[ARTICLE XIV.--1868]

 

     Section 1.  All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

 

Attorney General Opinions

 

Due process.

  This clause guarantees a jury trial in all serious criminal cases but not for petty offenses.  Att. Gen. Op. 68-10.

  Student regulations at state universities are subject to the vagueness standard but do not require the same specificity required of criminal statutes.  Att. Gen. Op. 71-9.

  The State's retention of any funds in excess of what is deemed necessary and proper to administer the county surcharge on state tax under §248-2.6 does not violate the equal protection clause or due process clause of the United States Constitution or the Hawaii State Constitution.  Att. Gen. Op. 15-1.

 

Equal protection.

  Statutes requiring United States citizenship or declaration of intention to become a citizen as a condition of obtaining a license are invalid.  Att. Gen. Op. 74-18.

  The State's retention of any funds in excess of what is deemed necessary and proper to administer the county surcharge on state tax under §248-2.6 does not violate the equal protection clause or due process clause of the United States Constitution or the Hawaii State Constitution.  Att. Gen. Op. 15-1.

 

Privileges and immunities.

  A bill to provide for a capitation tax on all persons arriving in State by commercial airline would abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.  Att. Gen. Op. 69-7.

 

Law Journals and Reviews

 

  The New Resident:  Hawaii's Second-Class Citizen.  5 HBJ 77.

  Hawaii's Land Reform Act:  Is it Constitutional?  6 HBJ 31.

  Suppression of Evidence Without the Aid of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  8 HBJ 109.

  Discussion of the First Amendment rights of the policemen, see the Dissenting Cop.  9 HBJ 59.

  The Hawaii Prison Inmate's Emerging Right to Due Process.  10 HBJ 115.

  Included Offenses in Hawaii Case Law and the Rights to Trial by Jury:  Coherence or Confusion.  II HBJ No. 13, at pg. 77.

  Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Hawaii:  One of These Things is Not Like The Other.  III HBJ No. 13, at pg. 1.

  The Death Of The Living Will And The Making of Health Care Decisions Under Hawaii's New But Not Quite Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act.  III HBJ No. 13, at pg. 29.

  Real Property Tax Litigation in Hawaii.  III HBJ No. 13, at pg. 57.

  To Dwell on the Earth in Unity:  Rice, Arakaki, and the Growth of Citizenship and Voting Rights in Hawai‘i.  V HBJ No. 13, at pg. 15.

  National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian:  The End of Judicial Review of the NCAA.  12 UH L. Rev. 383.

  Stop H-3 Association v. Dole:  Congressional Exemption from National Laws Does Not Violate Equal Protection.  12 UH L. Rev. 405.

  State v. Suka:  Balancing the Need for Witness Accompaniment Against Its Prejudicial Effect.  12 UH L. Rev. 461.

  Sandy Beach Defense Fund v. City and County of Honolulu:  The Sufficiency of Legislative Hearings in an Administrative Setting.  12 UH L. Rev. 499.

  Hawaii's Quarantine Laws:  Can Spot Come Home?  13 UH L. Rev. 175.

  The Constitutional Structure of the Courts of the United States Territories:  The Case of American Samoa.  13 UH L. Rev. 379.

  The Hostile Work Environment:  Are Federal Remedies Hostile, Too?  13 UH L. Rev. 537.

  The Protection of Individual Rights Under Hawai‘i's Constitution.  14 UH L. Rev. 311.

  The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands.  14 UH L. Rev. 445.

  Burdick v. Takushi:  Yes to Equal Voice in Voting, No to a Fundamental Right to Vote for Any Particular Candidate.  14 UH L. Rev. 715.

  Hawai`i's New Administrative Driver's License Revocation Law:  A Preliminary Due Process Inquiry.  14 UH L. Rev. 853.

  The Law and Politics of Dancing:  Barnes v. Glen Theatre and the Regulation of Striptease Dance.  14 UH L. Rev. 925.

  Foucha v. Louisiana:  The Keys to the Asylum for Sane But Potentially Dangerous Insanity Acquittees?  15 UH L. Rev. 215.

  For Better or for Worse, in Sickness and in Health, Until Death Do Us Part:  A Look at Same Sex Marriage in Hawaii.  16 UH L. Rev. 447.

  The Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate and the Constitution.  17 UH L. Rev. 413.

  A Biologic Argument for Gay Essentialism-Determinism:  Implications for Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process.  18 UH L. Rev. 571.

  Criminal Procedure Rights Under the Hawaii Constitution Since 1992.  18 UH L. Rev. 683.

  Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena:  A Color-blind Remedy Eliminating Racial Preferences.  18 UH L. Rev. 939.

  A Constitutionally Valid Justification for the Enactment of No-Growth Ordinances:  Integrating Concepts of Population Stabilization and Sustainability.  19 UH L. Rev. 93.

  An Evaluation of the Summary Contempt Power of the Court:  Balancing the Attorney's Role as an Advocate and the Court's Need for Order.  19 UH L. Rev. 145.

  Rethinking Race for Strict Scrutiny Purposes:  Yniguez and the Racialization of English Only.  19 UH L. Rev. 221.

  Should The Right To Die Be Protected?  Physician Assisted Suicide And Its Potential Effect On Hawai`i.  19 UH L. Rev. 783.

  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg And Gender Discrimination.  20 UH L. Rev. 699.

  Tired of Your Masses:  A History of and Judicial Responses to Early 20th Century Anti-Immigrant Legislation.  21 UH L. Rev. 131.

  The Future of Same-Sex Marriage.  22 UH L. Rev. 119.

  The Fine Line Between Love and the Law:  Hawai`i's Attempt to Resolve the Same-Sex Marriage Issue.  22 UH L. Rev. 149.

  Love and Let Love:  Same-Sex Marriage, Past, Present, and Future, and the Constitutionality of DOMA.  22 UH L. Rev. 185.

  The California Civil Rights Initiative:  Why It's Here, Its Far Reaching Effects, and the Unique Situation in Hawai`i.  22 UH L. Rev. 279.

  A New Segregation?  Race, Rice v. Cayetano, and the Constitutionality of Hawaiian-Only Education and the Kamehameha Schools.  23 UH L. Rev. 109.

  Unfair Punishment of the Mentally Disabled?  The Constitutionality of Treating Extremely Dangerous and Mentally Ill Insanity Acquittees in Prison Facilities.  23 UH L. Rev. 623.

  Saenz v. Roe:  The Right to Travel, Durational Residency Requirements, and a Misapplication of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  23 UH L. Rev. 685.

  The Akaka Bill:  The Native Hawaiians' Race For Federal Recognition.  23 UH L. Rev. 857.

  The Defense of Marriage Act:  Sex and the Citizen.  24 UH L. Rev. 279.

  Akaka Bill:  Native Hawaiians, Legal Realities, and Politics as Usual.  24 UH L. Rev. 693.

  Driving into the Sunset:  A Proposal for Mandatory Reporting to the DMV by Physicians Treating Unsafe Elderly Drivers.  25 UH L. Rev. 59.

  Punishment and Deterrence:  Merely a Mantra; A Casenote on State Farm v. Campbell.  26 UH L. Rev. 229.

  Arrow of Time:  Vested Rights, Zoning Estoppel, and Development Agreements in Hawai`i.  27 UH L. Rev. 17.

  Emergency Contraception in Religious Hospitals:  The Struggle Between Religious Freedom and Personal Autonomy.  27 UH L. Rev. 65.

  To See or Not to See?  The Real Question Behind the Supreme Court's Grutter & Gratz Decisions.  27 UH L. Rev. 165.

  Trailblaze or Retreat?  Political Gerrymandering After Vieth v. Jubelirer.  27 UH L. Rev. 269.

  Wiping Out the Ban on Surfboards at Point Panic.  27 UH L. Rev. 303.

  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater and Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City of Denver:  Breathing Life into Croson's Passive Participant Model.  27 UH L. Rev. 469.

  Prudent Use of Judicial Minimalism:  Why Minimalism May Not be Appropriate in the Context of Same-Sex Marriage.  27 UH L. Rev. 501.

  Price Controls in Paradise:  Foreshadowing the Legal and Economic Consequences of Hawai`i's Gasoline Price Cap Law.  27 UH L. Rev. 549.

  Text-Mess:  There is No Textual Basis for Application of the Takings Clause to the States.  28 UH L. Rev. 373.

  Free Exercise and Hybrid Rights:  An Alternative Perspective on the Constitutionality of Same-Sex Marriage Bans.  29 UH L. Rev. 23.

  Physician Assisted Suicide:  Expanding the Laboratory to the State of Hawai`i.  29 UH L. Rev. 269.

  Prostitution:  Protected in Paradise?  30 UH L. Rev. 193.

  Property Rights:  Substantive Due Process and the "Shocks the Conscience" Standard.  31 UH L. Rev. 577 (2009).

  The State Marriage Cases:  Implications for Hawai`i's Marriage Equality Debate in the Post-Lawrence and Romer Era.  31 UH L. Rev. 653 (2009).

  Maka‘ala Ke Kanaka Kahea Manu:  Examining a Potential Adjustment of Kamehameha Schools' Tuition Policy.  32 UH L. Rev. 237 (2009).

  Ke Kanawai Mamalahoe:  Equality in Our Splintered Profession.  33 UH L. Rev. 249 (2010).

  From Sea to Rising Sea:  How Climate Change Challenges Coastal Land Use Laws.  33 UH L. Rev. 289 (2010).

  Hawai`i's Right to Privacy.  33 UH L. Rev. 669 (2011).

  A Modest Proposal for Determining Class Member Damages:  Aggregation and Extrapolation in the Kalima v. State Breach of Homelands Trust Class Action.  34 UH L. Rev. 1 (2012).

  Missing the Men:  Defining Female Servicemembers as Primary Caregivers in Deployment Deferral Policy.  34 UH L. Rev. 161 (2012).

  The New First Amendment:  Allowing Unlimited Corporate Election Speech Free from Response.  34 UH L. Rev. 263 (2012).

  Homeless Property Rights:  An Analysis of Homelessness, Honolulu's "Sidewalk Law," and Whether Real Property is a Condition Precedent to the Full Enjoyment of Rights under the U.S. Constitution.  35 UH L. Rev. 197 (2013).

  Hamilton v. Lethem:  The Parental Right to Discipline One's Child Trumps a Child's Right to Grow Up Free from Harm.  36 UH L. Rev. 347 (2014).

  Economic Substantive Due Process:  Considered Dead Is Being Revived by a Series of Supreme Court Land-use Cases.  36 UH L. Rev.  455 (2014).

  Drawing the Curtain:  Examining the Colorblind Rhetoric of Ruiz v. Robinson and Its Implications.  36 UH L. Rev. 529 (2014).

  Exclusive Democracy:  Contemporary Voter Discrimination and the Constitutionality of Prophylactic Congressional Legislation.  37 UH L. Rev. 535 (2015).

  A Unified Framework to Adjudicate Corporate Constitutional Rights.  39 UH L. Rev. 115 (2016).

  Turning Homeowners into Outlaws:  How Anti-Home-Sharing Regulations Chip Away at the Foundation of an American Dream.  39 UH L. Rev. 395 (2017).

  (Re)Righting History:  Deconstructing the Court's Narrative of Hawai`i's Past.  39 UH L. Rev. 631 (2017).

 

Case Notes

 

Generally.

  State's ban on write-in voting does not unreasonably infringe upon voters' constitutional rights.  504 U.S. 428.

  As birth in Philippines during U.S. territorial period does not constitute being born "in the U.S.", U.S. citizenship does not arise for such persons under citizenship clause.  35 F.3d 1449.

  No qualified immunity on 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for prison official who allegedly forced inmate to choose between constitutional right to outdoor recreation and law library access.  39 F.3d 936.

  Independent candidates for president denied access to State's ballot for the 2004 election appealed district court's holding that relevant provisions governing access do not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments or the equal protection clause; district court's holding that the presidential ballot access scheme is constitutional, affirmed.  620 F.3d 1214 (2010).

  Has no bearing on requirement that applicant must take bar examination.  44 H. 597, 358 P.2d 709.

  Program of board of land and natural resources for introduction of axis deer to island of Hawaii not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.  50 H. 207, 436 P.2d 527.

  For State to convict indigent without first providing indigent with counsel violates indigent's Fourteenth Amendment rights.  56 H. 23, 525 P.2d 1108.

  Where church was not a hierarchical church, but a congregational church that made decisions by a vote of its members as set forth in its "petition for charter" of incorporation and by-laws, the church was governed by chapter 414D; thus, appellants should have been allowed to amend their complaint, had standing to contest their expulsion, and were not precluded from doing so by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine; also, doctrine did not bar appellants' complaint to the extent it did not require resolution of controversies over church doctrine, law, or polity.  118 H. 165 (App.), 185 P.3d 913.

 

Due process.

  See also notes to Amendment 5.

  Prison regulations do not create a protected liberty interest.  461 U.S. 236.

  Transfer of prisoner to mainland facility did not implicate due process clause directly.  461 U.S. 236.

  Inmate's discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest; neither the Hawaii prison regulation in question, nor the due process clause itself, afforded inmate a protected liberty interest that would entitle inmate to procedural protections set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell.  515 U.S. 472.

  Defendant was not denied due process by alleged prosecutorial misconduct before grand jury.  614 F.2d 214.

  Only where defendant alleges governmental conduct "of the most shocking and outrageous kind" will due process be violated and court required to divest itself of jurisdiction.  625 F.2d 308.

  Prison transfer regulations created liberty interest subject to due process protection.  664 F.2d 708.

  Standard of proof for invalidation of plea bargain on basis of information submitted for sentencing.  682 F.2d 799.

  Hawaii civil service appeals process does not per se violate due process.  707 F.2d 1100.

  Patients did not have entitlement to services at Hale Mohalu.  Hence, no hearing required in order to close facility.  720 F.2d 564.

  State cannot, by judicial decision, divest vested property rights.  753 F.2d 1468.

  Not violated in termination of physician's staff privileges.  754 F.2d 1420.

  Personal jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturer of military products comports with due process.  785 F.2d 720.

  Not violated where civilians prosecuted differently than military personnel for traffic violations on military bases.  786 F.2d 951.

  Defendant not denied due process by introduction into evidence of photographs showing defendant's front and profile images; court must weigh prejudicial effect of testimony that defendant had "a long police record" against its probative value; prosecution's disclosure of exculpatory evidence at pretrial conference did not violate due process; individual voir dire, when required.  789 F.2d 1425.

  Defendant's conviction violated due process where only evidence was stipulation which followed ambiguous indictment.  796 F.2d 261.

  Admission of videotape of autopsy not fundamentally unfair.  800 F.2d 1463.

  Jury instructions that erroneously characterized murder as a "lesser included offense" of "murder-for-hire" did not warrant relief, but this error, along with others, may cumulatively have deprived defendant of defendant's rights; limitation of witnesses' prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes and not for their substance did not violate due process.  807 F.2d 805.

  Defamation, without more is not a constitutional violation.  827 F.2d 1310.

  Boat owner did not have a property right to boat slip where permit to use slip expired automatically.  915 F.2d 528.

  Award for damages to fired city employee for violation of due process rights upheld where city failed to afford employee a pretermination hearing.  963 F.2d 1167.

  Prison rule requiring inmates to communicate in English language only gave inmates insufficient notice that they were forbidden to pray in a foreign language.  994 F.2d 1408.

  Bars State from imposing inmate punishment on the basis of an unexpected and unusual interpretation of prison rule forbidding non-English communication.  15 F.3d 1463.

