The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Attorney General Opinions
Bargained for random drug testing program for public school teachers with appropriate procedural protections is constitutional and would not violate either the federal or state Constitution. If a court were to find such a program to violate either the federal or state Constitution, the doctrine of qualified immunity would bar personal liability for any state official; if a court were to impose personal liability, based upon past history and practice, the legislature would fund payment of the claims. Att. Gen. Op. 08-1.
Law Journals and Reviews
Suppression of Evidence Without the Aid of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 8 HBJ 109.
In Search of Reason at the Border. 10 HBJ 101.
"Totem Pole" Hearsay and the Search Warrant Affidavit. 12 HBJ No. 4 Winter 1977, pg. 3.
State v. Sherlock: Police Use of a Controlled Purchase of Contraband to Corroborate an Informant's Tip. 12 UH L. Rev. 237.
Reasonable Searches Absent Individualized Suspicion: Is There a Drug-Testing Exception to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement After Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association? 12 UH L. Rev. 343.
State v. Rothman: Expanding the Individual's Right to Privacy Under the Hawaii Constitution. 13 UH L. Rev. 619.
The Protection of Individual Rights Under Hawai`i's Constitution. 14 UH L. Rev. 311.
State v. Quino: The Hawai`i Supreme Court Pulls Out All the "Stops". 15 UH L. Rev. 289.
Criminal Procedure Rights Under the Hawaii Constitution Since 1992. 18 UH L. Rev. 683.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton: Now Children Must Shed Their Constitutional Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate. 18 UH L. Rev. 869.
Cyberprivacy on the Corporate Intranet: Does the Law Allow Private-Sector Employers to Read Their Employees' E-mail? 20 UH L. Rev. 165.
Wyoming v. Houghton: The Bright Line Search Includes Passengers' Belongings. 22 UH L. Rev. 645.
United States v. Montero-Camargo Elimination of the Race Factor Develops Piecemeal: The Ninth Circuit Approach. 23 UH L. Rev. 703.
Kyllo v. United States: The Warrantless Use of Thermal Imagery Devices, and Why the Public Use Standard Proves Unworkable. 24 UH L. Rev. 383.
Still Wondering After All These Years: Ferguson v. City of Charleston and the Supreme Court's Lack of Guidance over Drug Testing and the Special Needs Doctrine. 24 UH L. Rev. 797.
Reconsidering Hawai`i's HIV Statute: The Need to Protect an Individual's Basic Liberties. 28 UH L. Rev. 169.
Drunk, Driving, and Untouchable: The Implications of State v. Heapy on Reasonable Suspicion in Hawai`i. 31 UH L. Rev. 607 (2009).
State v. Spillner: An Investigatory Traffic Stop Based on Unreasonable Suspicion. 31 UH L. Rev. 631 (2009).
The Privacy Rights of Public School Students. 32 UH L. Rev. 305 (2010).
Hawai`i's Right to Privacy. 33 UH L. Rev. 669 (2011).
Chief Justice Moon's Criminal Past. 33 UH L. Rev. 755 (2011).
Homeless Property Rights: An Analysis of Homelessness, Honolulu's "Sidewalk Law," and Whether Real Property is a Condition Precedent to the Full Enjoyment of Rights under the U.S. Constitution. 35 UH L. Rev. 197 (2013).
State Search and Seizure: The Original Meaning. 38 UH L. Rev. 63 (2016).
A Unified Framework to Adjudicate Corporate Constitutional Rights. 39 UH L. Rev. 115 (2016).
Turning Homeowners into Outlaws: How Anti-Home-Sharing Regulations Chip Away at the Foundation of an American Dream. 39 UH L. Rev. 395 (2017).
Plaintiff contended that police officer used deadly force against plaintiff's son in violation of son's Fourth Amendment rights and that the district court erred in granting the officer qualified immunity; district court's judgment affirmed. 511 F.3d 901.
Police officers did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment in attempting to restrain an individual. 523 F.3d 1103.
A reasonable fact finder could conclude that the defendant-appellant police officers' use of a taser gun in dart-mode, as alleged, against plaintiff-appellee was constitutionally excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; however, defendant-appellant police officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established when the conduct occurred. 661 F.3d 433 (2011).
Trial court's jury instruction enforced an erroneous partial grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant police officers and constituted reversible error, where jury was instructed that defendants did not, as a matter of law, use excessive force when they broke stolen vehicle's window and dragged plaintiff through it. The substance of the applicable law under Graham is whether the officers' force was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances; the court's instruction plainly prevented the jury from applying Graham to all of the relevant facts. 704 F. 3d 624 (2012).
There was no constitutional violation and individual police officers were entitled to qualified immunity in the 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights suit stemming from allegations of excessive force, where unwanted visitor died as a result of a heart attack sustained during the encounter with police. 414 F. Supp. 2d 965.
Where plaintiff alleged that defendant police officer violated an individual's Fourth Amendment rights when the officer shot and killed the individual, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. 554 F. Supp. 2d 1141.
Based on the totality of the circumstances and on factors prescribed by the United States Supreme Court in Graham, defendant police officers did not employ excessive force against plaintiff based on the situation that presented itself to defendants prior to plaintiff being removed from the car by defendants; however, defendants' motion for summary judgment denied because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether or not defendants' use of force, once plaintiff was removed from the car plaintiff was in, was reasonable. 753 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (2010).
Defendant city and county of Honolulu's motion to dismiss denied on plaintiff's claim that plaintiff was subjected to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment where plaintiff alleged that defendant police officer shot plaintiff with a taser without provocation, and proceeded to punch and kick plaintiff, while in the course of arresting plaintiff. 761 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (2010).
Where plaintiff alleged that defendant police officer's failure to intercede to stop alleged violations violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force, plaintiff's failure to intercede claim failed. Plaintiff failed to set forth facts sufficient to demonstrate the kind of cooperation and/or conspiracy necessary for a finding that defendant security guard, a private party, may be considered a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §1983 liability; as such, defendant security guard could not fairly be characterized as defendant police officer's "fellow officer". 955 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (2013).
