, taking into consideration the factors specified in §174C-71(2)(D); and (2) the ramifications of an erroneous IIFS could offend the public trust, and was too important to deprive the parties of due process and judicial review.  128 H. 228, 287 P.3d 129 (2012).

  Intermediate court of appeals erred in concluding that petitioner waived petitioner's due process claim relating to the Hawaii paroling authority's (HPA) nondisclosure of adverse materials in petitioner's HPA file, where petitioner would not have any opportunity to raise the issue of HPA's nondisclosure of evidence in any other proceeding if petitioner was not aware of the existence of letters sent between victim's aunt and HPA prior to second hearing until they were filed with respondent State's response to petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief.  129 H. 429, 302 P.3d 697 (2013).

  Advisement by the family court did not adequately ascertain whether petitioner understood petitioner's constitutional right to testify or not to testify, as required by the Hawaii supreme court in Tachibana v. State.  Moreover, petitioner's need for an interpreter during the trial was a "salient fact" heightening the necessity for the court to insure that petitioner understood the rights petitioner waived.  Accordingly, the court did not obtain a valid on-the-record waiver of petitioner's right to testify.  130 H. 83, 306 P.3d 128 (2013).

  Circuit court's failure to give a specific unanimity instruction that the jury was required to agree unanimously as to the person against whom defendant used force constituted plain error and there was at least a reasonable possibility that the circuit court's error contributed to defendant's conviction; thus, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  131 H. 19, 313 P.2d 708 (2013).

  Plaintiffs were denied the most "elementary and fundamental requirement of due process", notice of the charges against them and an opportunity to voice their objections in a meaningful time and manner before governmental deprivation of a significant liberty interest.  Thus, the circuit court clearly erred by finding, among other things, that plaintiffs were generally provided with notice through the union.  The circuit court also erred in concluding that plaintiffs received adequate notice for purposes of due process and a meaningful process to challenge the complaints against them.  131 H. 167, 317 P.3d 1 (2013).

  The adverse effect of the city's ban on plaintiffs' future employment opportunities was so prevalent and comprehensive that it implicated a liberty interest under this section.  131 H. 167, 317 P.3d 1 (2013).

  Indigent parents are guaranteed the right to court-appointed counsel in termination proceedings under the due process clause of this section.  Trial courts must appoint counsel for indigent parents upon the granting of a petition to the department of human services for temporary foster custody of their children.  131 H. 419, 319 P.3d 338 (2014).

  Circuit court plainly erred in precluding defense expert's testimony with regard to the probable effects of cocaine on the victim at the time of the shooting; the exclusion of the expert's cocaine testimony compromised petitioner's ability to present a complete defense.  131 H. 463, 319 P.3d 382 (2014).

  To prevent future misunderstandings over the significance and effect of the planning director's statements and correspondence, it would be beneficial for the planning director to clearly indicate when an appealable decision has been made and how an interested person may challenge the decision.  131 H. 513, 319 P.3d 432 (2014).

  Where the district court's ultimate Tachibana colloquy was defective because it incompletely advised defendant of defendant's right to testify and because it did not establish that defendant understood defendant's rights, the district court did not obtain an on-the-record waiver of the right to testify from defendant; defendant demonstrated a constitutional violation of defendant's right to testify, which could not be considered harmless.  132 H. 85, 319 P.3d 1093 (2014).

  Where the defendant presented extensive evidence, called four expert witnesses, submitted two scientific studies, and presented multiple lay witnesses, the defendant was not deprived of due process because the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to present arguments and evidence at the contested case hearing.  132 H. 247, 320 P.3d 912 (2014).

  Where inmate was transported to the courthouse upon being subpoenaed to testify but refused to testify, circuit court did not violate defendant's right to due process by denying defendant's request to extract the inmate so that the inmate could refuse to testify in front of the jury.  133 H. 253, 327 P.3d 931 (2014).

  Where the child support enforcement agency recorded a lien prior to an attorney's lien established for payment of fees in an unrelated action, the circuit court did not violate the attorney's due process rights by granting priority to the child support enforcement agency's lien.  133 H. 311, 328 P.3d 320 (2014).