  State officials performing discretionary function not entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable official would have known that prison regulation forbidding non-English communication did not forbid foreign language prayer.  15 F.3d 1463.

  Not violated by §286-260 provision allowing for judicial review of administrative revocation of driver's license "as soon as practicable".  17 F.3d 1244.

  Federal wastewater treatment permit not unconstitutionally vague where defendants were knowledgeable in wastewater field, could be expected to have understood what the permit meant, and took considerable pains to conceal their illegal dumping activities.  35 F.3d 1275.

  Prison policies not sufficiently "mandatory" to create liberty interest in inmate not being transferred from minimum to medium security facility.  55 F.3d 454.

  Prison regulations on confinement did not create a liberty interest that would entitle inmate to due process protection.  59 F.3d 931.

  No violation where plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §1983 action against dental board was barred by res judicata as plaintiff failed to seek state court judicial review of dental board's order failing plaintiff on dental exam.  60 F.3d 626.

  At time of alleged misconduct, persons in custody had established right to not have officials remain deliberately indifferent to the persons' serious medical needs.  74 F.3d 977.

  Where landowners argued that ordinance creating mechanism through which condominium owners could convert their leasehold interests into fee simple interests was arbitrary and irrational, landowners could not meet burden of showing irrationality.  124 F.3d 1150.

  Inmate who had never been convicted of a sex offense and had never had opportunity to formally challenge imposition of sex offender label in adversarial setting did not receive required minimum due process protections and was entitled to injunctive relief; inmate who was convicted after formal criminal proceedings of a sex offense received all of process to which inmate was due.  131 F.3d 818.

  Where child protective service caseworker's seven-day delay in filing a court petition for temporary custody violated state law, neither the seven-day delay before obtaining post-deprivation judicial review, nor the seven-day delay before filing a court petition, violated appellant's federal due process rights.  141 F.3d 927.

  Plaintiff-appellant challenged §667-5 as violating the due process clause; district court's dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim because the sale was a purely private remedy and involved no state action, affirmed.  324 F.3d 1091.

  While defendants were denied summary judgment in the district court's proceedings on the merits of plaintiffs' due process claim in a 42 U.S.C. §1983 lawsuit seeking damages for "over detention", defendants were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because the duty of defendants to review plaintiffs' original court records beyond what was in plaintiffs' institutional file was not clearly established; district court's denial of summary judgment to defendants as to the issue of qualified immunity vacated and remanded.  663 F.3d 1094 (2011).

  The definition of "advertisement" under §11-302 was not unconstitutionally vague, where the court agreed with the campaign spending commission that the definition was sufficiently precise without a limiting construction and therefore declined to adopt one.  786 F.3d 1182 (2015).

  The definitions of "expenditure" and "noncandidate committee" under §11-302 were not unconstitutionally vague, where the court adopted the campaign spending commission's proffered construction of the term "influence" in the definitions to refer only to "communications or activities that constitute express advocacy or its functional equivalent".  786 F.3d 1182 (2015).

  Where plaintiff argued that defendants' decision to deny plaintiff's student teaching application constituted constructive dismissal from the program and deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally protected interest in remaining in the program, defendants provided plaintiff with adequate process.  Defendants' denial of the application satisfied the due process requirements set forth in Horowitz; defendants fully informed plaintiff of the faculty's dissatisfaction with plaintiff's performance and the decision was careful and deliberate.  813 F.3d 850 (2015).

  Appellate court rejected petitioner's challenges to the creation of the post-conviction record and to the intermediate court of appeals' (ICA) reliance on the facts found on remand, where the ICA remanded petitioner's case to develop the record on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (IAAC) claim.  Because the State failed to argue the independent IAAC issue specifically and distinctly, it waived its challenge to the district court's grant of relief on IAAC for failure to raise the Brooks claim.  825 F.3d 1103 (2016).

  Where petitioner argued that the intermediate court of appeals' (ICA) rejection of petitioner's "forced testimony" claim involved an unreasonable application of Brooks v. Tennessee, the ICA's rejection of the Brooks claim was not objectively unreasonable; fairminded jurists could disagree on the state court's decision for at least three reasons.  825 F.3d 1103 (2016).

  Plaintiffs' interlocutory appeal dismissed as moot, where plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction solely to prevent defendants from undertaking certain voter registration activities and from calling or holding racially-exclusive elections for Native Hawaiians.  Given the changed circumstances, the court could not provide any effective relief sought in the preliminary injunction request; also, the appeal did not fall within an exception to the mootness doctrine.  835 F.3d 1003 (2016).

  Court concluded that qualified immunity was not available to defendant, an off-duty police officer hired by hotel to provide security for a party and who conceded to acting under the color of state law in helping to detain plaintiff, who trespassed the party.  Defendant failed to show: (1) a "firmly rooted" tradition of immunity for off-duty or special duty police officers acting as private security guards; and (2) the policies underpinning qualified immunity warranted invoking the doctrine.  Defendant was not serving a public, governmental function while being paid by the hotel to provide private security.  869 F.3d 771 (2017).

  District court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant, an off-duty police officer hired by hotel to provide security for a party, on plaintiff's due process claim, where  plaintiff contended that because defendant detained and prevented plaintiff from leaving the party, defendant had a duty to intervene once the hotel security guards began assaulting plaintiff.  Court held that a reasonable jury could find defendant liable for failure to intercede, in that defendant engaged in affirmative conduct that exposed plaintiff to forseeable harm, or that defendant showed deliberate indifference in presence of known danger created by defendant's conduct.  As a trained police officer, defendant should have known the guards were overreacting and exposing plaintiff to injury.  869 F.3d 771 (2017).

  Re applicability of due process to out-of-state prison transfers.  387 F. Supp. 912; 396 F. Supp. 196.

  Denying public employment eligibility by erroneous interpretation of law, deprived person of due process.  402 F. Supp. 84.

  Courts are not immune from prohibition against taking without compensation.  402 F. Supp. 95.

  Re court's relocation of private land boundary without due process.  402 F. Supp. 95.

  Law regarding filing of notice of lis pendens held not an unconstitutional seizure of property without due process.  418 F. Supp. 695.

  A prisoner's right to classification hearing before an impartial board, as granted by state correction's regulations, cannot be arbitrarily abrogated.  421 F. Supp. 83.

  Garnishment procedures which do not provide safeguards against improper garnishment of AFDC (assistance) grants deny due process.  431 F. Supp. 1369.

  Mandatory union service fees collected from teachers not belonging to union cannot be used for political purposes.  437 F. Supp. 368.

  Several provisions of state statutes regarding emergency and nonemergency admission to psychiatric facility violated due process.  438 F. Supp. 1106.

  Hawaii may not change its laws governing property rights of riparian landowners to use of water without compensating owners for lost rights.  441 F. Supp. 559.

  In dispute over water rights, a supreme court decision rendered without affording parties a hearing, held to violate procedural due process.  441 F. Supp. 559.

  Since prison authorities are granted practically unlimited discretion to transfer state prisoners and the regulations do not provide standards limiting such discretion, defendant does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest against transfer.  459 F. Supp. 473.

  Action of supreme court decreeing that property seaward of vegetation line belonged to public deprived owners of due process because there was no hearing on title and it was a radical departure from prior law.  460 F. Supp. 473.

  Parents' right to give their child any name they wish is protected from arbitrary state action.  466 F. Supp. 714.

  Law providing for affidavit method of postjudgment garnishment of wages not unconstitutional.  467 F. Supp. 544.

  "Public use" includes "public interest".  471 F. Supp. 871.

  Parental tort liability statute did not contain irrebuttable presumption.  529 F. Supp. 294.

  Ex parte appointment of receiver did not constitute taking of property without due process.  547 F. Supp. 988.

  Violated by §657-11, which discriminates against actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983.  574 F. Supp. 1510.

  Alleged conduct of police officers truly "shocks the conscience" and offends "the concept of ordered liberty", and thus violates strictures of substantive due process.  584 F. Supp. 356.

  Applicability of "void for vagueness" doctrine; does not apply to county charter provision allocating governmental power.  623 F. Supp. 657.

  Zoning and land use regulations for Queen's Beach rationally related to valid planning goals; landowner not entitled to procedural due process with respect to enactment of zoning regulations, which are legislative acts; landowner and prospective developer did not have vested property rights pursuant to general plan and detailed land use map, thus, passage of restrictive zoning did not deny them due process.  649 F. Supp. 926.

  No denial of due process where the unauthorized wrongful act is not sanctioned by any established state procedure and the state law provides a realistic means for the plaintiff to be made whole.  694 F. Supp. 738.

  Only the United States Supreme Court is empowered to review state court judgments.  735 F. Supp. 963.

  No due process liberty interest in parole is created under §§353-68 and 353-69; inmate had due process liberty interest at stake at misconduct hearing.  795 F. Supp. 1020.

  Forcing inmates to choose between law library time and outdoor exercise unconstitutional; liberty interest not created by prison regulation governing when officials could administratively segregate inmates.  816 F. Supp. 1501.

  Regulation regarding classification of inmates, acting in conjunction with language of classification scoring system, created protectable liberty interest.  Prison policy concerning inmate access to courts, legal services, and legal materials did not create a protectable liberty interest.  Inmate's claim based on prison policy regarding participation in employment was without merit; while regulation may create protectable interest, inmate offered no evidence that inmate had been denied the right to participate in activities described in the section.  823 F. Supp. 750.

  Any claim based on takings clause of Fourteenth Amendment lacked merit, regarding state mooring regulations; the regulations did not affect plaintiffs in a manner that implicated Fourteenth Amendment.  823 F. Supp. 766.

  Where plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated their constitutional rights to due process by depriving them of their dwelling without constitutionally adequate process, plaintiffs received adequate due process.  832 F. Supp. 1399.

  Where plaintiff alleged that condominium lease-to-fee ordinance violated plaintiff's substantive due process rights, ordinance was a rational exercise of legislative power. 832 F. Supp. 1404.

  Defendants granted summary judgment on plaintiff's procedural and substantive due process claims, where plaintiff contended that testing of Hawaiian terms and the lack of notice thereof constituted a violation of a protected liberty interest without due process; first-time applicant for a surveyor's license had no protected property interest in the license.  846 F. Supp. 1411.

  Police officers would have violated plaintiff's due process rights by demonstrating deliberate indifference to plaintiff's need in failing to take plaintiff to receive medical care, assuming the facts as plaintiff stated them.  872 F. Supp. 746.

  Neither prison's grooming standards nor memorandum regarding enforcement of grooming policy created a protected liberty interest; enforcement of grooming standards did not impose sufficiently "atypical or significant hardship" to justify due process protection.  902 F. Supp. 1220.

  Plaintiff's due process claims against state hospital superintendent, registered nurse, and paramedical assistant, based on defendants' use of force, barred as to superintendent and nurse in their individual capacities by doctrine of qualified immunity.  909 F. Supp. 737.

  Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction denied, where defendant based in California had taken action in Hawaii whereby it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, facts established a prima facie case that but for defendant's activities in Hawaii, plaintiffs' claims would never have arisen, and defendant had not presented any argument that factors rendered jurisdiction unreasonable (court found factors favored exercise of personal jurisdiction).  980 F. Supp. 1134.

  Elements for specific jurisdiction, discussed, where defendants filed motion to dismiss complaint based on court's lack of personal jurisdiction in case containing causes of action sounding in both tort and contract.  980 F. Supp. 1362.

  Correctional facility's law library access policy was reasonable, provided meaningful access to the courts, and did not violate the Constitution.  938 F. Supp. 650.

  Section 353-14 (1987) provided Hawai`i paroling authority board [sic] with complete discretion to assess inmates' needs and to award "gate money" as necessary in light of those needs; thus, no protected property interest existed.  The right to "gate money" not so fundamental as to warrant constitutional protection apart from its status under state law.  940 F. Supp. 1523.

  Where the court construed allegations of plaintiff (who previously held a position at correctional facility), to, at most, state a claim for negligence on the part of correctional facility officials in failing to provide plaintiff with a personal security guard, even in accepting these allegations as true, plaintiff failed to state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983.  25 F. Supp. 2d 1124.

  Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim granted, where, inter alia, it appeared plaintiff was asserting a federal constitutional right to be free from bad faith prosecution.  45 F. Supp. 2d 794.

  Student suspended from school for violating Act 90, L 1996 (§302A-1134.5(a)), which prohibited possession of alcohol while attending school, where student allegedly participated in consumption of alcohol at student's home prior to school luau in violation of school's zero tolerance policy under Act 90.  Plaintiffs' (student's parents) motion for preliminary injunctive relief granted in part and denied in part where, among other things, it was very likely that plaintiffs would prevail on merits of claim that defendants violated due process requirements when they allegedly punished student without evidence that student violated Act 90; and plaintiffs very likely to prevail on merits of claim that if student's conduct fell within Act 90, due process violated because the statute was too vague.  84 F. Supp. 2d 1113.

  Court had personal jurisdiction over defendants, where plaintiff, allegedly a resident of Hawaii for almost thirteen years, filed complaint in response to article written by a defendant who resided in New York, and published by a newspaper distributed primarily in New York city metropolitan area.  87 F. Supp. 2d 1060.

  Where plaintiff, terminated OHA chief financial officer, claimed that defendants, OHA administrator and trustee, in individual capacities, unlawfully deprived plaintiff of plaintiff's property and liberty without due process of law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, defendants' motion for summary judgment granted with prejudice as to these claims.  120 F. Supp. 2d 1244.

  Sufficient minimum contacts existed to give rise to specific in personam jurisdiction where, inter alia, a parent corporation with control over a local facility had purposefully availed itself into the jurisdiction and invoked the benefits and protections of the State's laws.  140 F. Supp. 2d 1062.

  Having created a permit structure for commercial vessels, having issued and reissued such permits in the past, and having promised plaintiff renewal, division of boating and ocean recreation violated the due process clause by summarily withholding the promised "vessel moored elsewhere" permit for reasons that were undisclosed or tested through a fair administrative hearing process.  195 F. Supp. 2d 1157.

  Two per cent use fee did not violate right to substantive due process of plaintiff, a corporation engaged in offering boating excursions from state boating facilities on the island of Kauai.  195 F. Supp. 2d 1157.

  Federal due process requirements discussed, where defendants' motion to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction denied; plaintiff (an Oregon citizen) met plaintiff's burden of demonstrating that the court had specific jurisdiction over each defendant (California citizens) as to each claim.  283 F. Supp. 2d 1128.

  Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction granted; among other things, those defendants could not have "reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court" in Hawaii by responding to communications from various credit reporting agencies regarding plaintiff's credit status.  293 F. Supp. 2d 1156.

  Defendant insurer was subject to personal jurisdiction, where plaintiff's complaint alleged state law claims arising from insurer's "wrongful and bad-faith denial of its obligations to defend and indemnify" insured and its president against plaintiff's claims; insurer had issued an insurance policy indemnifying insured for liability arising from bodily injury and property damage caused by an occurrence within the coverage territory, and the coverage territory included the United States of America, Puerto Rico, and Canada.  304 F. Supp. 2d 1232.

  Where plaintiff sued defendant for allegedly violating plaintiff's rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, based on defendant's involvement in the removal and subsequent destruction of motorcycles and mopeds in the area of plaintiff's motorcycle repair shop, genuine issues of material fact existed and precluded the court from determining whether defendant was entitled to qualified immunity under federal law.  333 F. Supp. 2d 942.

  Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction granted as to their due process claim, where plaintiffs asked the court to require defendants to, inter alia, refrain from failing to protect plaintiffs from anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender peer harassment and abuse at a secure juvenile correctional facility.  415 F. Supp. 2d 1129.