Person entrusted with photos by co-owner had authority to consent to police examination of them. 575 F.2d 209.
"Voluntariness" of consent to search is a factual question to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. 577 F.2d 473.
Court agreed with district court's reasoning rejecting contentions that, inter alia, consent to undercover agents' entry into home was vitiated when, in response to direct question, they denied that they were police officers, and that warrantless entry of additional uniformed officers was unlawful and therefore invalidated subsequent consent to search. 103 F.3d 1475.
Not violated where homeowner voluntarily consented to search for marijuana even if co-owner's later consent was involuntary. 779 F. Supp. 1272.
Entry and search of hotel room was nonconsensual where government agents threatened to break door down and were observed with weapons drawn. 803 F. Supp. 352.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, although defendant was in custody and was not read Miranda rights before providing consent, defendant's consent to search defendant's luggage was ultimately intelligent and voluntary; inter alia, detective's suggestion that defendant may be able to continue defendant's travels if defendant consented did not transform the consent into a product of duress or coercion. 835 F. Supp. 2d 938 (2011).
Defendant's consent to search and waiver of search warrant was voluntary; scope of consent was not exceeded. 894 F. Supp. 1384.
Authority of defendant's wife to consent to search and seizure considered. 45 H. 622, 372 P.2d 365.
Right to privacy is a personal right that can be waived by possessor only. 51 H. 62, 451 P.2d 257.
To be valid, consent to warrantless search must be voluntary. 55 H. 442, 521 P.2d 376.
Determination of voluntariness of consent. 58 H. 462, 571 P.2d 745.
Consent implied where visitor applies for admission to prison with knowledge of practice of strip search. 59 H. 366, 580 P.2d 1282.
Question raised but not decided. 63 H. 95, 621 P.2d 374.
Consent to search was given under duress. X-ray should have been conducted as least intrusive means of conducting body cavity search. 65 H. 601, 655 P.2d 864.
No showing of voluntary consent by defendant to search car. 67 H. 126, 681 P.2d 553.
Babysitter did not have authority to consent to search of suspect's room. 67 H. 496, 692 P.2d 1156.
Finding that defendant not coerced by police officers and voluntarily consented to search of defendant's truck not clearly erroneous. 81 H. 358, 917 P.2d 370.
Evidence found in defendant's living room illegally seized where no exigent circumstances or search warrant to enter living room and person consenting to police entering living room did not have "actual authority" to consent. 82 H. 394 (App.), 922 P.2d 1007.
Warrantless search of defendant's bedroom in defendant's parents' house unreasonable where mother did not have actual authority to consent to search of son's bedroom; son had, by implicit agreement and in practice, exclusive possession of bedroom, and there was no indication that son gave mother access to room or permission to allow others access. 96 H. 472 (App.), 32 P.3d 116.
Right of privacy.
Arrest of defendants sunbathing nude on public beach did not violate their right of privacy. 52 H. 336, 475 P.2d 684.
Not violated by use by police of a ruse to effect the voluntary opening of a door and the subsequent entry without use of force for purpose of executing a lawful arrest warrant. 83 H. 13, 924 P.2d 181.
Regardless of the number of times that the police tested defendant's blood sample for its DNA, no violation of defendant's constitutional right to privacy occurred because the analyses did not exceed the objective for which the original warrant was sought--DNA testing for the purpose of identification. 103 H. 38, 79 P.3d 131.
Where police forcibly entered petitioner's home in pursuit of petitioner's son without a warrant and in the absence of any exigent circumstances, there was no conceivable basis in the law to uphold the entry as valid; thus, trial court's conclusion to the contrary reversed. 121 H. 74, 214 P.3d 613 (2009).
Search and seizure generally.
Drug enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs to make investigative stop. 490 U.S. 1.
If inaccuracies in warrant affidavit are not deliberate and remaining allegations support probable cause, seizure based on the warrant is lawful. 575 F.2d 209.
Absent exigent circumstances, seizure of items alleged to violate Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act must comply with basic Fourth Amendment requirements. 641 F.2d 1289.
General requirements for probable cause. 703 F.2d 408.
Even though article seized illegally, forfeiture may proceed if requirement for forfeiture can be satisfied with untainted evidence. 715 F.2d 1339.
Probable cause for search of vehicle and plastic bag within. 757 F.2d 969.
Defendant's purchase of printing equipment and ink, questions about printing, and conversation established probable cause for defendant's arrest for counterfeiting. Untainted information independently established probable cause for search of vehicle. 790 F.2d 789.
Under circumstances, affidavit provided substantial basis for warrant though based on allegedly anonymous and conclusory allegations. 795 F.2d 841.
Seizure was reasonable when defendants were detained at airport while dog sniffed their luggage, and during detention federal agent held their airplane tickets and drivers' licenses; dog's sniff of luggage not a search; admissibility of notes discovered in envelope in defendant's luggage, after search, where warrant covered only drugs. 796 F.2d 257.
No "plain view" seizure since government agents' presence no longer justified. 807 F.2d 792.
Defendant was seized when grabbed by the arm and sat down for questioning; seizure not based on reasonable suspicion. 808 F.2d 1366.
A person who is detained illegally is not immunized from prosecution for crimes committed during the person's detention. 812 F.2d 1250.
Detention of packages suspected of containing marijuana for seven to twenty-three days prior to obtaining a search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 849 F.2d 414.
Investigatory detention was justified. 871 F.2d 1497.
Warrant authorizing search and seizure of art gallery's entire works was overbroad. 875 F.2d 747.
Detention was reasonable where police detained party for interview but waited until party was sober. 879 F.2d 607.
No seizure occurred when defendant voluntarily gave agent airline ticket. 887 F.2d 232.
No reasonable expectation of privacy in illegally taken seal meat stored in freezer where defendant merely had possession to store meat, not right to exclude others from freezer. 945 F.2d 254.
Not applicable to search of nonresident aliens on ship in international waters. 946 F.2d 608.