  Where the land use commission (LUC) reverted property to the agricultural land use district, the circuit court erred in concluding that property owners' due process rights were violated because: (1) the property owners had notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the reversion issue; and (2) the LUC's conduct was not arbitrary and unreasonable, given the long history of unfulfilled promises made in connection with the development of the property.  134 H. 187, 339 P.3d 685 (2014).

  Where family court's strict enforcement of a three-hour time limit for trial on a petition to determine custody over minor children unduly curtailed mother's ability to present evidence relevant to the proper determination of the children's best interests, the family court abused its discretion in denying mother's motion for additional trial time; the time limit unreasonably deprived mother of a fair opportunity to present mother's case and prevented the family court from being able to determine the best interests of the children.  134 H. 221, 339 P.3d 719 (2014).

  Section 707-756, electronic enticement of a child in the first degree, is not rendered unconstitutionally vague by its use of the word "communicates", which is undefined, or by its reference to covered offenses under §846E-1, which includes catch-all clauses and conviction clauses; the catch-all clauses, conviction clauses, and term "communicates" provide citizens of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited and provide explicit standards for those who apply the statute to do so in a consistent and nondiscriminatory manner.  134 H. 515, 345 P.3d 181 (2015).

  Deprivation of property solely on basis of substituted service in adverse possession action violates due process, where, with due diligence, actual notice possible.  6 H. App. 241, 718 P.2d 1109.

  Does not require agency hearing before tax director issues notices of tax assessment.  6 H. App. 260, 718 P.2d 1122.

  In paternity action, due process not violated by exclusion of sexual access information and preclusion of cross-examination of mother regarding her earlier pregnancy.  6 H. App. 629, 736 P.2d 448.

  Act of state witness leaving witness stand in presence of security personnel was not so prejudicial as to deny defendant's right to fair trial; jury is presumed to adhere to court's cautionary instruction to draw no inference from event.  8 H. App. 624, 817 P.2d 130.

  Violated where court imposed attorney sanctions pursuant to its powers under §603-21.9 without adequate prior notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard.  9 H. App. 249, 833 P.2d 85.

  Because the constitutional right of allocution is one afforded "pre-sentence", manifestly, the defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard before the court imposes sentence; defendant had right of allocution before being sentenced for misdemeanor offense of driving with revoked license and for violation charge of illegal turn.  77 H. 241 (App.), 883 P.2d 663.

  Defendant's constitutional and statutory right to testify in defendant's own defense was violated where judge reproached defendant to follow defendant's attorney's advice and thus refrain from testifying, and the violation was plain error; denial of the right to testify was prejudicial and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  78 H. 115 (App.), 890 P.2d 702.

  Defendant's right to an impartial judge was violated where nature and extent of the court's questioning of one of the complainants demonstrated that the court assumed the role of a prosecutor, thus failing to act impartially.  When the court assumes the role of a prosecutor, it violates the fundamental due process requirement that the tribunal be impartial, and such an error, by definition, is inherently prejudicial and not harmless.  78 H. 115 (App.), 890 P.2d 702.

  Motions court's order denying defendant's pre-trial motion to dismiss for pre-indictment delay affirmed, where, inter alia, motions court was correct in concluding that defendant failed to establish that defendant's claimed inability to recollect events prior to defendant's indictment, even with the aid of others, amounted to substantial prejudice to defendant's right to a fair trial.  79 H. 165 (App.), 880 P.2d 217.

  Violated where trial court's exclusion of gun-like cigarette lighter prejudiced defendant by precluding jury from properly evaluating essential defense evidence.  79 H. 385 (App.), 903 P.2d 690.

  Violated where petitioner whose driver's license was administratively revoked denied right to cross-examine director's representative regarding basis for continuance of administrative hearing.  80 H. 358 (App.), 910 P.2d 129.

  Defendant entitled to elicit evidence of complainant's past sexual behavior, not to attack complainant's character, but to determine whether complainant was mentally defective and whether defendant knew that complainant was mentally defective.  81 H. 447 (App.), 918 P.2d 254.

  Where discussion that defendant was subject to mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to §706-660.1 was conducted at bench outside of defendant's hearing, defendant was not given reasonable notice of intended application of mandatory minimum term statute.  82 H. 158 (App.), 920 P.2d 372.