  Specific jurisdiction test discussed, where court denied nonresident defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  416 F. Supp. 2d 948.

  Where plaintiff contended that enforcement of §§134-6 and 134-9 violated plaintiff's individual right to carry a gun and right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted for violation of plaintiff's due process rights and dismissal of the claim was warranted.  548 F. Supp. 2d 1151.

  Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction denied; among other things, defendant had purposefully availed itself of the forum by installing retarders in custom built vehicles which it knew were to be used in Hawaii, the alleged malfunctioning of which caused harm in this State.  556 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (2008).

  Plaintiff, a nonprofit health maintenance organization, did not state a valid due process claim, where plaintiff alleged that defendants deprived it of a liberty/property interest without due process of law when defendants removed plaintiff's "automatic eligibility conferred by federal law ... to receive a contract" regarding the QUEST expanded access program.  567 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (2008).

  Ordinance that repealed chapter 38, Revised Ordinances of Honolulu, which allowed owners of long-term leasehold interests to convert them into fee interests through the city and county of Honolulu's eminent domain power, did not violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights.  630 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (2009).

  Plaintiff made a prima facie case that the court had specific personal jurisdiction over defendant; the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with due process and defendant's contacts with Hawaii, as alleged and evidenced by plaintiff, satisfied Hawaii's long-arm statute (§634-35).  664 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (2008).

  Defendants failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that they were entitled, either factually or legally, to summary judgment as a matter of law on the merits of a due process claim, in a 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights lawsuit brought by a former state prisoner and other allegedly similarly-situated plaintiffs primarily seeking damages for "over detention".  678 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (2010).

  Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's equal protection and due process claims denied, where defendants claimed, among other things, that:  (1) the circuit court and the liquor commission had primary jurisdiction; and (2) plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that it was treated differently than similarly situated individuals.  Defendants' motion to stay proceedings pending the resolution of plaintiff's appeals of the liquor commission's decisions currently before the circuit court, granted.  681 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (2009).

  Defendant social worker was not entitled to qualified immunity because defendant did not have specific, articulable evidence that provided reasonable cause to believe that the subject child was in imminent danger of abuse before defendant took custody of the child; the lack of exigency would have been apparent to any reasonable social worker and defendant violated plaintiffs' clearly established Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by taking custody of the child without a warrant.  683 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (2009).

  Defendants' motion for summary judgment granted on plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim where defendant police officers and public safety aids were not subjectively aware of decedent pre-trial detainee's serious medical needs, and were therefore not deliberately indifferent to detainee, and did not violate the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights; defendants' subjective knowledge that detainee could have been monitored more closely or thoroughly was not commensurate with the subjective knowledge that the detainee faced a substantial risk due to a lack of close or thorough monitoring.  727 F. Supp. 2d 898 (2010).

  Summary judgment denied to two defendant police officers and one defendant public safety aid on plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim where a reasonable factfinder could find that defendants were deliberately indifferent to decedent pre-trial detainee's serious medical needs in violation of detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights; also, defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable fact finder could conclude that defendants were subjectively aware of and disregarded a substantial risk to detainee's health.  727 F. Supp. 2d 898 (2010).

  Section 481B-14 was not unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process; moreover, §481B-14 did not deny defendant hotel and resort employer due process because it did not automatically transform the service charges in question into the property of plaintiff hotel employees, who sought unpaid wages, because it permitted defendant the option of disclosing to customers that the service charges would not be paid to employees.  810 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (2011).

  Plaintiff physician had presented evidence that, under the circumstances, defendant hospital's decision to adopt a closed-department model for its radiation oncology department was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious because it was part of an attempt to eliminate all competition in the radiation oncology field in Hawaii; for the purposes of plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order, or in the alternative, for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff physician was reasonably likely to succeed on the merits of plaintiff's due process claim.  861 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (2012).

  Defendant police chief was entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff firearm permit applicant's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims for monetary damages for alleged violations of plaintiff's Second Amendment right to bear arms and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process right because a reasonable official in defendant's circumstances would not have understood that defendant's conduct violated a right that was clearly established at the time of the denial of plaintiff's permit; §134-7, on which the denial was based, had not been invalidated by case or legislative action.  869 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (2012).

  Plaintiff firearm permit applicant's allegations that:  (1) plaintiff was deprived of plaintiff's fundamental constitutional right to bear operational firearms and ammunition as guaranteed by the Second Amendment; and (2) plaintiff was wrongfully denied a permit under §134-2 without being afforded minimal due process protection such as a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to have the decision reviewed, were sufficient to state a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for denial of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  869 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (2012).

  It was "reasonable and readily apparent" that the court narrowly construed relevant Hawaii campaign provisions and interpreted the terms "to influence" and "for the purpose of influencing" in the definitions of "noncandidate committee" and "expenditure" in §11-302 as referring to express advocacy or its functional equivalent; so construed, the meaning of "influence" was "considerably more precise", and "ensur[ed] that persons of average intelligence will have reasonable notice of the provisions' coverage" so as not to offend due process.  872 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (2012).

  The definition of "advertisement" in §11-302, which was narrowly construed by the court and used the wording "advocates or supports the nomination, opposition, or election of the candidate", was not unconstitutionally vague.  872 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (2012).

  Hawaii's marriage laws (§572-1 and article I, §23 of the state constitution), which define marriage as a union between a man and a woman, are rationally related to legitimate government interests and do not violate the due process clause.  884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (2012).

  Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction granted, where plaintiff did not meet its burden of showing that defendant, an Idaho corporation not licensed to do business in Hawaii, had the minimum contacts with Hawaii necessary for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant.  887 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (2012).

  Plaintiff, a graduate student, was likely to succeed on the merits of plaintiff's due process claim where, among other things, amended letter from defendant, the university director of judicial affairs, deprived plaintiff of a meaningful opportunity to respond to allegations against plaintiff and plaintiff did attempt to respond to the allegations or to otherwise participate in the process.  927 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (2013).

  A probationary police officer does not have a property interest in continued employment, and the kind of procedural and substantive due process rights plaintiff described simply did not attach to plaintiff's job.  937 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (2013).

  Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction denied; among other things, defendant, which manufactured high pressure turbine blades, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Hawaii with respect to plaintiff's negligence, strict liability, and negligent misrepresentation claims.  942 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (2013).

  Even if defendant, an employee of Hawaii Island Humane Society, had violated plaintiff's due process rights to notice, qualified immunity still applied because plaintiff's rights were not "clearly established" at the time of the violation.  947 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (2013).

  Summary judgment granted to defendants county of Hawaii, Hawaii Island Humane Society (HIHS), HIHS executive director, and HIHS officer as to plaintiff's constitutional claims.  Among other things, because state tort remedies may provide adequate post-deprivation relief, the HIHS defendants did not violate plaintiff's procedural due process rights.  947 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (2013).

  Summary judgment granted to defendants county of Hawaii, Hawaii Island Humane Society (HIHS), HIHS executive director, and HIHS officer as to plaintiff's constitutional claims.  Among other things, HIHS defendants did not take conscious action to deprive plaintiff of plaintiff's property in violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights; rather, defendants passively agreed to plaintiff's agents' decision to transfer the dogs through the general power of attorney and animal surrender policy form.  947 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (2013).

  Summary judgment granted to defendants county of Hawaii, Hawaii Island Humane Society (HIHS), HIHS executive director, and HIHS officer as to plaintiff's constitutional claims.  Among other things, as to plaintiff's substantive due process claim, HIHS defendants' decision regarding whether to honor a form submitted by plaintiff's purported agents was not the type of "egregious official conduct" that is "arbitrary in the constitutional sense", and their actions did not fall within the category of "the large concerns of the governors and the governed" that due process attempts to address.  947 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (2013).

  Plaintiff's rejection of all offered alternative public schools, in lieu of no schooling, did not constitute a deprivation of education.  Accordingly, plaintiffs were not deprived of a constitutionally-protected property interest in public education, and were not entitled to any procedural due process protections in connection with minor plaintiff's expulsion from defendant charter school.  950 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (2013).

  Plaintiff did not establish that plaintiff had a liberty or property interest under the Second Amendment that would trigger due process protection.  976 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).

  Where plaintiff asserted violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and plaintiff's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and under 5 U.S.C. §7701(c)(2)(A):  (1) because the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) did not have jurisdiction over the nondiscrimination claim, plaintiff's case was not a "mixed case", and any appeal of the jurisdictional determination must be filed in the federal Circuit Court of Appeals, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal of the final MSPB decision pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §7703 and dismissed the due process claims; (2) to the extent that plaintiff relied on a Bivens-style claim, a Bivens suit against a federal official in his or her official capacity would merely be another way of pleading an action against the United States, which would be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; and (3) even assuming that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the due process claims, to the extent that plaintiff asserted any age discrimination claims predicated on the U.S. Constitution, the ADEA's specific, complex procedural provisions provided the exclusive remedy for claims of age discrimination.  997 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (2014).

  Defendants' motion denied to the extent it sought dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, where plaintiff asserted tort and contract claims.  6 F. Supp. 3d 1068 (2014).

  It was contrary to and an unreasonable application of Brooks to remand the case to bolster the record since Kido supported petitioners' valid Brooks claim, and the record was already clear that the Kido exemptions did not apply.  23 F. Supp. 3d 1182 (2014).

  Because plaintiff could not establish a liberty or property interest under the Second Amendment, plaintiff could not establish that plaintiff's due process rights under this Amendment were violated.  Consequently, plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims, predicated on Second and Fourteenth Amendment violations, failed as well.  49 F. Supp. 3d 727 (2014).

  Property owner was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion from relitigating whether the Hawaii Land Use Commission's reclassification of property owner's land from urban to agricultural use violated property owner's due process and equal protection rights, where such issues had previously been decided by the Supreme Court in property owner's related state administrative appeal.  125 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (2015).

  Where plaintiff asserted that plaintiff's due process rights were violated when defendant seized plaintiff's protest signs without a hearing, county ordinance's procedures for seizure of personal property left on public property did, in fact, satisfy federal procedural due process.  Safeguards to prevent erroneous deprivation of property included providing written notice twenty-four hours before seizure, providing post-seizure notice describing items seized and location for retrieval, and holding seized items for at least thirty days before destruction.  Pre- or post-seizure hearing would have added little to prevent erroneous deprivation while increasing the administrative burden on government.  125 F. Supp. 3d 1080 (2015).

  Neither nonprofit corporation's proposed election of native Hawaiian delegates to a convention of native Hawaiians to discuss, and possibly organize, a native Hawaiian governing entity nor Act 195, Session Laws of Hawaii 2011, violated plaintiff's equal protection or due process rights under this amendment.  Under 42 U.S.C. §1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the deprivation of a constitutional right occurred under the color of a statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any state.  141 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2015).

  Where, as a pro se criminal defendant, defendant was not permitted to have access to defendant's materials at the start of trial and the trial court failed to provide defendant with the option of continuing the trial, conditioned upon defendant's agreement to waive defendant's right to a speedy trial, especially given that defendant's materials were scheduled to arrive the next day, and compelling defendant to proceed without defendant's materials, defendant was denied defendant's due process right to adequately prepare defendant's defense.  121 H. 339, 219 P.3d 1126 (2009).

  Statute may be so vague as to violate due process.  43 H. 66.

  Ordinance prohibiting use of streets for soliciting sales does not violate due process clause.  43 H. 71.

  No constitutional right to preliminary hearing, and denial of hearing does not affect indictment.  45 H. 604, 372 P.2d 356.

  Generally speaking, public employment does not create property rights subject to the protection of due process.  48 H. 370, 405 P.2d 772.

  Criminal statute must be sufficiently definite, but only a reasonable degree of certainty is required.  49 H. 624, 636-38, 425 P.2d 1014.

  Penal sanctions, effect on requirement of legislative standards for administrative agencies in adoption of regulations.  49 H. 651, 657-58, 426 P.2d 626.

  Regulation of signs for aesthetic reasons not a denial of due process.  50 H. 33, 429 P.2d 825.

  Conduct of trial judge in examining and discrediting witnesses called by defendant may violate requirements of fair trial and due process.  50 H. 287, 439 P.2d 666.

  An ordinance proscribing "presence" at a cockfight is too vague to satisfy requirement of due process.  50 H. 384, 441 P.2d 333.

  Law providing for service of summons on nonresident motorist by publication does not violate due process clause.  50 H. 484, 443 P.2d 155.

  Trial by jury composed only of jurors meeting three-year residence qualification not denial of due process.  51 H. 195, 456 P.2d 805.

  Notice by publication provided by §531-14 was constitutionally insufficient by itself and should have been supplemented by notice by mail or personal service.  52 H. 145, 472 P.2d 494.

  Public employees seeking accidental disability retirement benefits are entitled to hearing on contested issues before board of trustees.  52 H. 212, 473 P.2d 866.

  Law imposing on private employers obligation to pay their employees for service on juries and public boards, constituted taking.  52 H. 327, 475 P.2d 679.

  Defendant in criminal proceedings is entitled to fair hearing on objections to appointed counsel.  52 H. 484, 479 P.2d 207.

  Law is void for vagueness when it neither gives fair notice of what conduct is prohibited nor prescribes fixed standards for adjudging guilt of accused.  52 H. 527, 480 P.2d 148.

  Law making presence in barricaded place a crime, was too vague and overly broad.  52 H. 604, 483 P.2d 997.

  Law together with other sections of part II, chapter 709, was invalid for failing to require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  53 H. 40, 487 P.2d 283.

  Right of accused to be convicted only upon proof by prosecution of all elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt is constitutionally protected.  53 H. 110, 488 P.2d 322.

  Prejudicial conduct of prosecutor in presenting case to grand jury violates due process.  53 H. 226, 491 P.2d 1089.

  Admitting evidence of prior convictions to impeach criminal defendant's credibility imposes unreasonable burden on defendant's right to testify; §621-22 unconstitutional.  53 H. 254, 492 P.2d 657.

  Prosecutor's deliberate misrepresentation of law or fact which denies a defendant fair opportunity to prepare for trial may constitute denial of due process.  53 H. 536, 498 P.2d 635.

  Penal statute must clearly define proscribed behavior or it denies due process of law.  54 H. 1, 501 P.2d 363.

  Right to effective counsel in criminal trial.  54 H. 28, 501 P.2d 977.

  Personal jurisdiction over nonresidents--requirement that minimal contacts be such as give rise to or were causally connected with the obligation sought to be enforced in state court.  54 H. 597, 513 P.2d 165.

  Necessity of appointing interpreter for defendant who has difficulty understanding English.  54 H. 637, 513 P.2d 697.

  Honolulu ordinance prohibiting loitering by juveniles is too vague and overbroad.  54 H. 647, 513 P.2d 1385.

  Summary prejudgment garnishment statute is violative of due process as applied to bank accounts.  54 H. 656, 513 P.2d 1390.

  Method of selection of Bishop Estate trustee by supreme court justices not constitutionally defective; beneficiaries have no "property" right in selection process.  55 H. 104, 516 P.2d 1239.

  Mere lack of wisdom in enacting a statute does not render it void under the due process clause.  55 H. 148, 516 P.2d 715.

  Prerequisites for waiver of counsel and acceptance of guilty plea.  55 H. 336, 519 P.2d 892.

  Penal Code's classification of marijuana along with certain mild narcotic compounds not a violation of due process.  56 H. 501, 542 P.2d 366.