Probable cause demonstrated for warrant authorizing drug raid on defendants' home independent of readings taken by infrared device during helicopter surveillance of home. 984 F.2d 1053.
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in hallway outside defendant's apartment in high security high rise apartment building. 3 F.3d 1239.
Employee's contention that employee's designation as a witness in IRS summons to obtain handwriting exemplars was a calculated maneuver to circumvent employee's Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures and employee's due process rights under both Fifth Amendment and IRS regulations, rejected. 94 F.3d 1342.
Where an undercover agent is invited into a home, establishes the existence of probable cause to arrest or search, and immediately summons help from other officers, the other officers' warrantless entry does not violate Fourth Amendment. 103 F.3d 1475.
Search warrant authorizing search of a residence also authorizes without so stating the search of the residence's curtilage. 104 F.3d 272.
District court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress evidence acquired after Federal Express employees opened appellant's package and contacted Drug Enforcement Administration because they suspected it contained illegal drugs, affirmed, where appellant failed to establish Federal Express was acting as an instrument or agent of the government. 153 F.3d 1079.
When an administrative search scheme encompasses both a permissible and an impermissible purpose, and when the officer conducting the search has broad discretion in carrying out the search, that search does not meet Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirements. Secondary purpose for administrative search was improper, where primary purpose behind search at federal building was to look for weapons and explosives, and secondary purpose was to look for other materials that violated regulations, e.g., drugs. 156 F.3d 963.
Fourth Amendment had no application, where defendants challenged "walk and talk" procedure in which police officer made initial contact with defendants, arguing that, although in form consensual, the approach was in fact coercive, defendants yielding to pressure exerted by a police officer showing officer's identification and asking if they were willing to speak. 177 F.3d 1130.
Where defendants contended that officer lacked probable cause to arrest either of them, probable cause that was sufficient for officer to arrest [other person] also was sufficient for officer to arrest the two persons officer had observed acting in concert with [other person]. 177 F.3d 1130.
District court judgment affirmed, concerning order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained by police during allegedly illegal search of defendant's home; defendant contended, inter alia, that observations made by officers while standing within curtilage of defendant's home were made in violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and were wrongfully relied upon by magistrate in issuing search warrant, arguing that officers had no right to approach defendant's home in an attempt to investigate their suspicions, officers violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by leaving front door and circling defendant's home, and marijuana plants were not in plain view of officers. 236 F.3d 1054.
Defendants lacked standing to challenge police entry into hotel room at 12:40 p.m., where a defendant had checked out of the hotel before noon and other defendant's expectation of privacy was reasonable only until 12:30 p.m. 241 F.3d 1124.
Where police stopped defendant's rental car after they had received a report from the car's owner that the car was overdue, police had reasonable suspicion to stop the car, even if the report turned out to be mistaken due to its timing, because the police were acting on a police report from the car's owner, whose honesty had not been questioned. 241 F.3d 1124.
Prosecutor entitled to qualified immunity where the right allegedly violated, i.e., Fourth Amendment right not to have a prosecutor, in order to obtain a bail revocation, personally attest to a false statement of a biased source with no investigation of the statement's truth or falsity, was not "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violation. 279 F.3d 1064.
Detention of express mail package addressed to defendant was reasonable, where defendant challenged postal inspector's initial detention of the package and the delay in calling for a canine unit to sniff the package. 313 F.3d 1206.
In 42 U.S.C. §1983 case against an elementary school vice principal who taped a second grade student's head to a tree for disciplinary purposes, student's claim was appropriately brought under the Fourth Amendment, and district court correctly denied vice principal's motion for summary judgment on basis of qualified immunity. 334 F.3d 906.
Where defendant had no privacy interest in an illegal gambling room, defendant could not challenge the protective sweep. The fact that defendant was arrested outside the gambling room did not automatically preclude police officers from conducting an appropriate sweep of the interior of the room to dispel suspicion and protect themselves; police officer's search behind the sofa did not exceed the scope of the protective sweep. 469 F.3d 760.
Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not implicated by the brief pre-sniff detention of defendant's package and thus could not be violated. Once the narcotics detection dog alerted to the package, probable cause supported the further diversion of the package, and the search was properly conducted pursuant to a warrant. 486 F.3d 1156.
Airport screening search of defendant was a constitutionally reasonable administrative search, where defendant elected to attempt entry into the posted secured area of the airport when defendant walked through the magnetometer, thereby subjecting defendant to the airport screening process. 497 F.3d 955.
Even if the search warrant was technically deficient, the executing FBI agents were entitled to the good faith exception; the search warrant adequately described the items to be seized; the agents did not act unreasonably in failing to enlist the help of an agent fluent in Chinese in conducting the search. 525 F.3d 709.
To establish probable cause for defendant's arrest, plaintiff government did not need to prove that the arresting officers knew defendant had committed a crime, but only that the officers' belief that defendant committed crimes related to child pornography was an objectively reasonable one; district court erred, and case was remanded for further proceedings. 648 F.3d 820 (2011).
Transportation Security Administration employee's viewing of photographs from the envelope found in defendant's luggage during airport screening was justified by and part of the lawful administrative search and even the development of a secondary desire to confirm that the photographs evidenced contraband did not invalidate that search; suppression order by district court vacated and remanded. 648 F.3d 820 (2011).
Warrantless search of defendant's vehicle was permissible under the automobile exception of this amendment, where law enforcement agents had probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in defendant's truck. Among the totality of circumstances, defendant was associating with known drug dealer, dealer's concern that dealer and defendant meet alone suggested that they were engaging in illicit activity, and agent intercepted text message from defendant to dealer asking for defendant's "tools" back, referring to methamphetamine. 869 F.3d 1145 (2017).
Telescopic surveillance of apartment by government agents without a warrant held to be an unreasonable search. 415 F. Supp. 1252.
Section 346-42, authorizing inspection of offices and records of medical providers, violated Fourth Amendment because it did not require that facts upon which inspection is based be measured against objective standard. 481 F. Supp. 1028.