  Section 291C-112, which prohibits the use of a vehicle "for purposes of human habitation", not unconstitutionally vague.  82 H. 269 (App.), 921 P.2d 1170.

  "Reasonable grounds" standard of §709-906(4) not unconstitutionally vague where standard is an objective standard requiring a trial court to independently assess facts and circumstances which responding officers had before them in determining to issue warning citations.  82 H. 381 (App.), 922 P.2d 994.

  Section 709-906(4) not overbroad as issuance of warning citation must be based on objective facts and circumstances, other than merely a complainant's claim, which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe recent physical abuse was inflicted on family or household member.  82 H. 381 (App.), 922 P.2d 994.

  Violated where claimant failed to serve employer and insurer with motion and summons; circuit court thus did not acquire personal jurisdiction over employer and insurer and judgment and garnishee summons issued pursuant to §386-91 in absence of personal jurisdiction void.  82 H. 405 (App.), 922 P.2d 1018.

  Procedural due process right not denied when guardian ad litem not appointed for mother where mother was provided with court-appointed attorney and, pursuant to §587-34(d), court determined mother was capable of comprehending legal significance of issues.  85 H. 119 (App.), 938 P.2d 178.

  Application of preponderance of the evidence standard as appropriate judicial basis for issuance of protective order under §586-5.5 does not violate right.  85 H. 197 (App.), 940 P.2d 404.

  Where building addition was permitted structure under zoning ordinance in existence at time subsequent land use ordinance was adopted, requiring landowner to remove addition and pay daily fines until addition was removed constituted interference with landowner's vested property rights under this clause.  86 H. 343 (App.), 949 P.2d 183.

  Right violated where circuit court's instruction to jury regarding the statutory presumption created by §708-801(4) failed to further instruct jury pursuant to HRE rule 306(a) that the presumption is merely a permissible inference of fact and that in order to apply the presumption, the jury must find that the presumed fact exists beyond a reasonable doubt.  88 H. 216 (App.), 965 P.2d 149.

  As no Hawaii statute governing parole requires a parolee's parole to be automatically revoked upon the parolee's conviction and sentence to imprisonment for a crime committed while on parole, and §353-62 appears to vest Hawaii paroling authority with discretion to revoke parole, parolee's right violated when authority summarily revoked parole without giving parolee a final revocation hearing.  88 H. 229 (App.), 965 P.2d 162.

  Section 852-1 not void for vagueness as:  (1) a person of ordinary intelligence would have a reasonable opportunity to know that it is unlawful to refuse or wilfully fail to move as directed by an officer; (2) person may then choose between the lawful and unlawful conduct; and (3) the statute provides sufficiently explicit standards for those who apply it.  89 H. 27 (App.), 968 P.2d 194.

  Under the due process clause of the Hawaii constitution, entrapment by estoppel defense may be raised against the State in criminal cases and clause would be violated if the facts established the defense.  89 H. 27 (App.), 968 P.2d 194.

  Section 52D-8 provides officers with a constitutionally protected property interest--the right to legal representation for acting within the scope of their duty; due process thus entitles an officer to a contested case hearing under chapter 91 before the officer can be deprived of this interest.  89 H. 221 (App.), 971 P.2d 310.

  Right violated where jury instruction failed to correctly  convey proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard to jury; instruction that jury must be "firmly convinced" of defendant's guilt diminished this very high standard by which jury must abide in order to convict.  90 H. 113 (App.), 976 P.2d 427.

  Right violated by trial court entering free-standing restitution order where no notice was provided to defendant that defendant's original sentence might be modified at the hearing on the probation officer's motion to revoke restitution.  92 H. 36 (App.), 986 P.2d 987.

  Where trial court did not apply clear and convincing standard of proof on complainant as required by §604-10.5, applied a subjective rather than objective reasonable person standard in evaluating whether defendant's conduct caused complainant emotional distress, and violated defendant's due process rights, court erred by denying defendant's motion for reconsideration of injunction order.  92 H. 330 (App.), 991 P.2d 840.

  Where there was a distinct and reasonable possibility that trial court's error in commenting upon the location of the incriminating items contributed to the conviction of the defendants, error materially impinged upon defendants' right to trial by jury, and error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  92 H. 675 (App.), 994 P.2d 607.