  In absence of expectancy of employment, non-tenured faculty does not have property interest in continued employment.  56 H. 680, 548 P.2d 253.

  Law requiring payment of taxes prior to judicial hearing, does not violate due process.  57 H. 1, 548 P.2d 246.

  Admission of irrelevant, prejudicial evidence of other offenses of defendant denies fair trial.  57 H. 17, 548 P.2d 1397.

  Cross-examination of defendant on credibility must be limited to defendant's capacity for truth.  57 H. 17, 548 P.2d 1397.

  Trial judge's prejudicial comments violate right to fair trial.  57 H. 17, 548 P.2d 1397.

  Constitutional errors in criminal trial that are harmless beyond reasonable doubt do not mandate reversal.  57 H. 26, 548 P.2d 1402.

  Convictions based on eyewitness identifications at trial, following a pretrial photograph identification, will be set aside if pretrial identification procedure was so suggestive as to create substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.  57 H. 150, 552 P.2d 357.

  The basic test of state jurisdiction to tax is whether tax bears reasonable fiscal relation to benefits given by the State.  57 H. 175, 554 P.2d 242.

  An accused need not be informed, prior to acceptance of guilty plea, about every collateral effect of a conviction.  57 H. 354, 556 P.2d 577.

  Imposition of both an excise tax on an activity and an ad valorem tax on the value of property did not violate due process.  57 H. 436, 559 P.2d 264.

  Due process not violated by court's refusal to permit certain voir dire questions.  57 H. 492, 559 P.2d 728.

  Statutes may authorize inferences of fact only if there is a natural and rational evidentiary relation between the facts proven and the fact inferred.  57 H. 526, 560 P.2d 110.

  Member of prosecution serving as agent of grand jury violated due process requirement of separation of functions.  57 H. 574, 560 P.2d 1309.

  Refusal by court to permit withdrawal of guilty plea under deferred acceptance of guilty plea procedure was not violative of due process.  58 H. 304, 568 P.2d 1194.

  Effect of news accounts prejudicial to defendant; protective measures required of trial court.  58 H. 356, 569 P.2d 891.

  Defendant's right to be present at all stages of trial; voluntary absence.  58 H. 425, 570 P.2d 848.

  Consideration of hearsay information by court in hearing on waiver of family court jurisdiction over juvenile does not violate due process.  58 H. 522, 574 P.2d 119.

  No duty on State to personally notify individuals of effective date of act.  59 H. 430, 583 P.2d 955.

  Failure of state court to observe procedures to protect defendant from being tried while incompetent to stand trial deprives defendant of due process right to fair trial.  60 H. 17, 586 P.2d 1028.

  State is required to prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  61 H. 308, 603 P.2d 141.

  Pre-trial identification on a one-to-one show up.  62 H. 59, 610 P.2d 502.

  "To loiter about" in §445-43 is invalid for vagueness.  62 H. 147, 613 P.2d 354.

  Prosecutorial misconduct before grand jury must be extreme and clearly infringe upon jury's decision making function in order to serve as basis for quashing indictment.  62 H. 209, 614 P.2d 373.

  Defendant who leaves trial voluntarily waives right to be present at trial, which may continue as if defendant were present.  62 H. 309, 615 P.2d 91.

  Hearsay admissible if not deliberately used in place of better evidence to improve case for indictment.  62 H. 518, 616 P.2d 1383.

  Accused's right to a fair trial includes right to present matters in accused's defense, and government may not by its conduct render a material witness unavailable to defendant.  63 H. 27, 620 P.2d 728; 63 H. 34, 620 P.2d 732.

  The notice-of-alibi rule provides the defendant reciprocal right to discover the State's witnesses who will be used to rebut defendant's alibi witnesses and is not violative of due process.  63 H. 191, 624 P.2d 376.

  Lineup of accused and due process rights.  63 H. 354, 628 P.2d 1018.

  Notice provisions of tax lien statute failed to meet minimum standards of due process.  64 H. 4, 635 P.2d 938.

  Specific finding of unfitness need not be made prior to involuntary termination of parental rights.  64 H. 85, 637 P.2d 760.

  No violation in denial by trial court of defendant's request to examine identification witnesses where claim was impermissibly suggestive identification.  64 H. 217, 638 P.2d 324.

  Subjection of Nevada corporation to unemployment compensation contributions did not violate due process.  64 H. 274, 639 P.2d 1088.

  Peddling ordinance was unduly vague.  64 H. 499, 643 P.2d 1058.

  Availability of rehearings process and U.S. Supreme Court review of constitutional violations allegedly created by state supreme court decision provides aggrieved persons adequate opportunity to have arguments considered.  65 H. 641, 658 P.2d 287.

  No denial in summary termination of lease of public land.  66 H. 632, 672 P.2d 1030.

  Retrospective application of §584-7 to case did not violate due process.  67 H. 63, 677 P.2d 468.

  No constitutional right to examine probation officer's sentencing recommendation.  67 H. 408, 689 P.2d 754.

  No violation where civilian agent used to obtain prostitution convictions by engaging in sexual acts with defendants.  67 H. 608, 699 P.2d 983.

  Rational basis exists for treating public assistance recipients differently from other no-fault insurance policyholders.  68 H. 192, 708 P.2d 129.

  Violated where defendant was denied opportunity to challenge reasonableness of agency recommendation regarding restitution.  68 H. 292, 711 P.2d 1295.

  Prosecutorial suppression of favorable material evidence violates due process, regardless of any good faith or bad faith by State; violation where defendant sentenced under attempted murder statute which was not raised until after jury returned guilty verdict.  69 H. 204, 738 P.2d 812.

  Shackling of defendant during trial, discussed.  69 H. 633, 756 P.2d 1033.

  Not violated by proceedings conducted by city council when acting upon Shoreline Management Act permit.  70 H. 361, 773 P.2d 250.

  Violated where counselor of victim-witness was allowed to place hands upon victim's shoulders while victim was testifying.  70 H. 472, 777 P.2d 240.

  Bifurcating two methods of proof for the same offense into separate trials violated defendant's rights.  70 H. 528, 777 P.2d 1187.

  Plaintiff failed to show existence of clearly established substantive due process right in continued enrollment in university program under 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim where defendants raised defense of qualified immunity.  72 H. 586, 825 P.2d 1060.

  Claim that failure to call expert witnesses to rebut State's DNA profiling evidence introduced at motion in limine constituted ineffective assistance of counsel was meritless.  73 H. 130, 828 P.2d 1274.

  Counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise contention that defendant had not waived right to be present at trial where defendant had voluntarily absented oneself after trial had begun.  73 H. 147, 828 P.2d 281.

  Claim brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 that exchange of ceded lands by State violated right to due process was barred by statute of limitations and res judicata.  73 H. 578, 837 P.2d 1247.

  Right not violated by defendant's absence from conference settling jury instructions as conference does not involve jury's presence or witness testimony.  74 H. 141, 838 P.2d 1374.

  Requires unbiased administrative adjudicators; no violation where §88-77 trustees not shown to have pecuniary or institutional disqualifying interest in adjudication.  74 H. 181, 840 P.2d 367.

  Written notice of specific charges not required for §710-1077(1)(a) direct summary criminal contempt case; contemnor's misconduct and judge's response did not require contempt trial before different judge.  74 H. 267, 842 P.2d 255.

  Section 707-716 not unconstitutional where threats sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution.  75 H. 398, 862 P.2d 1063.

  Post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel HRPP rule 40 petition not prejudiced where defendant alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle defendant to relief and claim is not patently frivolous and without trace of support on the record.  75 H. 419, 864 P.2d 583.

  Third-party agreements homestead lessees entered into with third party non-Hawaiian farmers could not be considered property interests.  76 H. 128, 870 P.2d 1272.

  Circuit court did not commit an abuse of discretion in granting defendant's motion for new trial; circuit court's conclusions of law that possible juror misconduct at voir dire and juror misconduct during deliberations deprived defendant of a trial by twelve fair and impartial jurors not clearly erroneous.  76 H. 172, 873 P.2d 51.

  Because appellants had been afforded an adequate opportunity to challenge the fine assessed by department of land utilization on appeal--at both administrative and judicial levels--before they incurred any obligation to pay it, the application of the procedural mechanism set forth in section of land use ordinance had not violated their right to due process of law.  77 H. 168, 883 P.2d 629.

  Hawaiian Homes Commission Act beneficiaries on pastoral waiting list were entitled to contested case hearings at which Hawaiian homes commission must at least consider their applications for pastoral lot awards of sufficient acreage (within statutory limits) for commercial ranching activities.  78 H. 192, 891 P.2d 279.

  Presumption of nonconsent imposed on appellant a burden of persuasion of the nonexistence of an essential element of the crime with which appellant was charged; so construed, the presumption would violate due process clauses of Fourteenth Amendment and article I, §5 of Hawai`i constitution by virtue of improperly shifting burden of proof to appellant.  78 H. 262, 892 P.2d 455.

  Reversible error where jury may have reached verdict by improperly shifting burden of proof from prosecution to defense by concluding that defendant had not established defendant's claim of extreme mental or emotional distress before considering whether prosecution had disproved that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 80 H. 172, 907 P.2d 758.

  Section 703-309(1) not unconstitutionally vague as it describes with sufficient clarity level of force that may be justifiably used in discipline of a minor.  81 H. 5, 911 P.2d 725.

  Defendant received adequate notice that consecutive sentences may be imposed by sentencing court where court had that discretion by statute, and plain language of §706-668.5 informed defendant that defendant may be sentenced to consecutive sentences.  81 H. 309, 916 P.2d 1210.

  No facial violation of substantive due process by repeal of court reporter temporary certification rule as right to work not a fundamental right and certification requirement rationally furthers legitimate state interest in ensuring efficient administration of justice.  82 H. 329, 922 P.2d 942.

  No procedural violation where plaintiffs received prior notice and "opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner" prior to repeal of court reporter temporary certification rule.  82 H. 329, 922 P.2d 942.

  No violation of substantive due process by repeal of court reporter temporary certification rule where board did not apply rule to appellants in arbitrary or unreasonable manner or in a manner that had no substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.  82 H. 329, 922 P.2d 942.

  Defendant's due process right to fair hearing violated where circuit court refused to allow defendant's witness to offer relevant testimony in support of defendant's motion to suppress evidence.  83 H. 229, 925 P.2d 797.

  In the context of Child Protective Act proceedings involving parents neither resident nor domiciled in Hawaii, personal jurisdiction may not be exercised over a parent pursuant to §587-11 to terminate their parental rights unless due process requirements are satisfied.  83 H. 367, 926 P.2d 1290.

  Water commission's failure to hold contested case hearing on water management area designation pursuant to chapter 174C did not deny aquifer water user procedural due process.  83 H. 484, 927 P.2d 1367.

  Section 704-415 does not violate due process principles; at release hearing, insanity acquittee bears burden of proving by preponderance of evidence freedom from mental illness and dangerous propensities.  84 H. 269, 933 P.2d 606.

  In products liability action, cumulative effect of three alleged errors by trial court did not deny defendants right to fair trial where overwhelming and substantial evidence supported jury's verdict.  86 H. 214, 948 P.2d 1055.

  Prosecution's use of pre-scripted questions and answers in connection with its grand jury witnesses, called in a proceeding resulting in indictment of defendant, did not violate defendant's right by invading province of grand jury or induce unwarranted action by the grand jurors.  86 H. 282, 949 P.2d 122.

  Section 134-8 not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad on its face or as applied to defendant for "possession of a bomb".  87 H. 71, 951 P.2d 934.

  Although appellant was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who had testified at a public hearing but not before the zoning board of appeals, error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  87 H. 217, 953 P.2d 1315.

  Director's exposure to materials outside the record constitutionally harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as director expressly declined to consider material in rendering decision.  87 H. 217, 953 P.2d 1315.

  Definition of "sexual contact" in §707-700 not unconstitutionally overbroad as it does not interfere with the constitutionally protected activity of nude dancing; section permits dancing in the nude and allows customers to look at performers dancing in the nude; the conduct prohibited is the touching of sexual or intimate parts.  88 H. 19, 960 P.2d 1227.

  Definition of "sexual contact" in §707-700 not void for vagueness as it establishes a bright line rule "you can look but you can't touch", gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited, constitutes an explicit standard that avoids arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and is not subjective.  88 H. 19, 960 P.2d 1227.

  Arrestee's right not violated by administrative driver's license revocation office's practice under §286-259 of denying all prehearing subpoena requests for witnesses other than law enforcement officials submitting sworn statements.  88 H. 55, 961 P.2d 620.

  A trial court must pass on a defendant's attempted withdrawal of the prior waiver of his or her right to testify, tendered before the commencement of closing arguments, pursuant to the "liberal approach", whereas such an attempted withdrawal tendered thereafter is subject to the "manifest injustice" standard.  88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

  Where defendant did not meet burden of establishing plausible and legitimate reasons for withdrawal of defendant's prior waiver of defendant's right to testify, defendant failed to present "fair and just reasons" for defendant's request to exercise defendant's right to testify in defendant's own behalf; thus trial court did not abuse discretion by ruling that it would not reopen case.  88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

  Where trial court's denial of defendant's post-verdict motion for a new trial--based on defendant's claim that defendant's attempt to withdraw defendant's waiver of right to testify in defendant's own behalf should have been allowed--was not "manifestly unjust", no abuse of discretion.  88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

  Not violated by county's retroactive change, by ordinance, in property tax classification of time share units where county enacted ordinance to create uniformity in tax treatment of time share units, established a reasonable period of retroactivity of only six months, appellant did not acquire a vested right in a specific tax rate and no evidence that appellant would have been entitled to a refund had ordinance not been passed.  90 H. 334, 978 P.2d 772.

  Where an owner's right to a hearing subsequent to impoundment of a derelict vessel was not clearly established under §§200-48, 200-49, or other law at the time of state boating officers' actions, it was not unreasonable for officers to have believed it was lawful to dispose of vessel without a hearing; thus officers, in individual capacities, entitled to qualified immunity in 42 U.S.C. §1983 action.  91 H. 1, 979 P.2d 586.

  Where trial court erred by ruling that evidence of defendant's eligibility for HUD assistance was irrelevant under HRE rule 401 and thus inadmissible under rule 402 when evidence was probative of and relevant to defendant's requisite intent, defendant's right to present a complete defense violated.  91 H. 275, 982 P.2d 904.

  Three separate findings required by trial court before criminal defendant may constitutionally be involuntarily medicated with antipsychotic drugs, where it is alleged that the medication is necessary because the defendant poses a danger to himself or herself or others.  91 H. 319, 984 P.2d 78.

  Out-of-state attorneys, who were granted pro hac vice status, not denied procedural due process prior to revocation of status and imposition of sanctions where three separate oral notices were given to one attorney and to local counsel.  91 H. 372, 984 P.2d 1198.

  Right not violated where defendant failed to supply any evidence that prosecution acted in bad faith when it "inadvertently" destroyed evidence.  93 H. 87, 997 P.2d 13.

  Adverse party's right to fair tribunal in contested case hearing before water resource management commission not violated by land and natural resources department chairperson also serving as chairperson of water resource management commission under §174C-7(b) where legislature deemed it appropriate for one person to serve in both capacities and could override common law doctrine of incompatible offices which prohibited a person from serving in a dual capacity.  94 H. 97, 9 P.3d 409.

  Department of land and natural resources chairperson's dual status as chairperson of the water resource management commission and the department did not constitute a reversible due process violation where, although chairperson should have been precluded from presiding over the hearing, objecting party did not seek chairperson's disqualification, and where chairperson's disqualification would have prevented commission from acting on the case for lack of quorum, the "rule of necessity" demanded that chairperson preside over the hearing.  94 H. 97, 9 P.3d 409.