Prevailing federal law is that warrantless recordings do not violate Fourth Amendment where one party to conversation consents to recording. 526 F. Supp. 1198.
Postal parcel held for seven days without a warrant was an unreasonable seizure. 666 F. Supp. 1424.
The warrantless entry of a home by deception is not a violation. 673 F. Supp. 387.
Applicable to searches and seizures on the high seas. 685 F. Supp. 732.
Exclusionary rule is completely irrelevant to issues involving the operation of grand juries. 707 F. Supp. 1207.
Agent was entitled to open notebook located on passenger seat to see if it contained a weapon. 751 F. Supp. 161.
Police department did not exhibit a deliberate indifference to warrantless stops and arrests. 751 F. Supp. 1385.
Government must demonstrate probable cause to believe that seized property was involved with illegal drugs or money laundering transactions prescribed by statutes. 754 F. Supp. 1467.
Defendants had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in heat emanations, as incidental byproduct of energy sources used in marijuana cultivation, detected by instrument in helicopter flying above defendants' residence. 773 F. Supp. 220.
Probable cause existed to believe that search of defendant's residence would uncover specific evidence relating to drug trafficking. 800 F. Supp. 892.
Seizure of vehicle proper where probable cause existed to believe vehicle had been used to transport drugs. 803 F. Supp. 352.
Airport "walk and talk" encounter was a consensual exchange under federal law; even if a seizure, it was supported by reasonable suspicion and was therefore valid. 823 F. Supp. 792.
Federal law governed admissibility of evidence in case involving investigatory detention where there was no federal investigative involvement at time of encounter and arrest. 823 F. Supp. 792.
Where plaintiff asserted that defendant police officer and defendant resident manager unlawfully arrested plaintiff, both defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for harassment. 855 F. Supp. 1167.
No government action, where defendant's law partner (off-duty reserve police officer), former secretary, and former secretary's husband (off-duty full-time police officer) removed documents and on-duty police officers sent to law firm did not remove any files or property from law firm. 14 F. Supp. 2d 1194.
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence denied, where government demonstrated that defendant's initial encounter with officer and search were consensual, that there was probable cause for defendant's arrest, and that evidence in issue was therefore lawfully obtained. 191 F. Supp. 2d 1173.
Plaintiffs challenging city and county of Honolulu's practice of charging nonresidents a $3 fee to enter bay designated a marine life conservation district and nature preserve were not "seized" in violation of the Fourth Amendment or article I, §7 of the Hawaii constitution; stopping to pay $3 entrance fee at turnstile did not constitute an impermissible seizure. 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098.
Police officer had not established that the officer was entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, where in plaintiff's version of events, the officer could see plaintiff's hands in the air and therefore knew that shooting plaintiff would clearly violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. 294 F. Supp. 2d 1179.
Where plaintiff sued defendant for allegedly violating plaintiff's rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, based on defendant's involvement in the removal and subsequent destruction of motorcycles and mopeds in the area of plaintiff's motorcycle repair shop, genuine issues of material fact existed and precluded the court from determining whether defendant was entitled to qualified immunity under federal law. 333 F. Supp. 2d 942.
Police officers did not violate a civil process server's Fourth Amendment rights, because the officers had probable cause to arrest the process server for impersonating a law enforcement officer; since no constitutional violation occurred, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. 348 F. Supp. 2d 1165.
Defendant's ownership interest in a mailed parcel, where defendant was neither the sender nor the addressee of the parcel, along with defendant's control and supervision of the parcel, was sufficient to manifest a subjective expectation of privacy, and the expectation was objectively reasonable; defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained through an initial warrantless search and an ensuing sting operation and subsequent home search granted. 351 F. Supp. 2d 1040.
"Automobile exception" permitted police officers to search defendant's car without a search warrant, provided that the government had probable cause to believe that defendant's car contained contraband or evidence of a crime; the police had probable cause to believe that they would find a shotgun and ammunition in the trunk and center console of the car, based on the totality of the circumstances. The police were entitled to search the car to protect the public safety. 388 F. Supp. 2d 1185.
Defendant had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle defendant was driving and the search of the locked duffel bag removed from the vehicle. DEA special agent's affidavit in support of the search warrant for the bag contained sufficient detail to establish probable cause; even if the affidavit failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause, the DEA agents acted in good faith and the evidence obtained from the bag need not be suppressed. 470 F. Supp. 2d 1202.
Container search by government agents that occurred at the U.S. border as the container was entering the country, was conducted in a reasonable manner and the searches of defendant at the airport as defendant was exiting the country, were constitutionally valid. 610 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (2009).
Defendant social worker was not entitled to qualified immunity because defendant did not have specific, articulable evidence that provided reasonable cause to believe that the subject child was in imminent danger of abuse before defendant took custody of the child; the lack of exigency would have been apparent to any reasonable social worker and defendant violated plaintiffs' clearly established Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by taking custody of the child without a warrant. 683 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (2009).
Federal Bureau of Investigation's agents limited search for weapons in defendant's hotel room's night drawer was reasonable in order to ensure officer safety and public safety prior to defendant's hotel room co-occupant's access to defendant and defendant's hotel room co-occupant's belongings. 693 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2010).
Search warrant and supporting affidavit sufficiently established a basis for probable cause to search defendant's computer and peripheral devices for evidence relating to defendant's crimes; search was not overreaching because the search produced only evidence related to defendant's crimes and the evidence found was not used to substantiate additional charges or establish additional search warrants against defendant. 693 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2010).
Defendant city and county of Honolulu's motion to dismiss denied on plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim where plaintiff alleged that a police officer shot plaintiff with a taser, punched and kicked plaintiff and proceeded to arrest plaintiff without any provocation or probable cause to believe plaintiff committed a crime because it was plausible to infer that defendant failed to adequately train and/or supervise the police officers resulting in plaintiff's unlawful arrest. 761 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (2010).
Defendant's motion to suppress granted, where, government did not carry its burden of establishing that law enforcement agent had reasonable suspicion formed by specific, articulable acts to search defendant's car at a traffic stop and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment; collective knowledge doctrine did not apply to the evidence presented. 802 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (2011).