  The conditions for eligibility for parole under the Hawaii sex offender treatment program, which includes admitting to committing a sexual offense, implicate a protected liberty interest under this section; this section of the Hawaii constitution provides an independent basis for the due process right to a sex offender classification hearing before such requirements may be imposed.  93 H. 298 (App.), 1 P.3d 768.

  Where there was no genuine possibility that the jurors were not unanimous as to the conduct for which defendant was found culpable, trial court's failure to give specific unanimity instruction as to the methamphetamine manufacturing offense did not violate defendant's substantial due process right to a unanimous jury verdict.  95 H. 365 (App.), 22 P.3d 1012.

  Section 711-1102 not unconstitutionally vague under this section as its language is specific and clear, it is narrowly tailored to a person's failure to disperse pursuant to a law enforcement order to leave the immediate vicinity of disorderly conduct, and citizens of this State should thus have no difficulty in understanding §711-1102.  101 H. 153 (App.), 64 P.3d 282.

  Defendant's right violated where, based on the specific facts of the case, trial court abused its discretion in directing, over defendant's objection, that defendant testify before defendant's other defense witness; error not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as there was a reasonable possibility that trial court's error contributed to defendant's conviction.  102 H. 369 (App.), 76 P.3d 612.

  Having been previously convicted of driving without motor vehicle insurance, driver was clearly on notice that driving without motor vehicle insurance was a criminal offense; thus, revocation of driver's suspended sentence for commission of the same offense during the period of suspension did not implicate driver's due process rights.  106 H. 391 (App.), 105 P.3d 1197.

  Where father was not appointed counsel until sixteen days prior to the permanent custody trial of father's two biological sons, applying the case-by-case balancing test of Lassiter--(1) the private interests at stake, (2) the government's interest, and (3) the risk that the failure to appoint counsel will lead to an erroneous decision--father was deprived of father's due process right.  119 H. 28 (App.), 193 P.3d 1228.

  Defendant's right to due process not violated where the record in the case did not indicate that juror was incompetent, unable to understand the proceedings, and unable to participate in deliberations.  120 H. 94 (App.), 201 P.3d 607.

  If a family court determines that an emergency situation requires an immediate change of custody, then an ex parte order changing custody must include notice of: (1) a post-deprivation hearing, promptly set; and (2) the grounds for this extraordinary measure; a parent deprived of custody in this manner must be given a prompt and meaningful opportunity to address the allegations supporting the immediate change in custody.  120 H. 149 (App.), 202 P.3d 610.

  Under the Hawaii constitution, absent express findings of exigent or emergency circumstances, due process requires that a parent be given notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to a change in primary physical or legal custody in family court custody matters; absent evidence that harm is likely to result from the delay necessary to set a hearing, no parent involved in a custody dispute should have his or her child removed by police, without notice of the grounds for removal and an opportunity to be heard on the charges.  120 H. 149 (App.), 202 P.3d 610.

  Where mother had a fundamental liberty interest in her right of care, custody, and control of child, and under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and this section, the State could not deprive mother of this interest without providing a fair procedure for deprivation, family court's ex parte order awarding father sole custody of child deprived mother of custody of child without the constitutionally required procedural protections.  120 H. 149 (App.), 202 P.3d 610.

  Where effect of the default sanction was to divest mother of mother's parental rights--mother's fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of her child--without affording mother the opportunity to contest the department of human services' permanent custody motion on the merits, family court abused its discretion in imposing the harsh and drastic sanction of default against mother based upon mother's single non-appearance; record did not show wilful or contemptuous behavior on mother's part or that the court considered the availability of less drastic sanctions.  124 H. 468 (App.), 248 P.3d 234 (2011).

  Chapter 586 is not unconstitutional, as the right of parents to discipline their children is not unlimited; as parents do not possess a fundamental right to inflict force or harm upon a child that the legislature has deemed to be excessive and harmful to the child's welfare, a rational basis review applied to that chapter; under that review, ex parte TROs under chapter 586 were rationally related to the legitimate state interest in protecting minors from physical and psychological harm.  125 H. 330 (App.), 260 P.3d 1148 (2011).

  The process for obtaining an ex parte temporary restraining order under chapter 586 did not fall short of the constitutional requirements of procedural due process where the strength of the State's and petitioner's interests, the "emergency nature of the decision", and the "practical difficulties inherent in convening an immediate evidentiary hearing" mitigated against requiring further procedural protections.  125 H. 330 (App.), 260 P.3d 1148 (2011).