  Petitioners' right not violated, and water resource management commission's decision not invalidated by governor's remarks about merits of case where governor's comments arose in public forums apart from commission's proceedings, and, as there was no evidence of direct communication by the governor with the decisionmakers, petitioners failed to demonstrate the requisite nexus between the external political pressure and the actual decisionmaker.  94 H. 97, 9 P.3d 409.

  Petitioners' right not violated by attorney general simultaneously representing two state agencies and the water resource management commission, where dismissal of commission's deputy attorney general effectively cured the conflict of interest and petitioners failed to show that dismissal impaired commission's ability to decide case competently and impartially.  94 H. 97, 9 P.3d 409.

  Where department of land and natural resources was a party in a contested case proceeding before the water resource management commission, constitutional mandate that tribunal be impartial precluded chairperson of the commission, who was also chairperson of the department, from presiding over the hearing.  94 H. 97, 9 P.3d 409.

  Right not violated by district court affirming administrative driver's license revocation office's denial of motorist's request for continuance of driver's license revocation hearing where administrative driver's license revocation office properly considered the evidence before it at the time of the administrative hearing and imposed the statutorily mandated revocation period.  94 H. 232, 11 P.3d 457.

  Section 706-657 not unconstitutionally vague as section provides adequate guidance to a fact-finder charged with determining whether a murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity" and provides adequate notice to the person of ordinary intelligence that an enhanced sentence may be imposed if he or she intentionally or knowingly inflicts unnecessary torture on the murder victim and the victim in fact suffers unnecessary torture.  95 H. 1, 18 P.3d 203.

  Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for pre-indictment delay where defendant did not demonstrate that defendant's alleged loss of memory, loss of potential witnesses and evidence, or failure of police to tape record defendant's confession caused substantial prejudice to defendant's right to a fair trial.  97 H. 170, 35 P.3d 197.

  Juror questioning of witnesses did not deprive defendant of fair and impartial trial where questions posed by jurors were carefully reviewed by the trial court and questions tending to elicit improper or inadmissible evidence were excluded.  97 H. 206, 35 P.3d 233.

  The right to a public trial is not implicated by the exclusion of a potential witness pursuant to the witness exclusionary rule; both the witness exclusionary rule and the right to a public trial ensure the appearance of fairness at trial; thus, defendant's right not violated by exclusion of defendant's father from the courtroom as a potential prosecution rebuttal  witness.  97 H. 206, 35 P.3d 233.

  Trial court abused its discretion in concluding there was manifest necessity for mistrial as circumstances creating apparent need for mistrial did not make it impossible for trial to proceed; in absence of manifest necessity, defendant should have been allowed to choose between continuing with trial or consenting to a mistrial; by moving for dismissal with prejudice, defendant did not "consent" to the mistrial; retrial thus barred by double jeopardy.  97 H. 238, 35 P.3d 755.

  As an aspect of procedural due process, individuals must, as needed, be provided an interpreter at family court proceedings where their parental rights are substantially affected.  99 H. 522, 57 P.3d 447.

  Where family court conducted an in camera review of the complainant's child protection services records and produced the relevant portions to defense counsel, defendant's due process rights not violated; and family court's order to seal the remaining portions of the child protection services file for appellate review did not constitute an abuse of discretion.  101 H. 172, 65 P.3d 119.

  Lost opportunities for concurrent sentencing, parole, and loss of parental rights do not affect a defendant's ability to present an effective defense, and thus do not constitute actual substantial prejudice to a defendant's due process right to a fair trial.  102 H. 183, 74 P.3d 6.

  Where there was no evidence that the trial court either reviewed the reasons for the preindictment delay prior to requiring a showing of actual substantial prejudice to the defendant or required a showing of something less than actual substantial prejudice, the trial court did not misapply the correct standard to be used to determine whether charges should be dismissed for preindictment delay.  102 H. 183, 74 P.3d 6.

  Vexatious litigant's due process right not impacted in present or future cases where litigant was only restrained from bringing unmeritorious litigation, which could be restricted in any event; as trial court held a hearing to review litigant's objections to prefiling order, order imposed on litigant under §634J-7 satisfied procedural due process because it afforded litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard.  102 H. 289, 75 P.3d 1180.

  Section 663-15.5 adequately protects a non-settling joint tortfeasor's right to procedural due process; subsections (b) and (c) afford a non-settling joint tortfeasor notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the determination whether a settlement has been given in good faith and, consequently, bars cross-claims for contribution against the settling joint tortfeasor.  102 H. 399, 77 P.3d 83.

  No prosecutorial misconduct by prosecutor's questions and remarks regarding defendant's failure to "explain away" the DNA evidence as questions and remarks were more analogous to legitimate prosecutorial comment on the state of the evidence and not the improper shifting of the burden of proof onto the defendant.  103 H. 38, 79 P.3d 131.

  Where defendant's statements were not the product of "interrogation", but, rather, were "volunteered confessions or admissions, obtained independent of express police questioning or its functional equivalent", defendant's constitutional rights against self-incrimination and due process of law not violated.  104 H. 224, 87 P.3d 893.

  Appellants were not deprived of any identifiable property interest by the registration of an apprenticeship program, under chapter 372, initiated by the union, so as to invoke due process protections by way of a contested case hearing.  104 H. 275, 88 P.3d 647.

  Where lease was executed in contravention of chapter 343, power plant developers were not "existing Hawaiian homes commission act lessees"; trial court's decision that the lease was void did not deprive developers of any interest they were entitled to under the law.  106 H. 270, 103 P.3d 939.

  Applying the covered loss deductible under §431:10C-301.5 to plaintiff's recovery of underinsured motorist benefits did not violate plaintiff's right to substantive due process as the legislature's policy determination to enact this section to reduce one of the costs of the motor vehicle insurance system was expressly within the constitutional purview of the legislature.  106 H. 511, 107 P.3d 440.

  Assuming that possession of leased premises and rent to be paid into the trust fund are property interests protected under the due process clause, §666-21 does not offend due process as tenants are afforded an opportunity to challenge summary possession and motions for the establishment of a rent trust fund.  107 H. 73, 110 P.3d 397.

  In securing hearings, administrative driver's license revocation office's identification and sign-in procedure did not violate defendant's right to a public hearing as procedure serves an important government interest, the security procedure is unrelated to the content of the information disclosed at the hearings, and there is no less restrictive way to meet the goal of securing the hearings.  108 H. 31, 116 P.3d 673.

  Right not violated by administrative driver's license revocation hearing procedure where defendant was afforded a hearing where witnesses were called and defendant was represented by counsel, and hearing office advised counsel of the procedure that hearing officer was going to follow.  108 H. 31, 116 P.3d 673.

  Where effect of administrative driver's license revocation office's default decision was to deprive petitioner of driver's license, a constitutionally protected property interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures the office used was great, and outweighed the government's interest, including the function of the office and the fiscal and administrative burdens that any additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail, procedural due process right denied.  110 H. 407, 133 P.3d 1199.

  As §207(c)(1)(A) of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act does not provide a "statutory entitlement" to any entity which may be granted a license pursuant to it, plaintiff energy producer failed to establish that plaintiff's exclusive telecommunications service license issued under that section constituted "property" which would entitle plaintiff to due process protection.  110 H. 419, 134 P.3d 585.

  Where definition of "incapacitated person" in §560:5-101 (2003), when read as a whole, sufficiently apprised ward of the bases on which the court would review the guardianship petition and any ambiguity in the statute did not render it "substantially incomprehensible", so as to overcome the "presumption of constitutionality", definition was not unconstitutionally vague.  113 H. 236, 151 P.3d 717.

  Considerations of due process continue to require that the aggravating factors set forth in §291E-61(b) – all of which remain "attendant circumstances that are intrinsic to and 'enmeshed' in the hierarchy of offenses that §291E-61 as a whole describes" – be alleged in the charging instrument and proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.  114 H. 227, 160 P.3d 703.

  Landowner was not vested with a property interest--building a particular sized structure or building in a particular location--sufficient to implicate due process protection where landowner's deed related that the Kauai planning commission retained authority to amend the shoreline setback at the time of building permit review; landowner was nevertheless afforded due process by being given a full public hearing and the commission conducted a site inspection of the property before making its ruling.  115 H. 477, 168 P.3d 929.

  Defendant's right to have all elements of an offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt was statutorily protected under §701-114 and constitutionally protected under the Hawaii and federal Constitutions; as only defendant personally could have waived such fundamental right and such right could not have been waived or stipulated to by defendant's counsel, stipulation by defendant's counsel of the fact that defendant committed defendant's crime within two years of a second or prior conviction of abuse for purposes of the §709-906(7) charge violated defendant's due process rights.  116 H. 3, 169 P.3d 955.

  County park camping ordinance and rule was unconstitutionally overbroad where rule stated that certain conduct, according to the definition of camping, constituted camping "regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of any other activities in which they may also be engaging", thus subjecting "innocent, constitutionally protected behavior as well as conduct which may be validly regulated", to a criminal penalty.  116 H. 146, 172 P.3d 458.

  County park camping ordinance and rule was unconstitutionally vague where rule stated that a camping without a permit violation occurs where "it reasonably appears, in light of the circumstances, that the participants in conducting certain listed activities were in fact using the area as a living accommodation regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of any activities in which they may also be engaging", as this standard was internally inconsistent and incomprehensible to a person of ordinary intelligence and vested virtually complete discretion to the police to determine whether a person had violated the regulation.  116 H. 146, 172 P.3d 458.

  The "best interests of the child" standard in §571-46.3(2) (grandparent visitation statute) required the family court to give "special weight" to (i.e., uphold a rebuttable presumption in favor of) the visitation decisions of a custodial parent whose fitness had not been challenged; thus, the family court erred to the extent that it relied on Troxel to invalidate §571-46.3 (2003); however, as a "harm to the child" standard was constitutionally required and could not be read into §571-46.3 without making a substantive amendment to the statute, §571-46.3, as written, was unconstitutional.  116 H. 323, 172 P.3d 1067.

  Where (1) prosecutor argued the unreasonable inference that defendant was guilty in light of defendant’s post-arrest silence, (2) the trial court declined to give a curative instruction when defendant objected to prosecutor’s comments, and (3) the evidence against defendant was not so overwhelming that prosecutor’s intrusion into defendant’s right to remain silent may not have contributed to defendant’s conviction, prosecutor’s improper comments were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendant was entitled to a new trial.  117 H. 235, 178 P.3d 1.

  Where candidates failed to show that the chief election officer had a "direct, personal, pecuniary interest" in the officer's exercise of judicial power, the trial court did not err in holding that candidates were provided with a fair administrative hearing.  117 H. 323, 179 P.3d 1050.

  Invocation of a court's inherent power to provide process where none exists, by reforming §706-662 (1996) to allow for jury fact-finding did not violate defendant's due process right, where assigning the fact-finding role to the jury would be a procedural, as opposed to a substantive, change that would not expand the scope of criminal liability, increase punishment, or alter any evidentiary burdens to defendant's detriment, but, rather, would simply change the course to a result.  117 H. 381, 184 P.3d 133.

  Where the State promised as a condition of the plea agreement to "take no position" on petitioner's deferred acceptance of no contest plea (DANCP) motion but prosecutor's comments directly addressed the issues pertinent to the motion, the terms of the agreement were not fulfilled and petitioner was denied petitioner's due process rights; because this contravention of petitioner's DANCP plea agreement violated petitioner's fundamental rights and resulted in manifest injustice, this was plain error under HRPP rule 52, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and sentencing by another judge was the proper remedy.  122 H. 92, 223 P.3d 157 (2010).

  Where petitioner lacked "written notice" that probation revocation was sought because petitioner was a high risk to commit another offense, and petitioner was not notified of the "evidence" of other sexual assaults that was used "against" petitioner in seeking revocation, petitioner's due process rights were violated.  125 H. 114, 254 P.3d 425 (2011).

  Where the Tauiliili decision did not "reform" the law in any way--did not overrule any prior decision of the Hawaii supreme court with regard to application of presentence credit to two or more consecutive sentences and was the first opportunity for the court to interpret §706-671 on that issue--and did not increase the punishment for the crime for which defendant was convicted, the court's construction of §706-671 reflected the correct reading of the statute, not an expansion of it, and did not violate due process.  125 H. 429, 263 P.3d 709 (2010).

  Court's ruling that evidence of defendant's juvenile proceedings could be admissible violated §571-84(h) and constituted reversible error, where ruling was a reason defendant decided not to testify, infringed on defendant's constitutional right to testify, and there was a reasonable possibility that the court's error might have contributed to defendant's conviction.  127 H. 432, 279 P.3d 1237 (2012).

  The Hawaii supreme court had appellate jurisdiction over, and petitioners had a due process right to a hearing and judicial review of the commission on water resource management's (CWRM) interim instream flow standards (IIFS) determination where: (1) the analysis that the CWRM had to undertake in setting IIFS was complex and involved significant and thorough analysis and factfinding, taking into consideration the factors specified in §174C-71(2)(D); and (2) the ramifications of an erroneous IIFS could offend the public trust, and was too important to deprive the parties of due process and judicial review.  128 H. 228, 287 P.3d 129 (2012).

  Where a defendant has expressed an intention to be absent from the proceedings and the court has the opportunity to address the defendant, trial courts should advise a defendant of the constitutional rights that will be lost upon exiting a courtroom; by engaging defendants in this manner, the trial courts seek to ensure that a defendant makes an informed decision not to be present.  128 H. 479, 291 P.3d 377 (2013).

  The trial court's questioning of witness seemingly clarified and developed the evidence and it could not be concluded on the record that the court was biased.  Although it could not be ascertained definitively whether the court considered witness' testimony, the court would be acting within its discretion to do so inasmuch as the court's questioning of witness only clarified and developed the testimony.  129 H. 30, 292 P.3d 1260 (2013).

  Advisement by the family court did not adequately ascertain whether petitioner understood petitioner's constitutional right to testify or not to testify, as required by the Hawaii supreme court in Tachibana v. State.  Moreover, petitioner's need for an interpreter during the trial was a "salient fact" heightening the necessity for the court to insure that petitioner understood the rights petitioner waived.  Accordingly, the court did not obtain a valid on-the-record waiver of petitioner's right to testify.  130 H. 83, 306 P.3d 128 (2013).

  Charge of excessive speeding under §291C-105(a)(1) against petitioner dismissed where the charge did not allege that petitioner acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly thus failing to allege the requisite state of mind.  A charge that fails to charge a requisite state of mind cannot be construed reasonably to state an offense and thus the charge was dismissed without prejudice because it violated due process.  130 H. 353, 311 P.3d 676 (2013).

  Where the written submission of plea form in which defendant entered a plea of no contest solely to the subsection (a)(1) method of proof, was silent regarding subsection (a)(3), and the hearing transcript revealed some ambiguity as to the State's and district court's understandings of the plea, the court construed the State as having given up its ability to prosecute defendant under subsection (a)(3) in exchange for defendant's conditional plea under subsection (a)(1); in these circumstances, permitting the State to prosecute defendant under subsection (a)(3) would allow the State to avoid its end of the bargain, and would thereby violate defendant's due process rights.  131 H. 1, 313 P.3d 690 (2013).

  To prevent future misunderstandings over the significance and effect of the planning director's statements and correspondence, it would be beneficial for the planning director to clearly indicate when an appealable decision has been made and how an interested person may challenge the decision.  131 H. 513, 319 P.3d 432 (2014).