Based on all of the relevant circumstances--that TSA screeners saw photographs of nude and semi-nude children, at least one, if not two photos they saw contained child pornography, and there were additional photos that they were aware of--HCPD officers had an objectively reasonable belief that defendant had committed a violation of §707-752; in effect, probable cause to arrest defendant existed. 835 F. Supp. 2d 938 (2011).
The exclusionary rule did not apply to the attachment of a global positioning device on defendant's vehicle at the navigation dock because the search was conducted "in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent ... ", moreover, drug enforcement agents' conduct in the use of the GPS tracking device was objectively reasonable; the agents acted with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct was fully compliant with then-existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 856 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (2012).
Defendant, as an employee of defendant Hawaii Island Humane Society, was protected by qualified immunity; even if defendant's actions constituted a violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, qualified immunity would apply because plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights were not "clearly established". 947 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (2013).
Summary judgment granted to defendants county of Hawaii, Hawaii Island Humane Society (HIHS), HIHS executive director, and HIHS officer as to plaintiff's constitutional claims. Among other things, no violation of the Fourth Amendment, where: (1) search and seizure of dogs by defendant HIHS officer was performed under a valid search warrant; and (2) assuming plaintiff's version of the facts as true, the officer's disposal of the dogs was based on a mistake of fact as to the validity of the power of attorney and animal surrender policy form. The officer's failure to detect fraud regarding the documents was not objectively unreasonable. 947 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (2013).
Defendant police officer was not an integral participant in the alleged takedown and subsequent assaults such that defendant may be subject to 42 U.S.C. §1983 liability for those acts of other defendants. Also, plaintiff's allegations, absent specific facts indicating abusive or otherwise unreasonable conduct, were insufficient to demonstrate that defendant police officer acted unreasonably; therefore, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. 955 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (2013).
Plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order granted where, among other things, the county having failed to articulate a special need to subject plaintiff to mandatory urinalysis before plaintiff began work as scheduled for the county, the court found that plaintiff was likely to succeed on plaintiff's as-applied challenge under the Fourth Amendment. 90 F. Supp. 3d 1095 (2015).
No violation of this amendment arising from seizure of condemnee's protest signs, which had been placed on the property before condemnor asserted its right to exclusive possession. Condemnor had a strong possessory interest in the condemned property. Condemnee was provided with advanced notice and opportunity to retrieve condemnee's personal property, i.e., signs, which condemnee was later able to retrieve. Thus, the seizure of the signs was reasonable as a matter of law. 125 F. Supp. 3d 1080 (2015).
Officer did not have reasonable suspicion to seize defendant where officer did not have evidence that defendant, rather than other members of defendant's group, had committed or was about to commit a crime; officer did not observe defendant drinking, arguing, fighting or making unreasonable amounts of noise; thus, appeals court erred in affirming the district court's judgment. 126 H. 68, 266 P.3d 1122 (2011).
Where defendant was seized without reasonable suspicion when officer told defendant to exit the vehicle, and continued when officer subsequently chased defendant, officer's stop was a single illegal seizure; thus, officer's continuing attempt to improperly seize defendant placed officer in the position from which officer could observe the beer bottles in defendant's car and was thus evidence obtained as a result of an illegal seizure. 126 H. 68, 266 P.3d 1122 (2011).
Where officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop defendant when officer told defendant to exit car, and after officer chased defendant and subsequently discovered probable cause to arrest defendant when officer observed the beer bottles in defendant's car, the evidence obtained after the initial stop was the fruit of the poisonous tree as it was discovered by exploiting the officer's prior illegal seizure. 126 H. 68, 266 P.3d 1122 (2011).
Where police consent form stated that search of defendant's automobile and its contents was expressly confined to evidence of "firearms, ammunition", and officer acknowledged that the wallet was lying closed on the seat and that officer searched the wallet for ammunition but that officer was not nervous because officer could not "feel anything", officer's observations did not reasonably suggest the presence of ammunition in the wallet; thus, the continued search of the wallet that uncovered another person's license was objectively unreasonable and exceeded the scope of defendant's consent. 121 H. 533 (App.), 221 P.3d 511 (2009).
Navy police officer's initial search of defendant's car after defendant drove defendant's car back through the base gate and subsequent search by federal agents were supported by probable cause given the collective knowledge of the officers who were involved in the investigation and apprehension of defendant and thus were valid under the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement; given the proximity in time and location to the reported theft involving defendant, the large amount of money involved and other circumstances, there was probable cause to believe that the missing money or other evidence would be present in defendant's car. 122 H. 2 (App.), 222 P.3d 409 (2010).
Effect on confession. 45 H. 622, 372 P.2d 365.
Confession tainted by illegal search and seizure must be excluded. 48 H. 204, 397 P.2d 558.
Illegal arrest does not render defendant's statement inadmissible. 48 H. 204, 210, 397 P.2d 558; 49 H. 522, 529-30, 423 P.2d 438.
Use of flashlight by police officer in scanning interior of automobile lawfully stopped for traffic offense is not per se unreasonable search and seizure. 50 H. 461, 443 P.2d 149; 430 F.2d 58.
Place protected; test is whether the place is of such a character as to give rise reasonably to expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion. 52 H. 100, 470 P.2d 510.
Under the facts, warrantless search held not justified by "exigent circumstance" and not "incident to an arrest". 52 H. 100, 470 P.2d 510; 66 H. 499, 666 P.2d 592.
Probable cause: general definition; defendant's reputation as a factor. 52 H. 226, 473 P.2d 567.
Police officer may in appropriate circumstances stop a person to investigate possible criminal activities even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. 52 H. 497, 479 P.2d 800.
No warrant is required when government secret agent is invited to private home to purchase marijuana and later goes there and makes purchase. 54 H. 513, 510 P.2d 1066.