  Defendant's right to due process not violated where defendant's waiver of defendant's right to a termination hearing from the drug court program (program) was voluntarily and intelligently undertaken under the totality of the circumstances.  Defendant was advised at three different hearings about the legal rights defendant would give up and the consequences of self-termination from the program, signed an admission agreement acknowledging that defendant understood what would happen upon termination from the program, and was warned repeatedly by the trial court regarding the consequences of termination from the program.  129 H. 135 (App.), 295 P.3d 1005 (2013).

  There is no infringement on parents' constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right to direct the upbringing of their children when a court, properly interposed between two parents, each equally vested with such rights, resolves an impasse between them regarding the exercise of those rights; in resolving such an impasse, a family court is required to base its determination on the best interests of the child pursuant to §571-46.  133 H. 415 (App.), 329 P.3d 320 (2014).

  Charges against defendant for accidents involving bodily injury and driving without a license were insufficient for failing to allege a mens rea and, therefore, were subject to dismissal without prejudice.  134 H. 465 (App.), 342 P.3d 884 (2015).


Equal protection.

  See also notes to U.S. Const. Amend 14.

  Ordinance creating mechanism through which condominium owners could convert their leasehold interests into fee simple interests was constitutional.  124 F.3d 1150.

  Applicable only to state action not private action.  698 F. Supp. 1496.

  Not violated where city ordinance providing mechanism for transfer of fee simple interest from condominium lessors to lessees did not intentionally discriminate against Native Hawaiians.  802 F. Supp. 326.

  Condominium lease-to-fee ordinance did not violate plaintiff's equal protection rights.  832 F. Supp. 1404.

  No violation, where plaintiff argued that §490:2-725 discriminated among two classes of warranty claimants, and appeared to argue that UCC arbitrarily discriminated among differing classes of defendants, insofar as it granted partial immunity to those in commercial sales without similarly limiting the liability of others potentially liable for industrial diseases.  854 F. Supp. 702.

  Inmates' motion for preliminary injunction regarding inmates' prayer objects denied, where inmates argued that the deprivation of the prayer objects violated inmates' rights to equal protection under the U.S. and state Constitutions.  One inmate failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as to the destruction of the prayer object, and even if the inmate had exhausted administrative remedies, the inmate had not established that the inmate was likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.  The other inmate, among other things, did not establish that the correctional center treated inmates who practiced the Native Hawaiian religion less favorably than it treated inmates of other religions, and was unlikely to prevail on the equal protection claims.  903 F. Supp. 2d 975 (2012).

  Where plaintiffs filed motion for preliminary injunction regarding Act 359 of 1993 Hawaii legislature (relating to Hawaiian sovereignty), as amended in 1994 and 1996, plaintiffs not likely to prevail on constitutional claims under Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of U.S. Constitution, article II, §1 and this section of Hawaii constitution, or Voting Rights Act with regards to native Hawaiian vote.  941 F. Supp. 1529.

  In view of underlying differences between cars and motorcycles, §286-81(1)(A), requiring motorcycle safety helmets, does not violate the equal protection clause.  55 H. 138, 516 P.2d 709.

  Requirement that a woman visitor to an all-male prison wear a brassiere is not invalid.  59 H. 346, 581 P.2d 1164.

  The protection of this section is not necessarily limited to that provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.  60 H. 71, 588 P.2d 394.

  Constitutionality of statute regulating taking of nehu upheld.  60 H. 662, 594 P.2d 130.

  In context of equal protection analysis, right to work does not invoke application of strict scrutiny.  60 H. 662, 594 P.2d 130.

  Rational basis exists for compulsory retirement age for state employees.  63 H. 501, 630 P.2d 629.

  No rational basis for disparate treatment of classes in establishing statute of limitations.  65 H. 26, 647 P.2d 276.

  Certain provisions of motor vehicle insurance law denied equal protection.  65 H. 623, 656 P.2d 736.

  Right to privacy does not invoke strict scrutiny; rational basis for county to require financial disclosure by "regulatory employees".  68 H. 140, 706 P.2d 814.