  Where the district court's ultimate Tachibana colloquy was defective because it incompletely advised defendant of defendant's right to testify and because it did not establish that defendant understood defendant's rights, the district court did not obtain an on-the-record waiver of the right to testify from defendant; defendant demonstrated a constitutional violation of defendant's right to testify, which could not be considered harmless.  132 H. 85, 319 P.3d 1093 (2014).

  Where the defendant presented extensive evidence, called four expert witnesses, submitted two scientific studies, and presented multiple lay witnesses, the defendant was not deprived of due process because the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to present arguments and evidence at the contested case hearing.  132 H. 247, 320 P.3d 912 (2014).

  Where inmate was transported to the courthouse upon being subpoenaed to testify but refused to testify, circuit court did not violate defendant's right to due process by denying defendant's request to extract the inmate so that the inmate could refuse to testify in front of the jury.  133 H. 253, 327 P.3d 931 (2014).

  Where the child support enforcement agency recorded a lien prior to an attorney's lien established for payment of fees in an unrelated action, the circuit court did not violate the attorney's due process rights by granting priority to the child support enforcement agency's lien.  133 H. 311, 328 P.3d 320 (2014).

  Where the land use commission (LUC) reverted property to the agricultural land use district, the circuit court erred in concluding that property owners' due process rights were violated because:  (1) the property owners had notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the reversion issue; and (2) the LUC's conduct was not arbitrary and unreasonable, given the long history of unfulfilled promises made in connection with the development of the property.  134 H. 187, 339 P.3d 685 (2014).

  Where family court's strict enforcement of a three-hour time limit for trial on a petition to determine custody over minor children unduly curtailed mother's ability to present evidence relevant to the proper determination of the children's best interests, the family court abused its discretion in denying mother's motion for additional trial time; the time limit unreasonably deprived mother of a fair opportunity to present mother's case and prevented the family court from being able to determine the best interests of the children.  134 H. 221, 339 P.3d 719 (2014).

  Four-month delay between date of offense and date of indictment was not a violation of due process.  1 H. App. 121, 615 P.2d 109.

  Court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for deferred acceptance of guilty plea and motion to reconsider.  1 H. App. 157, 616 P.2d 227.

  Trial judge has duty to determine admissibility of inculpatory statement prior to jury's exposure to such evidence.  1 H. App. 221, 617 P.2d 98.

  Purpose of family court waiver hearing is not to determine whether minor committed offense alleged or even to determine probable cause.  Presumption that charges are true does not violate due process.  1 H. App. 243, 617 P.2d 830.

  State must prove every material element of offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  1 H. App. 544, 622 P.2d 619.

  Testimony presented through interpreter was understandable, comprehensible, and intelligible.  5 H. App. 20, 686 P.2d 28.

  Not violated by trial court's refusal to allow further examination of witness.  5 H. App. 127, 681 P.2d 573.

  Violated where previously accepted expense item in ratemaking was disallowed without giving utility notice and chance to be heard.  5 H. App. 445, 698 P.2d 304.

  Deprivation of property solely on basis of substituted service in adverse possession action violates due process, where, with due diligence, actual notice possible.  6 H. App. 241, 718 P.2d 1109.

  Does not require agency hearing before tax director issues notices of tax assessment.  6 H. App. 260, 718 P.2d 1122.

  Not violated by bailiff's statement to jury foreperson that jurors should all agree with verdict if polled.  6 H. App. 320, 721 P.2d 718.

  Prohibiting defendant from challenging reliability of intoxilyzer test in DUI case violated due process.  7 H. App. 20, 740 P.2d 1017.

  In constructive criminal contempt proceedings, sufficient notice of hearing required.  7 H. App. 95, 746 P.2d 574.

  Prison rules did not create protected liberty interest.  7 H. App. 247, 753 P.2d 598.

  Act of state witness leaving witness stand in presence of security personnel was not so prejudicial as to deny defendant's right to fair trial; jury is presumed to adhere to court's cautionary instruction to draw no inference from event.  8 H. App. 624, 817 P.2d 130.

  Claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 properly dismissed where award of delayed tenure to probationary university employee and alleged damage to employee's reputation alone did not implicate liberty or property interest sufficient to invoke due process protection.  9 H. App. 21, 821 P.2d 937.

  Trial court's failure to orally instruct jury about presumption of defendant's innocence and beyond-a-reasonable doubt concept heightened the risk that defendant would be found guilty and thus unfairly deprived defendant of defendant's right to due process and a fair trial.  77 H. 177 (App.), 880 P.2d 1224.

  Defendant's constitutional and statutory right to testify in defendant's own defense was violated where judge reproached defendant to follow defendant's attorney's advice and thus refrain from testifying, and the violation was plain error; denial of the right to testify was prejudicial and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  78 H. 115 (App.), 890 P.2d 702.

  Motions court's order denying defendant's pre-trial motion to dismiss for pre-indictment delay affirmed, where, inter alia, motions court was correct in concluding that defendant failed to establish that defendant's claimed inability to recollect events prior to defendant's indictment, even with the aid of others, amounted to substantial prejudice to defendant's right to a fair trial.  79 H. 165 (App.), 880 P.2d 217.

  Violated where trial court's exclusion of gun-like cigarette lighter prejudiced defendant by precluding jury from properly evaluating essential defense evidence.  79 H. 385 (App.), 903 P.2d 690.

  Violated where defendant's assertions and defense counsel's representations raised good faith doubt whether defendant's failure to take medication affected defendant's legal competence to stand trial.  81 H. 332 (App.), 916 P.2d 1233.

  Not violated at sentencing where defendant received notice of information court was to consider, received notice that defendant might be subject to consecutive terms of imprisonment, and had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings concerning the information being considered.  81 H. 421 (App.), 918 P.2d 228.

  Section 291C-112, which prohibits the use of a vehicle "for purposes of human habitation", not unconstitutionally vague.  82 H. 269 (App.), 921 P.2d 1170.

  "Reasonable grounds" standard of §709-906(4) not unconstitutionally vague where standard is an objective standard requiring a trial court to independently assess facts and circumstances which responding officers had before them in determining to issue warning citations.  82 H. 381 (App.), 922 P.2d 994.

  Section 709-906(4) not overbroad as issuance of warning citation must be based on objective facts and circumstances, other than merely a complainant's claim, which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe recent physical abuse was inflicted on family or household member.  82 H. 381 (App.), 922 P.2d 994.

  Violated where claimant failed to serve employer and insurer with motion and summons; circuit court thus did not acquire personal jurisdiction over employer and insurer and judgment and garnishee summons issued pursuant to §386-91 in absence of personal jurisdiction void.  82 H. 405 (App.), 922 P.2d 1018.

  Procedural due process right not denied when guardian ad litem not appointed for mother where mother was provided with court-appointed attorney and, pursuant to §587-34(d), court determined mother was capable of comprehending legal significance of issues.  85 H. 119 (App.), 938 P.2d 178.

  Not violated by shooting victim being collaterally estopped in civil action against insurer from re-litigating issue of assailant's intent to cause victim's death where intent issue had already been decided in criminal trial.  85 H. 177 (App.), 938 P.2d 1196.

  Application of preponderance of the evidence standard as appropriate judicial basis for issuance of protective order under §586-5.5 does not violate right.  85 H. 197 (App.), 940 P.2d 404.

  Where an indictment is valid on its face, the burden is on the defendant seeking dismissal of indictment to prove that any improper presentation of evidence to grand jury was so extreme and flagrant that grand jury was clearly overreached or deceived in significant way.  86 H. 290 (App.), 949 P.2d 130.

  Section 707-731(1)(c), providing offense of second degree sexual assault for state correctional facility employee who knowingly subjects imprisoned person to sexual penetration, not unconstitutionally vague.  86 H. 426 (App.), 949 P.2d 1047.

  Right not violated:  (1) by setting of trial date before previously scheduled pre-trial hearing date where need for pre-trial hearing was obviated by appellant's decision to forgo second genetic test for paternity; and (2) where no showing that judge was not neutral and unbiased in deciding case.  88 H. 159 (App.), 963 P.2d 1135.

  As no Hawaii statute governing parole requires a parolee's parole to be automatically revoked upon the parolee's conviction and sentence to imprisonment for a crime committed while on parole, and §353-62 appears to vest Hawaii paroling authority with discretion to revoke parole, parolee's right violated when authority summarily revoked parole without giving parolee a final revocation hearing.  88 H. 229 (App.), 965 P.2d 162.

  Section 852-1 not void for vagueness as:  (1) a person of ordinary intelligence would have a reasonable opportunity to know that it is unlawful to refuse or wilfully fail to move as directed by an officer; (2) person may then choose between the lawful and unlawful conduct; and (3) the statute provides sufficiently explicit standards for those who apply it.  89 H. 27 (App.), 968 P.2d 194.

  Section 52D-8 provides officers with a constitutionally protected property interest--the right to legal representation for acting within the scope of their duty; due process thus entitles an officer to a contested case hearing under chapter 91 before the officer can be deprived of this interest.  89 H. 221 (App.), 971 P.2d 310.

  Minor's right to due process and fair hearing not violated where minor failed to show that trial delay was prejudicial, that minor's defense was in any way impaired by the passage of time, or that minor was denied a fair hearing.  91 H. 147 (App.), 981 P.2d 704.

  Right violated by trial court entering free-standing restitution order where no notice was provided to defendant that defendant's original sentence might be modified at the hearing on the probation officer's motion to revoke restitution.  92 H. 36 (App.), 986 P.2d 987.

  As §604-10.5(h) provides that there can be no criminal conviction unless "[a] knowing or intentional violation of a restraining order or injunction" has occurred, harassment under §604-10.5(a)(1) is not turned into a "strict liability" offense; thus, no violation of due process under §604-10.5(a)(1).  92 H. 312 (App.), 990 P.2d 1194.

  Section 604-10.5(a)(1) not unconstitutionally overbroad as it imposes no criminal liability nor places any burden on the reduced punishment or complete defense provisions of the penal code.  92 H. 312 (App.), 990 P.2d 1194.

  Where trial court's initial jury instruction and subsequent unanimity instructions, read in conjunction with each other, failed to maintain the defendant's presumption of innocence during the jury's consideration of the unanimity requirement, defendant's right to a fair trial violated.  92 H. 675 (App.), 994 P.2d 607.

  The judicial foreclosure system in Hawaii, pursuant to §667-1, is not clearly, manifestly and unmistakably violative of due process; considering the two basic elements of procedural due process--notice and the opportunity to be heard--appellants were afforded due process.  94 H. 422 (App.), 16 P.3d 827.

  Where counsel for successful bidder at a judicial foreclosure sale was aware at time of hearing on motion for cancellation of sale that the damages mortgagee bank had prayed for exceeded bidder's deposit, and had the opportunity to challenge, at the hearing, the damages the bank was seeking, bidder's right not violated.  96 H. 348 (App.), 31 P.3d 205.

  Defendant's right violated where, based on the specific facts of the case, trial court abused its discretion in directing, over defendant's objection, that defendant testify before defendant's other defense witness; error not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as there was a reasonable possibility that trial court's error contributed to defendant's conviction.  102 H. 369 (App.), 76 P.3d 612.

  Having been previously convicted of driving without motor vehicle insurance, driver was clearly on notice that driving without motor vehicle insurance was a criminal offense; thus, revocation of driver's suspended sentence for commission of the same offense during the period of suspension did not implicate driver's due process rights.  106 H. 391 (App.), 105 P.3d 1197.

  Where family court had neither general nor specific jurisdiction over father, court erred in entering default judgment against father in mother's child support action.  110 H. 294 (App.), 132 P.3d 862.

  Right not violated and trial court did not abuse discretion in ordering that defendant remain shackled during sentencing hearing where transcript of sentencing hearing contained no indication that the shackling in any way inhibited defendant from understanding what was going on, asserting defendant's self or consulting with counsel, or that the shackling in any way actually influenced or inclined the trial court against defendant.  111 H. 457 (App.), 142 P.3d 1286.

  Although consulting counsel had limited powers and duties in family court's pilot program proceedings for permanent custody, mother had the benefit of full representation of counsel and was not denied her right to due process.  113 H. 499 (App.), 155 P.3d 682.

  Loss of photographs did not violate defendant's due process rights where even if the lost photographs failed to depict any packets of crystal methamphetamine within defendant's bag, it would not have exculpated defendant; the lost photographs could only have diminished the strength of the State’s evidence; they could not have provided defendant with a complete defense; thus, the potential exculpatory value of the lost photographs was not compelling.  114 H. 162 (App.), 158 P.3d 280.

  Given the apparent absence of a "countervailing state interest of overriding significance", family court's restrictions violated mother's right to free access to the courts where family court required mother, if she was represented by an attorney, to access the record in the case only through a licensed Hawaii attorney or other attorney admitted pro hac vice, or allowing mother, if she was representing herself pro se, to access the record only if she was accompanied by a family court staff person.  118 H. 293 (App.), 188 P.3d 807.

  Where father was not appointed counsel until sixteen days prior to the permanent custody trial of father's two biological sons, applying the case-by-case balancing test of Lassiter--(1) the private interests at stake, (2) the government's interest, and (3) the risk that the failure to appoint counsel will lead to an erroneous decision--father was deprived of father's due process right.  119 H. 28 (App.), 193 P.3d 1228.

  Where mother had a fundamental liberty interest in her right of care, custody, and control of child, and under this Amendment and the Hawaii constitution, article I, §5, the State could not deprive mother of this interest without providing a fair procedure for deprivation, family court's ex parte order awarding father sole custody of child deprived mother of custody of child without the constitutionally required procedural protections.  120 H. 149 (App.), 202 P.3d 610.

  Sections 707-730(1)(b) and 707-732(1)(b), as applied to private consensual acts between two persons, including minors, did not violate minor's right to privacy as the State has at least a significant interest in regulating the sexual activities of children under the age of fourteen; in addition, there is no fundamental personal privacy right for minors under the age of fourteen to engage in sexual activities with other children under the age of fourteen; this applies to young boys, as well as to young girls, and is not strictly dependent on an age differential between the children.  121 H. 92 (App.), 214 P.3d 1082 (2009).

  State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the case was not constitutionally infirm where defendant failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that defendant was prosecuted based on an arbitrary classification; defendant was prosecuted under §§707-730 and 707-732 based on allegations that defendant was significantly older than child #1, had initiated the prohibited sexual activities with child #1 and child #2, and had engaged in multiple instances of prohibited sexual contact with more than one child.  121 H. 92 (App.), 214 P.3d 1082 (2009).

  Granting the labor relations board exclusive original jurisdiction over plaintiff's action under §89-14 did not violate plaintiff's substantive due process rights; as plaintiff's fundamental right was not implicated, granting the board exclusive original jurisdiction over public sector prohibited practice controversies was rationally related to the public policy of chapter 89 - that it would be more effective in promoting harmonious governmental employer-employee relations and assuring the effective operation of government for these controversies to be first decided by the board rather than the courts.  125 H. 317 (App.), 260 P.3d 1135 (2011).

  Section 89-14 did not violate plaintiff's procedural due process rights where: (1) chapter 89 afforded plaintiff the opportunity to present plaintiff's action to the labor relations board in an administrative hearing; (2) the decision of the board required a majority vote of its three members, and one member each must be representative of management, labor, and the public; and (3) any person aggrieved by a decision of the board could appeal that decision to the circuit court.  125 H. 317 (App.), 260 P.3d 1135 (2011).