Search or arrest without warrant valid only when officer has probable cause to believe that a crime is being, was, or is about to be, committed. Exists when facts and circumstances would warrant reasonable person to believe crime is being committed. 54 H. 552, 512 P.2d 551.
Search warrants; manner of executing warrants covering drugs; scope of warrants. 55 H. 90, 516 P.2d 65.
Sufficiency of affidavits based on informer's tip to support issuance of warrant. 55 H. 90, 516 P.2d 65.
If facts in affidavit together with reasonable inferences support existence of probable cause, appellate court is constrained to uphold that finding by lower court, even though other inferences might point to opposite conclusion. 55 H. 565, 524 P.2d 290.
Requisites of affidavit for warrant based on informer's tips. 55 H. 565, 524 P.2d 290.
Staleness of information forming basis of affidavit. 55 H. 565, 524 P.2d 290.
Warrant to search premises does not authorize search of identified possessions of visitors present during execution of warrant. 55 H. 583, 525 P.2d 573.
Street interrogation by police did not constitute "seizure". 56 H. 8, 525 P.2d 1099.
Although initial stop of vehicle was proper, when police without justification required defendant to leave vehicle, unlawful seizure of person occurred. 56 H. 216, 533 P.2d 270.
Disclosure of informer's identity is not required where sole purpose is to challenge finding of probable cause. 58 H. 19, 563 P.2d 990.
Sufficiency of affidavit based on informer's tip to support issuance of warrant. 58 H. 19, 563 P.2d 990.
Helicopter observation of open marijuana patch did not constitute search. 58 H. 412, 570 P.2d 1323.
Sufficiency of affidavit based upon hearsay. 58 H. 485, 572 P.2d 856.
Informant, actively recruited by police, may be considered agent of State, and Fourth Amendment prohibitions would apply to searches made by informant. 58 H. 530, 574 P.2d 1330.
Where officer had to stand upon a crate stacked on a bench to peer through a hole in the drawn drapes covering a window, the occupants had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 59 H. 23, 575 P.2d 462.
Sufficiency of affidavit based on informer's tip. 59 H. 120, 577 P.2d 335.
Discretionary stop of automobile by police officer to investigate possible violation of laws regulating motor vehicles may be made only if supported by a reasonable belief of a violation. 59 H. 130, 577 P.2d 781.
Strip search of prison visitor not unreasonable. 59 H. 366, 580 P.2d 1282.
In seizure of gun without warrant, knowledge of one officer was imputed to the other to establish probable cause. 59 H. 375, 581 P.2d 758.
Investigative stop of automobile held not justified under the circumstances. 59 H. 386, 581 P.2d 765.
Use of evidence wrongfully obtained--permissible scope. 59 H. 572, 584 P.2d 127.
Whether governmental visual surveillance was an unreasonable search depended on whether defendant had exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy. 60 H. 301, 588 P.2d 447.
Marijuana plants exposed to viewing by public are not within reasonable expectation of privacy. 60 H. 318, 589 P.2d 527.
Elements of legitimate expectation of privacy. 61 H. 117, 596 P.2d 773.
"Open view" doctrine applied. 61 H. 124, 596 P.2d 777.
Arrest without warrant for a specific offense was valid where police had probable cause to arrest for a different but closely related offense. 61 H. 291, 602 P.2d 933.
Pre-incarceration search. 61 H. 291, 602 P.2d 933.
Investigative stop and warrantless search of automobile. 61 H. 316, 603 P.2d 143.
Warrantless search of automobile, when permissible; exigent circumstances. 61 H. 492, 605 P.2d 930.
Warrantless entry of residence to effect arrest, when justified. 61 H. 505, 606 P.2d 913.
Where police allowed no one to touch box until a search warrant was obtained, there was a seizure without warrant. 61 H. 505, 606 P.2d 913.
"Stop" or "seizure" occurs when. 61 H. 566, 606 P.2d 1329.
Strip search of prison visitor not unreasonable; opening of balloon recovered from visitor and examination of contents similarly not unreasonable. 62 H. 1, 607 P.2d 1048.
Absent exigent circumstances, police may not enter private building without a warrant. 62 H. 44, 609 P.2d 131; 62 H. 52, 609 P.2d 637.
Where gambling was observable by anyone on adjoining premises, observation by police who trespassed on adjoining premises did not constitute unreasonable search and seizure. 62 H. 44, 609 P.2d 131.
Squatters on government property. 62 H. 52, 609 P.2d 637.
What is knowingly exposed to view and hearing of outsiders is not a subject of protection. 62 H. 52, 609 P.2d 637.
Warrantless search of automobile. 62 H. 59, 610 P.2d 502.
Pre-incarceration search. 62 H. 79, 611 P.2d 130.
Requirement that a warrant "particularly describe the things to be seized" discussed. Severability of provisions violating the particularity requirement. 62 H. 166, 613 P.2d 645.
Warrantless search of footlocker unreasonable in absence of exigency despite existence of probable cause to arrest owner and seize footlocker. 62 H. 238, 615 P.2d 84.
Warrantless search of automobile justified when probable cause and exigent circumstances are present. 62 H. 252, 614 P.2d 393.
Police impoundment of house which curtailed occupant's freedom of movement pending arrival of search warrant constituted seizure of house and contents. 62 H. 377, 615 P.2d 740.
Where valid investigative stop has been made, police may not order person to leave vehicle or conduct protective search unless specific conduct of defendant, reliable information or attendant circumstances indicate person is armed and dangerous. 62 H. 453, 617 P.2d 76.
Sufficiency of informer's tip to support warrantless search. 62 H. 459, 617 P.2d 565.
Warrant required for police to use optical aid to view activity which could not be seen with naked eye. 62 H. 459, 617 P.2d 565.
"Hot pursuit" is merely a criterion to use in determining whether exigency justifies warrantless search. 62 H. 495, 617 P.2d 89.
Warrantless search authorized by exigent circumstances. 62 H. 495, 617 P.2d 89; 64 H. 130, 637 P.2d 1105.
Warrantless automobile search exception did not extend to search of knapsack taken from automobile. 62 H. 660, 619 P.2d 108.