  Public policy against racial discrimination.  69 H. 238, 738 P.2d 1205.

  Sex is suspect category for purposes of equal protection analysis under this section; §572-1 is presumed to be unconstitutional unless defendant, as agent of State, can show that statute's sex-based classification is justified by compelling state interests, and statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of applicant couples' constitutional rights.  74 H. 530, 852 P.2d 44.

  Where county imposed impermissibly discriminatory tax, county must be given certain options to correct the impermissible discrimination.  81 H. 248, 915 P.2d 1349.

  Section 704-415 does not violate equal protection; State may place burden on insanity acquittee to prove by preponderance of evidence that acquitee should be released.  84 H. 269, 933 P.2d 606.

  Not violated by trial court's redaction of home street addresses and home and work telephone numbers on juror qualification forms where redaction procedure was not administered differently against other similarly situated criminal defendants having jury trials in the first circuit.  85 H. 258, 942 P.2d 522.

  Where violation of misdemeanor offense under §712-1248(1)(d) also constituted violation of felony offense under §712-1247(1)(h), conviction of felony offense would have constituted violation of defendant's due process and equal protection rights.  86 H. 48, 947 P.2d 360.

  Not violated by §431:10C-306 (pre-1997) as applied to persons ineligible for no-fault benefits.  87 H. 297, 955 P.2d 90.

  As chapter 671 rationally furthers legitimate state interest of assuring the provision of affordable health care to Hawaii's citizens by requiring  participation in medical malpractice dispute resolution such that the high cost of  litigation may be avoided, plaintiff not denied equal protection of the laws.  89 H. 188, 970 P.2d 496.

  Not violated by county ordinance classifying time share units into "hotel resort" category where classification was reasonably related to ordinance's stated purpose of eliminating disproportionate tax burdens within that category and classification applied to properties whose actual use was transient or short-term, regardless of whether the units were used personally. 90 H. 334, 978 P.2d 772.

  Clause not violated by §709-906 as State has a legitimate interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, enactment of §709-906 to address family violence within the community is "legitimate" in protecting Hawaii's citizens, and as including family and household members within scope of §709-906 may reduce or deter family violence by imposing upon violators greater criminal punishment than criminal assault, it is rationally related to the State's interest in preventing incidents of family violence.  93 H. 63, 996 P.2d 268.

  Search warrant did not violate appellant's rights under the U.S. and Hawaii Constitutions although it was not issued against any other bettors; to raise the selective prosecution defense, appellant needed to present sufficient evidence as to why appellant was prosecuted while the other seven bettors were not; reason provided by appellant that detective arbitrarily "classified" appellant as part of a conspiracy did not explain why only appellant was subject to the search warrant nor did it distinguish appellant from other bettors.  104 H. 323, 89 P.3d 823.

  As the imposition of a rent trust fund--requiring tenants to pay rent in exchange for possession for the duration of the dispute--appears rationally related to achieving the purpose of providing landlords with an expeditious alternative to eviction proceedings and tenants with an opportunity to maintain possession so long as rent is paid when properly due, §666-21 does not violate this clause.  107 H. 73, 110 P.3d 397.

  Chapter 584 did not implicate father's fundamental privacy right to procreational autonomy, but rather father's economic interest in not supporting his child, and although father had standing to raise an equal protection challenge to chapter 584, that standing was based on a non-suspect classification, i.e., the biological relationship of fathers to their children; thus, because chapter 584 bears a rational relation to the public welfare, the statute survives rational basis review and father's privacy and equal protection arguments failed.  109 H. 240, 125 P.3d 461.

  Where §46-72 (2006) created a class of tort claimants, injured by the conduct of a county, who were subject to a six-month statute of limitations period for filing their complaint, and victims of injuries caused by the State under §662-4 had a two-year limitation period, and there was no rational basis to support such disparate treatment, §46-72 (2006) was unconstitutional under this section.  115 H. 1, 165 P.3d 247.

  Where insurance commissioner imposed a substantial portion of the administrative cost of operating the insurance division and its supporting offices and divisions upon insurers pursuant to §431:2-215, and the insurance division's regulatory costs were necessitated by the business of insurers, §431:2-215 did not violate this section or the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  120 H. 51, 201 P.3d 564.