  Chapter 586 is not unconstitutional, as the right of parents to discipline their children is not unlimited; as parents do not possess a fundamental right to inflict force or harm upon a child that the legislature has deemed to be excessive and harmful to the child's welfare, a rational basis review applied to that chapter; under that review, ex parte TROs under chapter 586 were rationally related to the legitimate state interest in protecting minors from physical and psychological harm.  125 H. 330 (App.), 260 P.3d 1148 (2011).

  The process for obtaining an ex parte temporary restraining order under chapter 586 did not fall short of the constitutional requirements of procedural due process where the strength of the State's and petitioner's interests, the "emergency nature of the decision", and the "practical difficulties inherent in convening an immediate evidentiary hearing" mitigated against requiring further procedural protections.  125 H. 330 (App.), 260 P.3d 1148 (2011).

  Where defendant's HRPP rule 40 petition presented a colorable claim that the Hawaii paroling authority (HPA) acted arbitrarily and capriciously by increasing defendant's aggregate minimum term of imprisonment without providing an adequate justification so as to give rise to a due process violation, and defendant's petition presented a colorable claim of actual vindictiveness given the lack of pertinent evidence in the record regarding the HPA's justification for the increased aggregate minimum term, circuit court erred in denying defendant's petition without a hearing.  126 H. 555 (App.), 273 P.3d 1241 (2012).

  Plaintiff's right to procedural due process violated where defendant department of Hawaiian homelands (DHHL) and DHHL officials impounded plaintiff's trespassing cattle and sold the cattle, permanently depriving plaintiff of a significant property interest and in doing so, did not provide plaintiff with adequate prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Further, no qualified immunity for defendant DHHL officials given that they should have known their actions violated statutory requirements and due process.  129 H. 123 (App.), 295 P.3d 993 (2013).

  Defendant's right to due process not violated where defendant's waiver of defendant's right to a termination hearing from the drug court program (program) was voluntarily and intelligently undertaken under the totality of the circumstances.  Defendant was advised at three different hearings about the legal rights defendant would give up and the consequences of self-termination from the program, signed an admission agreement acknowledging that defendant understood what would happen upon termination from the program, and was warned repeatedly by the trial court regarding the consequences of termination from the program.  129 H. 135 (App.), 295 P.3d 1005 (2013).

  Respondent's conduct was sufficient to give rise to tort liability and some award of punitive damages based on respondent's intentional conduct, but did not rise to the high degree of reprehensibility necessary to warrant the amount of punitive damages awarded to petitioner by the circuit court in violation of respondent's due process rights.  130 H. 58 (App.), 305 P.3d 474 (2013).

  Assuming arguendo that the right to familial association extends to the maternal aunt of a child who is currently living with foster parents and under the custody of the department of human services, the department lacked the right to vicariously assert that right on the child's maternal aunt's behalf; department had not shown that maternal aunt was somehow hindered from asserting that right, e.g., prevented from appealing from the prior family court ruling or intervening in the current appeal.  130 H. 486 (App.), 312 P.3d 1193 (2013).

  Section 707-756 was not unconstitutionally overbroad and/or vague as applied to defendant, and the circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on that basis where, among other things, when the statute was read as a whole, it was clear that only criminal conduct was proscribed and the statute plainly criminalized conduct that is coupled with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony.  131 H. 312 (App.), 318 P.3d 602 (2013).

  There is no infringement on parents' constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right to direct the upbringing of their children when a court, properly interposed between two parents, each equally vested with such rights, resolves an impasse between them regarding the exercise of those rights; in resolving such an impasse, a family court is required to base its determination on the best interests of the child pursuant to §571-46.  133 H. 415 (App.), 329 P.3d 320 (2014).

  Charges against defendant for accidents involving bodily injury and driving without a license were insufficient for failing to allege a mens rea and, therefore, were subject to dismissal without prejudice.  134 H. 465 (App.), 342 P.3d 884 (2015).

 

Equal protection.

  Durational residency requirement for preferential rates for mooring privileges in small boat harbors not significant penalty on right to travel.  651 F.2d 661.

  No racially discriminatory motive despite disproportionate impact upon Caucasians of residency requirement.  651 F.2d 661.

  Claim arose where council made decision to finance the special election with private funds.  849 F.2d 1176.

  Not violated by Endangered Species Act where differential treatment between native Hawaiians and native Alaskans justified by importance of subsistence hunting in native Alaskan culture.  945 F.2d 254.

  Young adults do not constitute cognizable group for purposes of equal protection challenge to composition of petit jury.  986 F.2d 1259.

  Court's finding that government did not engage in purposeful discrimination in jury selection process was not clearly erroneous.  995 F.2d 1448.

  No qualified immunity for state officials where reasonable state official would have known of complainant's constitutional right to be free from sexual harassment.  39 F.3d 1021.

  No qualified immunity for supervising state official where state officials knew of sexual harassment complaint and failed to take any action.  39 F.3d 1021.

  Not violated by state small boat harbor mooring and anchoring regulations imposing higher fees on nonresidents than residents.  42 F.3d 1185.

  Not violated by rule that, for purposes of criminal history calculation, state conviction for conduct which occurred after defendant's federal offense, but for which defendant was sentenced before defendant's sentencing on the federal offense, is counted as a prior sentence.  44 F.3d 749.

  Ordinance creating mechanism through which condominium owners could convert their leasehold interests into fee simple interests was constitutional.  124 F.3d 1150.

  Ordinance requiring all publishers who wished to distribute their publications along sidewalks in the Waikiki special district to use one of two sets of newsracks, one reserved solely for publications that charge readers and one just for free publications, did not violate the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution.  298 F.3d 1037.

  Appellants who claimed that article XII of the state constitution and the statutes implementing it violated the equal protection clause because it restricted benefits to only those classified as "native Hawaiians" or "Hawaiians", lacked standing.  342 F.3d 934.

  Ordinance prohibiting aerial advertising did not violate the First Amendment or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Honolulu's airspace was a nonpublic forum, and the ordinance was reasonable, viewpoint neutral, and rationally related to legitimate governmental interests.  455 F.3d 910.

  Where plaintiffs alleged that various state programs preferentially treated persons of Hawaiian ancestry in violation of, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs, as state taxpayers, lacked standing to bring a suit claiming that the office of Hawaiian affairs (OHA) programs funded by state tax revenue violate the equal protection clause.  If any plaintiffs were able to establish standing, their challenge to the appropriation of tax revenue to OHA did not raise a nonjusticiable political question.  477 F.3d 1048.

  Independent candidates for president denied access to State's ballot for the 2004 election appealed district court's holding that relevant provisions governing access do not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments or the equal protection clause; district court's holding that the presidential ballot access scheme is constitutional, affirmed.  620 F.3d 1214 (2010).

  Hawaii's discretionary decision not to provide optional coverage for Compact of Free Association with United States residents, authorized by the Welfare Reform Act, was subject to rational-basis review.  748 F.3d 875 (2014).

  Where plaintiffs claimed that Basic Health Hawaii violated the equal protection clause because it provided less health coverage to Compact of Free Association with the United States residents than the health coverage that Hawaii provided to citizens and qualified aliens eligible for federal reimbursement through medicaid, plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence that Hawaii had not closely followed the federal direction and adhered to requirements prescribed by Congress.  Plaintiffs also did not allege that state expenditures for health insurance for aliens within the discretionary category were less than the state expenditures for health insurance for others.  748 F.3d 875 (2014).

  Where plaintiffs challenged the lack of parity in benefits that Compact of Free Association (COFA) residents received through Basic Health Hawaii as compared to benefits provided through medicaid, the Ninth Circuit Court vacated the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction preventing Hawaii from reducing state-paid health benefits for COFA residents.  The Ninth Circuit Court determined that rational-basis review applied to Hawaii's conduct, which was consistent with Graham and the Supreme Court's equal protection cases, because Hawaii was merely following the federal direction set forth by Congress under the Welfare Reform Act.  797 F.3d 572 (2014).

  Plaintiffs' interlocutory appeal dismissed as moot, where plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction solely to prevent defendants from undertaking certain voter registration activities and from calling or holding racially-exclusive elections for Native Hawaiians.  Given the changed circumstances, the court could not provide any effective relief sought in the preliminary injunction request; also, the appeal did not fall within an exception to the mootness doctrine. 835 F.3d 1003 (2016).

  Classification according to criminal record is not constitutionally suspect.  402 F. Supp. 84.

  Durational residency requirement for public employment has sufficient impact on right to travel to require statute be justified by compelling state interest test.  443 F. Supp. 228.

  Statistical evidence that tenure was awarded to almost everyone on the faculty who applied does not establish denial of equal protection.  469 F. Supp. 443.

  Natural parents are not a suspect class.  Classifications drawn by parental tort liability statute are not irrational.  Parental tort liability statute did not affect any fundamental rights, and has rational relation to legitimate government interests.  529 F. Supp. 394.

  Deductions from cost of living allowance paid to civilian employees who had commissary and exchange privileges unconnected to employment did not deny equal protection.  545 F. Supp. 356.

  State plan to reapportion house of representatives was unconstitutional because it failed to reasonably further rational policy of providing each basic island unit with meaningful representation.  Total population in redistricting of senate, 43.18%, was facially violative of equal protection.  552 F. Supp. 554.

  Use of registered voters as population base was impermissible because State failed to show that registered voter base substantially approximated results of using a population base.  552 F. Supp. 554.

  No evidence of economic discrimination regarding special elections or that equal access denied to voter lists.  623 F. Supp. 657.

  Definition of "Hawaiian" without reference to blood quantum does not violate equal protection.  631 F. Supp. 1153.

  Durational residency requirement for gubernatorial candidates does not violate equal protection clause.  639 F. Supp. 1552.

  Native Hawaiians have no standing to challenge constitutionality of Hawaiian Homes Commission Act on equal protection grounds as they would be asserting the rights of non-Hawaiian third parties.  795 F. Supp. 1009.

  Not violated where city ordinance providing mechanism for transfer of fee simple interest from condominium lessors to lessees did not intentionally discriminate against Native Hawaiians.  802 F. Supp. 326.

  Violated by use of excessive force by prison personnel against inmates.  818 F. Supp. 1333.

  Condominium lease-to-fee ordinance did not violate plaintiff's equal protection rights.  832 F. Supp. 1404.

  No violation, where plaintiff claimed that sex offender treatment program violated right to equal protection because it was overinclusive in that it included inmates who had not actually been convicted of a sex offense.  905 F. Supp. 813.

  Petitioner claiming that petitioner's sentence violated equal protection clause because by virtue of petitioner's status as a deportable alien, petitioner had been unconstitutionally excluded from early prerelease programs, failed to state equal protection claim because deportable aliens were not "similarly situated" to U.S. citizens.  940 F. Supp. 275.

  Denial of "gate money" where parole board determined that plaintiffs had no immediate needs satisfied rational basis test; thus, there was no equal protection violation.  940 F. Supp. 1523.

  Where plaintiffs filed motion for preliminary injunction regarding Act 359 of 1993 Hawaii legislature (relating to Hawaiian sovereignty), as amended in 1994 and 1996, no equal protection violation found regarding native Hawaiian vote.  941 F. Supp. 1529.

  No equal protection violation, where petitioner claimed, inter alia, that petitioner was denied parole in violation of equal protection clause because petitioner was classified by Hawaii paroling authority as Hawaiian.  2 F. Supp. 2d 1291.

  Student suspended from school for violating Act 90, L 1996 (§302A-1134.5(a)), which prohibited possession of alcohol while attending school, where student allegedly participated in consumption of alcohol at student's home prior to school luau in violation of school's zero tolerance policy under Act 90.  Plaintiffs' (student's parents) motion for preliminary injunctive relief granted in part and denied in part where, among other things, it was very unlikely that plaintiffs would prevail on merits of claim that defendants' conduct violated equal protection clause.  84 F. Supp. 2d 1113.

  Where plaintiffs challenged city and county of Honolulu's practice of charging nonresidents a $3 fee to enter bay designated a marine life conservation district and nature preserve, appropriate standard of review was rational basis; genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to rationality of ordinance instituting the fee.  215 F. Supp. 2d 1098.

  Plaintiffs' Hawaiian home lands lease program claim dismissed, because plaintiffs' claim necessarily involved a challenge to the Admission Act, a challenge that could not be brought by a party with only state taxpayer standing.  299 F. Supp. 2d 1114.

  Summary judgment denied as to 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim, where plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to a defendant's motives for denying craft vendors at an event hosted by a plaintiff, a nonprofit corporation, and for refusing to clean the park used for the event when requested.  300 F. Supp. 2d 1003.

  Plaintiffs asserted that an ordinance preventing them from flying their aerial tow banners over the city's beaches violated their rights under the equal protection clause; the ordinance did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not discriminate against any speaker or form of speech on the basis of viewpoint.  345 F. Supp. 2d 1123.

  Federal statute that exempted only Hawaii from the preemptive effect of federal marine mammal statutes and applied only to laws relating to humpback whales, furthered the legitimate governmental purpose of protecting humpback whales, an endangered species; as a whole, that statute satisfied rational basis review. 380 F. Supp. 2d 1166.

  Where plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the pre-employment residency requirement for public employment set forth in §78-1(c), plaintiffs had standing to challenge the constitutionality of §78-1, and the court granted plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction to bar defendants from enforcing the pre-employment residency requirement of §78-1(c).  423 F. Supp. 2d 1094.

  Section 13-5-23(L-6), Hawaii Administrative Rules, allowing for construction of single family residences within floodplains and coastal high hazard areas when granted permit approval from the board of land and natural resources, was not facially unconstitutional under the equal protection clause because it was rationally related to the State's legitimate interests.  438 F. Supp. 2d 1186.

  Because the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 is supported by a rational basis, the Act does not violate the equal protection clause.  532 F. Supp. 2d 1238.

  Plaintiff's equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment where plaintiff asserted, inter alia, that plaintiff's civil right to equal protection was violated by the enforcement of chapter 134, was without merit.  548 F. Supp. 2d 1151.

  Summary judgment granted to county defendants as to plaintiffs' facial equal protection claim and denied as to the as-applied equal protection claim and county defendants' "class of one" equal protection argument, regarding ordinance requiring developers seeking to build five or more residential units on their land to enter into a residential workforce housing agreement with county department before final subdivision approval or building permits are issued.  573 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (2008).

  Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's equal protection and due process claims denied, where defendants claimed, among other things, that:  (1) the circuit court and the liquor commission had primary jurisdiction; and (2) plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that it was treated differently than similarly situated individuals.  Defendants' motion to stay proceedings pending the resolution of plaintiff's appeals of the liquor commission's decisions currently before the circuit court, granted.  681 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (2009).

  Strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review for plaintiffs' equal protection claim given that the State's decision to distinguish between citizens and qualified aliens who may participate in older health care benefits programs that provided greater benefits versus Compacts of Free Association Residents and "New Residents" who may participate in the new health care benefits program implemented by the State was a classification based on alienage.  805 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (2011).

  Defendant employer Hawaii department of transportation's motion for summary judgment granted on plaintiff former employee's equal protection claim where plaintiff, who alleged that defendant subjected plaintiff to disparate treatment due to plaintiff's disability and role as an equal employment opportunity specialist who acted in accordance with all laws, did not cite 42 U.S.C. §1983; even if plaintiff did cite to 42 U.S.C. §1983, sovereign immunity prohibited the claim because claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 are limited by the scope of the Eleventh Amendment.  864 F. Supp. 2d 965 (2012).