Sufficiency of affidavit to support warrant; citizen informer; eyewitness informer; conduct which is as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity. 63 H. 36, 620 P.2d 1072.
Use of binoculars to view contents of greenhouse not visible to naked eye constituted search. 63 H. 90, 621 P.2d 370.
Establishment of probable cause to search house and adjacent areas from discovery of marijuana growing in vacant lot. 63 H. 95, 621 P.2d 374.
Arrest and seizure held valid. 63 H. 488, 630 P.2d 619.
Warrantless search. Exigent circumstances lacking. 63 H. 553, 632 P.2d 1064.
Procedural requirements for seizure of materials in obscenity prosecutions. 63 H. 596, 634 P.2d 80.
City policy requiring inspection prior to entering concert, of all containers or clothing capable of concealing bottles or cans held unreasonable. 64 H. 17, 635 P.2d 946.
Warrantless searches. Probable cause existed to search automobile for firearm. 64 H. 101, 637 P.2d 770.
Illegal arrest or seizure of evidence, without more, does not bar prosecution. Exclusion of tainted evidence is appropriate remedy; purchase of allegedly obscene material from "willing sellers" by private citizen under police direction prior to arrest was actually "preconceived seizure" designed to evade warrant procedures; warrantless arrest for promoting pornography and seizure of material cannot be premised on ad hoc determination by police officer that material was obscene. 64 H. 109, 637 P.2d 1095.
Evidence inadequate to support probable cause for issuance of warrant. 64 H. 399, 641 P.2d 1341.
Warrantless recordation by party to conversation upheld. 64 H. 659, 649 P.2d 346.
No reasonable expectation of privacy in airspace surrounding luggage. Use of dog to sniff luggage for narcotics upheld. 65 H. 104, 649 P.2d 366.
No unlawful search where binoculars used only to confirm unaided observations into area where no reasonable expectation of privacy. 65 H. 152, 648 P.2d 194.
No reasonable expectation of privacy shown. 65 H. 159, 649 P.2d 737.
Warrantless body cavity search not justified under circumstances. 65 H. 488, 654 P.2d 355.
Expectation of privacy under circumstances was not one which society is prepared to recognize as legitimate. Strip search of prisoner was reasonable under circumstances. 66 H. 21, 656 P.2d 1330.
Checking an engine number located inside a vehicle constitutes a "search". 66 H. 202, 659 P.2d 70.
Police may conduct warrantless search of lost property to identify and safeguard it, protect police from false claims, or negate danger presented. A police inventory of lost and found property is a search. 67 H. 107, 678 P.2d 1088.
Use of dog to sniff all packages in cargo room was reasonable in light of balance of interests. Prior suspicion of particular package not absolute prerequisite to use of dog to sniff for drugs. 67 H. 168, 681 P.2d 980.
Protective weapons search; scope of, when justified. 67 H. 181, 683 P.2d 822.
Warrantless search of probationer's person, property, or residence; when justified. 67 H. 268, 686 P.2d 1379.
Ordering driver out of car and to take sobriety test was reasonable seizure. Flashlight-aided inspection of vehicle's interior to confirm unaided observation of object in open view, not a search. 67 H. 293, 687 P.2d 544.
Circumstances, including anonymous tip, did not warrant search of car. 67 H. 535, 696 P.2d 346.
Any co-inhabitant of commonly held property has right to consent to search of property; no expectation of privacy in property abandoned; abandonment primarily a question of intent. 67 H. 644, 701 P.2d 171.
Extraction of cigarettes from purse at defendant's request not a search; if search, consent given; warrantless seizure as valid protective measure incident to lawful arrest. 67 H. 650, 701 P.2d 1277.
Based on record, no consent to search; legitimate expectation of privacy in area searched; warrantless seizure; exigent circumstances lacking. 68 H. 32, 703 P.2d 680.
Stopping automobile for a brief period during traffic stop is a "seizure". 68 H. 184, 706 P.2d 1305.
Warrant to install beeper not excused by difficulty in satisfying particularity requirement; sufficient basis for warrant. 68 H. 213, 708 P.2d 820.
Reasonable expectation of privacy in closed public toilet stall; no probable cause to search stall. 68 H. 404, 716 P.2d 493.
No reasonable expectation of privacy in defendant's yard where defendant made no attempts to screen neighbor's view, construct or maintain a fence. 69 H. 534, 750 P.2d 932.
Per se reasonable for arresting officer to conduct a warrantless, limited pat-down search. 70 H. 107, 762 P.2d 803.
Search warrant was valid although informant had no history of reliability because other corroborated information indicated informant was reliable. 70 H. 271, 768 P.2d 1290.
Constitutional right was not voluntarily waived by defendant's consent to search car where waiver was predicated on prior illegal search and State failed to meet burden of showing that taint of illegal search had been dissipated or that there was an independent source inducing defendant to waive right. 72 H. 505, 824 P.2d 833.
Although no force was used, officers' show of authority and questioning constituted seizure under Hawaii constitution. 74 H. 161, 840 P.2d 358.
Traffic stop was justified; police officer was permitted to invite appellant to exit appellant's vehicle for further investigation. 75 H. 1, 856 P.2d 1207.
Children in school have legitimate expectations of privacy that are protected by article I, §7 of Hawai`i constitution and the Fourth Amendment. 77 H. 435, 887 P.2d 645.
High school principal's search of student's purse was lawfully conducted. 77 H. 435, 887 P.2d 645.
Where handgun on floor of defendant's truck under corner of driver's seat was observed in plain view, presence of exigent circumstances was not required to justify a warrantless seizure. 78 H. 308, 893 P.2d 159.
Detective's entrance into defendants' home, whatever the purpose, over six hours after everyone had left was a "search" in the constitutional sense. 78 H. 433, 896 P.2d 889.
Clear plastic packets not "closed" containers as contents were within plain view of officer conducting search under warrant; defendant thus could not claim any reasonable expectation of privacy in the packets' contents. 80 H. 382, 910 P.2d 695.