  Petitioner's right not violated as nothing in chapter 103F prohibited judicial review; judicial review was available by way of a declaratory action under §632-1.  127 H. 76, 276 P.3d 645 (2012).

  Where the land use commission (LUC) reverted property to the agricultural land use district, the circuit court erred in concluding that property owners' equal protection rights were violated because the record did not establish that the LUC lacked a rational basis for its decisions.  134 H. 187, 339 P.3d 685 (2014).

  Due process claim by former parent company of liquidated life insurer failed, where:  (1) the liquidation court followed the Insurers Supervision, Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act (ISRLA); and (2) the company did not specify how the ISRLA proceedings did not meet constitutional due process requirements.  135 H. 49, 346 P.3d 118 (2015).

  State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the case was not constitutionally infirm where defendant failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that defendant was prosecuted based on an arbitrary classification; defendant was prosecuted under §§707-730 and 707-732 based on allegations that defendant was significantly older than child #1, had initiated the prohibited sexual activities with child #1 and child #2, and had engaged in multiple instances of prohibited sexual contact with more than one child.  121 H. 92 (App.), 214 P.3d 1082 (2009).

  No procedural due process violation where prisoner was placed and retained in administrative segregation.  7 H. App. 502, 753 P.2d 816.

  Not violated by §291C-112, which rationally furthers legitimate state interest in protecting health and welfare of public at large by prohibiting use of vehicles parked on public property as places of habitation during certain hours.  82 H. 269 (App.), 921 P.2d 1170.

  Not violated by use of preponderance of evidence standard of proof for §586-5.5 as family and household members not suspect class and rational basis underlying this standard adopted by legislature under chapter 571 for chapter 586 was to facilitate and expedite judicial issuance of protective orders.  85 H. 197 (App.), 940 P.2d 404.

  As a suspect classification or fundamental right was not involved, and based upon dissimilar statutory treatment generally accorded to possession of marijuana as opposed to alcohol, where there was a rational basis for dissimilar punishment, §710-1022 did not violate defendant's right because it imposed a more severe penalty for a prisoner's marijuana possession than for alcohol possession under §710-1023.  92 H. 217 (App.), 990 P.2d 115.

  1998 Amended Child Support Guidelines classification challenged by father was constitutional as it reasonably calculated the child support payable for child without regard to child support owed by the non-custodial parent to other children, whether by a previous court order or a non-adjudicated legal obligation, and reasonably imposed upon the non-custodial parent the burden of proving that exceptional circumstances warrant deviation from the calculated amount.  104 H. 449 (App.), 91 P.3d 1092.

  Amounts assessed by the state insurance division against insurers for payment into the insurance regulation fund under §431:2-215 did not violate this section where the regulatory fees were rationally related to the statutory objective of defraying any administrative costs and costs incurred by supporting offices and divisions.  117 H. 454 (App.), 184 P.3d 769.

  State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the case was not constitutionally infirm where defendant failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that defendant was prosecuted based on an arbitrary classification; defendant was prosecuted under §§707-730 and 707-732 based on allegations that defendant was significantly older than child #1, had initiated the prohibited sexual activities with child #1 and child #2, and had engaged in multiple instances of prohibited sexual contact with more than one child.  121 H. 92 (App.), 214 P.3d 1082 (2009).

  There is no infringement on parents' constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right to direct the upbringing of their children when a court, properly interposed between two parents, each equally vested with such rights, resolves an impasse between them regarding the exercise of those rights; in resolving such an impasse, a family court is required to base its determination on the best interests of the child pursuant to §571-46.  133 H. 415 (App.), 329 P.3d 320 (2014).

  Charges against defendant for accidents involving bodily injury and driving without a license were insufficient for failing to allege a mens rea and, therefore, were subject to dismissal without prejudice.  134 H. 465 (App.), 342 P.3d 884 (2015).

  Retroactive tax assessments on state property leased by taxpayer to operate wind energy business did not violate taxpayer's due process rights, where taxpayer failed to present a basis to determine that the tax burden was "so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation".  The only harm that taxpayer argued resulted from the retroactive assessments was surprise, in that taxpayer had not planned for the taxes.  135 H. 202 (App.), 347 P.3d 632 (2014).



Previous Vol01_Ch0001-0042F Next