  Plaintiff citizens had not shown a likelihood of succeeding on their claim that Hawaii's legislative reapportionment plan's use of a permanent resident base, coupled with extraction of military personnel, their dependents, and students, constituted an equal protection violation for the purpose of a preliminary injunction; further, the equities and public interest tipped overwhelmingly in defendant reapportionment commission's favor, as any preliminary relief at this stage would significantly upend the election process; plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction denied.  878 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (2012).

  Hawaii's marriage laws (§572-1 and article I, §23 of the state constitution) which define marriage as a union between a man and a woman, are rationally related to legitimate government interests and do not violate the equal protection clause.  884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (2012).

  Section 572-1 does not treat males and females differently as a class; it is gender-neutral on its face; it prohibits men and women equally from marrying a member of the same sex.  884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (2012).

  Inmates' motion for preliminary injunction regarding inmates' prayer objects denied, where inmates argued that the deprivation of the prayer objects violated inmates' rights to equal protection under the U.S. and state Constitutions.  One inmate failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as to the destruction of the prayer object, and even if the inmate had exhausted administrative remedies, the inmate had not established that the inmate was likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.  The other inmate, among other things, did not establish that the correctional center treated inmates who practiced the Native Hawaiian religion less favorably than it treated inmates of other religions, and was unlikely to prevail on the equal protection claims.  903 F. Supp. 2d 975 (2012).

  Summary judgment granted to defendants county of Hawaii, Hawaii Island Humane Society (HIHS), HIHS executive director, and HIHS officer as to plaintiff's constitutional claims.  Among other things, where plaintiff argued a "class-of-one" theory:  (1) plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact because plaintiff did not present any evidence of a clear standard that the HIHS defendants deviated from when performing their duties; and (2) the defendants had discretion with regard to enforcing animal control laws.  947 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (2013).

  Without evidence of a clear standard, plaintiff cannot demonstrate that plaintiff's right to equal protection was "clearly established"; qualified immunity protected defendant, employee of Hawaii Island Humane Society, as to plaintiff's claim.  947 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (2013).

  Hawaii's choice of a permanent resident population base for the 2012 reapportionment plan was constitutionally permissible; among other things, there was no evidence that Hawaii discriminated unreasonably among non-resident groups.  960 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (2013).

  Plaintiffs had standing to assert equal protection challenges to Hawaii's 2012 reapportionment plan, where plaintiffs had suffered the injury of losing an Oahu senate seat and three of the plaintiffs lived in underrepresented districts.  960 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (2013).

  Where plaintiffs contended that the reapportionment commission violated the equal protection clause by apportioning Hawaii's legislative districts unequally, the reapportionment commission's justifications for the challenged population deviations embodied rational, legitimate, and substantial state policies, and the 2012 reapportionment plan reasonably advanced those policies in a neutral and nondiscriminatory manner.  960 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (2013).

  Under §134-2(d), plaintiff, a lawful permanent resident alien of the United States and a resident of the State, was denied the opportunity to apply for a  permit to acquire firearms solely based upon plaintiff's alienage; the classification violated the equal protection clause.  Thus, §134-2(d) was unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff and other lawful permanent resident aliens.  54 F. Supp. 3d 1136 (2014).

  Property owner was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion from relitigating whether the Hawaii Land Use Commission's reclassification of property owner's land from urban to agricultural use violated property owner's due process and equal protection rights, where such issues had previously been decided by the Supreme Court in property owner's related state administrative appeal.  125 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (2015).

  Act 195, Session Laws of Hawaii 2011, did not violate the equal protection clause. Act 195 facilitated self-governance and organization of native Hawaiians and established a commission to prepare and maintain a "roll" of qualified native Hawaiians.  Even if section 10H-5 contemplated or encouraged a convention, it simply called for a chance for certain native Hawaiians to independently organize themselves without involvement from the State.  141 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2015).

  Act 195, Session Laws of Hawaii 2011, met strict scrutiny for purposes of equal protection.  The State had a compelling interest in bettering the conditions of its indigenous people and, in doing so, provided dignity in allowing a starting point for a process of self-determination, and Act 195's restriction to native Hawaiians was precisely tailored to meet that compelling interest.  141 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2015).

  Neither nonprofit corporation's proposed election of native Hawaiian delegates to a convention of native Hawaiians to discuss, and possibly organize, a native Hawaiian governing entity nor Act 195, Session Laws of Hawaii 2011 violated plaintiff's equal protection or due process rights under this amendment.  Under 42 U.S.C. §1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the deprivation of a constitutional right occurred under the color of a statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any state.  141 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2015).

  Ordinance prohibiting use of streets for soliciting sales does not violate equal protection clause.  43 H. 71.

  Classifications in ordinance regulating signs upheld, in absence of showing of discrimination.  50 H. 33, 429 P.2d 825.

  Three-year residence qualification for jurors upheld, in absence of showing of discrimination.  51 H. 195, 456 P.2d 805.

  Law imposing upon private employers the obligation to pay their employees who serve on juries and public boards, was invalid; reasonableness of classification discussed.  52 H. 327, 475 P.2d 679.

  Law authorizing imprisonment of person unable to pay fine, denied equal protection.  52 H. 601, 483 P.2d 191.

  Durational residence requirement has no rational basis and violates equal protection clause.  53 H. 557, 498 P.2d 644.

  Suggestion of leniency in return for testimony made to one co-defendant but not to another is not a denial of equal protection.  53 H. 574, 499 P.2d 678.

  Regulatory classifications are presumed valid and are to be upheld unless no reasonable state of facts is conceivable to support them.  55 H. 148, 516 P.2d 715.

  Discrimination in tax statute not invalid if there is rational basis for classification.  55 H. 572, 524 P.2d 890.

  Inconsistent with due process and equal protection to say putative father of illegitimate child has no parental rights.  56 H. 462, 541 P.2d 13.

  Differing treatment of alcohol and marijuana is not so arbitrary as to violate equal protection.  56 H. 501, 542 P.2d 366.

  University policy relating to retirement of person sixty-five years or older is not reasonably related to a state interest and is unconstitutional.  56 H. 601, 546 P.2d 1005.

  Law requiring payment of taxes prior to judicial hearing, does not deny equal protection.  57 H. 1, 548 P.2d 246.

  Requirement that a woman visitor to an all-male prison wear a brassiere is not invalid.  59 H. 346, 581 P.2d 1164.

  Sex-based classification must serve important governmental objective and be substantially related to the achievement of the objective.  59 H. 346, 581 P.2d 1164.

  Law requiring indigent candidates to submit nomination papers signed by a certain percentage of the voters in lieu of a filing fee, does not deny equal protection.  59 H. 430, 583 P.2d 955.

  Providing different means for partisan and nonpartisan candidates to appear on election ballot did not violate equal protection.  60 H. 282, 588 P.2d 915.

  A statute does not violate the equal protection clause merely because it could have included other persons, objects or conduct.  61 H. 262, 602 P.2d 914.

  Sex-based classification must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.  62 H. 120, 612 P.2d 526.

  Law prohibiting play of pinball machines, no longer bears rational relationship to legitimate statutory objective and denies equal protection.  62 H. 147, 613 P.2d 354.

  Discriminatory enforcement of a criminal law is unconstitutional and may be raised as a defense.  62 H. 222, 615 P.2d 730.

  Exemption of certain products from liquor tax was rationally related to achievement of valid legislative purpose.  65 H. 566, 656 P.2d 724.

  No violation in law denying bail pending appeal to convicted felon sentenced to imprisonment.  66 H. 82, 657 P.2d 464.

  Defendant failed to meet burden of proving intentional or purposeful discrimination; prostitution prohibition is gender-neutral; even if not, it does not deny equal protection.  67 H. 608, 699 P.2d 983.

  Rational basis exists for treating public assistance recipients differently from other no-fault insurance policyholders.  68 H. 192, 708 P.2d 129.

  Not violated by disqualification of recalled officials from running for vacancy created by recall.  68 H. 263, 711 P.2d 723.

  No equal protection violation where there is no showing that the two groups are similarly circumstanced.  69 H. 349, 742 P.2d 359.

  Reapportionment plan not unconstitutional where there was no identifiable political group whose homogenous interests might be the subject of illegal discrimination and no evidence of invidious purpose.  75 H. 463, 868 P.2d 1183.

  Equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment not violated by §601-20(b) (court annexed arbitration program).  76 H. 494, 880 P.2d 169.

  Where county imposed impermissibly discriminatory tax, county must be given certain options to correct the impermissible discrimination.  81 H. 248, 915 P.2d 1349.

  Section 704-415 does not violate equal protection; State may place burden on insanity acquittee to prove by preponderance of evidence that acquittee should be released.  84 H. 269, 933 P.2d 606.

  Not violated by trial court's redaction of home street addresses and home and work telephone numbers on juror qualification forms where redaction procedure was not administered differently against other similarly situated criminal defendants having jury trials in the first circuit.  85 H. 258, 942 P.2d 522.

  As chapter 671 rationally furthers legitimate state interest of assuring the provision of affordable health care to Hawaii's citizens by requiring  participation in medical malpractice dispute resolution such that the high cost of  litigation may be avoided, plaintiff not denied equal protection of the laws.  89 H. 188, 970 P.2d 496.

  Not violated by county ordinance classifying time share units into "hotel resort" category where classification was reasonably related to ordinance's stated purpose of eliminating disproportionate tax burdens within that category and classification applied to properties whose actual use was transient or short-term, regardless of whether the units were used personally. 90 H. 334, 978 P.2d 772.

  Clause not violated by §709-906 as State has a legitimate interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, enactment of §709-906 to address family violence within the community is "legitimate" in protecting Hawaii's citizens, and as including family and household members within scope of §709-906 may reduce or deter family violence by imposing upon violators greater criminal punishment than criminal assault, it is rationally related to the State's interest in preventing incidents of family violence.  93 H. 63, 996 P.2d 268.

  Search warrant did not violate appellant's rights under the U.S. and Hawaii Constitutions although it was not issued against any other bettors; to raise the selective prosecution defense, appellant needed to present sufficient evidence as to why appellant was prosecuted while the other seven bettors were not; reason provided by appellant that detective arbitrarily "classified" appellant as part of a conspiracy did not explain why only appellant was subject to the search warrant nor did it distinguish appellant from other bettors.  104 H. 323, 89 P.3d 823.

  As the imposition of a rent trust fund--requiring tenants to pay rent in exchange for possession for the duration of the dispute--appears rationally related to achieving the purpose of providing landlords with an expeditious alternative to eviction proceedings and tenants with an opportunity to maintain possession so long as rent is paid when properly due, §666-21 does not violate this clause.  107 H. 73, 110 P.3d 397.

  Trial court did not err in concluding that there was no unconstitutional deviation in the population count in the county council districts as set forth in the council redistricting plan adopted by the county reapportionment commission where the plan complied with the mandate of the county charter that the districts be comprised of "approximately equal resident populations as required by applicable constitutional provisions".  108 H. 318, 120 P.3d 217.

  Chapter 584 did not implicate father's fundamental privacy right to procreational autonomy, but rather father's economic interest in not supporting his child, and although father had standing to raise an equal protection challenge to chapter 584, that standing was based on a non-suspect classification, i.e., the biological relationship of fathers to their children; thus, because chapter 584 bears a rational relation to the public welfare, the statute survives rational basis review and father's privacy and equal protection arguments failed.  109 H. 240, 125 P.3d 461.

  Where insurance commissioner imposed a substantial portion of the administrative cost of operating the insurance division and its supporting offices and divisions upon insurers pursuant to §431:2-215, and the insurance division's regulatory costs were necessitated by the business of insurers, §431:2-215 did not violate this Amendment or article I, §5 of the Hawaii constitution.  120 H. 51, 201 P.3d 564.

  Where the land use commission (LUC) reverted property to the agricultural land use district, the circuit court erred in concluding that property owners' equal protection rights were violated because the record did not establish that the LUC lacked a rational basis for its decisions.  134 H. 187, 339 P.3d 685 (2014).

  Complaint that defendants illegally denied student's right to participate in interscholastic sports stated cognizable claim.  6 H. App. 397, 721 P.2d 165.

  Not violated by §291C-112, which rationally furthers legitimate state interest in protecting health and welfare of public at large by prohibiting use of vehicles parked on public property as places of habitation during certain hours.  82 H. 269 (App.), 921 P.2d 1170.

  Not violated by use of preponderance of evidence standard of proof for §586-5.5 as family and household members not suspect class and rational basis underlying this standard adopted by legislature under chapter 571 for chapter 586 was to facilitate and expedite judicial issuance of protective orders.  85 H. 197 (App.), 940 P.2d 404.

  As a suspect classification or fundamental right was not involved, and based upon dissimilar statutory treatment generally accorded to possession of marijuana as opposed to alcohol, where there was a rational basis for dissimilar punishment, §710-1022 did not violate defendant's right because it imposed a more severe penalty for a prisoner's marijuana possession than for alcohol possession under §710-1023.  92 H. 217 (App.), 990 P.2d 115.

  Not violated by disparate treatment of persons enjoined under §604-10.5(a)(1) and (a)(2) as those enjoined under subsection (a)(1) are not subject to a suspect classification vis-a-vis those enjoined under subsection (a)(2) and the legislature could reasonably omit a state-of-mind element in the more perilous cases under subsection (a)(1) but require an intentional or knowing course of conduct in subsection (a)(2) cases.  92 H. 312 (App.), 990 P.2d 1194.

  1998 Amended Child Support Guidelines classification challenged by father was constitutional as it reasonably calculated the child support payable for child without regard to child support owed by the non-custodial parent to other children, whether by a previous court order or a non-adjudicated legal obligation, and reasonably imposed upon the non-custodial parent the burden of proving that exceptional circumstances warrant deviation from the calculated amount.  104 H. 449 (App.), 91 P.3d 1092.

  Amounts assessed by the state insurance division against insurers for payment into the insurance regulation fund under §431:2-215 did not violate this Amendment where the regulatory fees were rationally related to the statutory objective of defraying any administrative costs and costs incurred by supporting offices and divisions.  117 H. 454 (App.), 184 P.3d 769.

  State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the case was not constitutionally infirm where defendant failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that defendant was prosecuted based on an arbitrary classification; defendant was prosecuted under §§707-730 and 707-732 based on allegations that defendant was significantly older than child #1, had initiated the prohibited sexual activities with child #1 and child #2, and had engaged in multiple instances of prohibited sexual contact with more than one child.  121 H. 92 (App.), 214 P.3d 1082 (2009).

  Granting the labor relations board exclusive original jurisdiction over plaintiff's action under §89-14 did not violate plaintiff's equal protection right; as plaintiff's fundamental right was not implicated, and plaintiff did not argue that public employees were a suspect class, the board's exclusive original jurisdiction over public sector prohibited practice controversies was rationally related to the public policy of chapter 89.  125 H. 317 (App.), 260 P.3d 1135 (2011).

 

Privileges and immunities.

  Plaintiff's claim that chapter 134 interfered with a right of national citizenship because it restricted the right to carry firearms was without merit.  548 F. Supp. 2d 1151.

  Law requiring three-year residence qualification for jurors does not violate privileges and immunities clause.  51 H. 195, 456 P.2d 805.

 

Right to privacy.

  Extends to decisions regarding psychiatric care and communication of personal information.  481 F. Supp. 1028.

  Defendant had no continuing or existing reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to defendant's hotel room pursuant to the Fourth Amendment when a person, who has the authority to do so, takes justifiable affirmative steps to evict defendant with the help of law enforcement prior to Federal Bureau of Investigation agents' entry into the hotel room.  693 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2010).

 

 

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