Obtaining warrant as precondition to testing suspected cocaine in clear plastic bags unnecessary where defendant could not have reasonable expectation of privacy in clear plastic bags. 80 H. 382, 910 P.2d 695.
Valid search incident to lawful arrest where there was probable cause to make an arrest prior to and independent of search of defendant's pants, search was limited to finding narcotics bindles, and arrest was made immediately after search. 80 H. 419, 910 P.2d 732.
As Hawaii constitution provides greater protection for Hawaii's citizens, determination of probable cause for issuance of search warrant warrants de novo review on appeal. 81 H. 113, 913 P.2d 39.
Defendant lacked standing to challenge seizure of search warrant evidence where evidence seizure did not violate defendant's personal rights; defendant was not owner of any of items seized and did not allege any reasonable expectation of privacy in items. 82 H. 474, 923 P.2d 891.
No "seizure" where private individual, acting on own initiative, secured videotape and voluntarily transferred possession to police. 82 H. 474, 923 P.2d 891.
Drug evidence admissible and wrongly suppressed where police intrusion into hotel room pursuant to valid arrest warrant was justified and evidence seizure was permissible under plain view doctrine. 83 H. 13, 924 P.2d 181.
"Totality of the circumstances test" correct test to determine whether private individual's search and seizure of evidentiary items was as a government agent, and subjective motivation of individual irrelevant to this determination. 83 H. 124, 925 P.2d 294.
Warrantless seizure justified where witness' identification of defendant as person who terrorized witness with gun gave officers probable cause to believe defendant committed a crime and officer's observation of defendant sleeping with gun in immediate reach presented sufficient exigent circumstances for officer to board boat and seize gun. 83 H. 229, 925 P.2d 797.
Officer lacked specific and articulable facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that defendant was engaged in criminal activity; officer was thus unjustified in initiating investigative "encounter" at airport with defendant. 83 H. 250, 925 P.2d 818.
Where nothing in objective facts available to police at time they obtained search warrant for house suggested defendant's bedroom was separate residential unit completely secured against access by other dwelling occupants, search warrant not overbroad and search of bedroom reasonable. 84 H. 462, 935 P.2d 1007.
Police may not prolong the detention of individuals subjected to brief, temporary investigative stops, once such stops have failed to substantiate the reasonable suspicion that initially justified them, solely for the purpose of performing a check for outstanding warrants. 91 H. 80, 979 P.2d 1106.
Officer's warrantless seizure of pouch containing handgun was justified based on exigent circumstances where, based on totality of the circumstances, including dark and deserted nature of area of traffic stop, truck occupants' unusual degree of movement in truck and refusal to obey officer's order to stay in truck, officer reasonably believed that occupants of truck posed a danger to officer. 93 H. 87, 997 P.2d 13.
When an airline passenger consents to a search of his or her effects at an airport security checkpoint, the scope of the search reasonably extends to those receptacles, the contents of which cannot be identified, contained in luggage. 97 H. 71, 34 P.3d 1.
A mandatory blood test, pursuant to §286-163, absent an arrest, violates neither this Amendment nor article I, §7 of the Hawaii constitution, so long as the police have probable cause to believe that the driver has committed one of the enumerated offenses and that the driver's blood contains evidence of intoxication or drug influence, exigent circumstances excuse a warrant, and the test is performed in a reasonable manner. 98 H. 221, 47 P.3d 336.
Assuming arguendo that, because drug detection dog jumped into the truck's passenger compartment, this canine screening constituted a "search" within the meaning of either this Amendment or article I, §7 of the Hawaii constitution, defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck (or specifically in the airspace within the cab of the truck); thus, neither the dog's nor police handler's conduct violated defendant's rights. 98 H. 426, 49 P.3d 1227.
In detaining defendant for the purpose of determining if defendant was impaired and if defendant would consent to a search of defendant's vehicle, officer did not exceed the scope of a temporary investigative stop premised upon circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while impaired or that defendant's vehicle might contain illicit substances. 99 H. 370, 56 P.3d 138.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, pool hall owner's actions in searching and detaining defendant were as a private citizen, not as a government agent; thus, owner's search and/or seizure of defendant was not constrained by this Amendment nor article I, §7 of the Hawaii constitution. 100 H. 195, 58 P.3d 1242.
Section 803-37 does not apply to the interior office door of a store; however, as an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy exists at the interior office door of a store, police are required to provide reasonable notification of their presence and authority before making a forced entry; police satisfied this requirement by knocking three times, announcing "police department, search warrant", and waiting fifteen seconds before forcibly entering the locked interior office door of the store. 100 H. 210, 58 P.3d 1257.
Use of thermal imager device to detect heat emanating from defendant's apartment constituted an unreasonable warrantless search; thus, information gained should have been excluded in the establishment of probable cause. 102 H. 13, 72 P.3d 485.
Officer's additional observations, considered in concert with the reasonable inferences arising from defendant's screeching of tires, warranted an objectively reasonable suspicion that defendant had, at a minimum, committed the offense of reckless driving of a vehicle, in violation of §291-2; thus, officer's investigative stop was within the parameters of permissible police conduct. 102 H. 228, 74 P.3d 980.
Police may act on an anonymous tip of reckless driving, but only under very narrow circumstances; based on the totality of the circumstances, including the reliability of the tip and the imminence of the harm, an anonymous tip was sufficiently reliable to justify an investigatory stop. 103 H. 451, 83 P.3d 714.
Even assuming the crime stoppers' anonymous tip was not "tainted" as a result of it being relayed to school officials via a police officer, the anonymous tip failed to provide even reasonable suspicion, much less probable cause, to justify the search of minor; the anonymous tip bore no indicia of reliability--the identity or status of the informant, the time the tip came in, the basis, if any, for the informant's knowledge, and the reliability of its assertion of illegality. 104 H. 403, 91 P.3d 485.
Reasonable suspicion for detaining defendant for the sole purpose of a canine screen did not exist where there were no specific facts to suggest that criminal activity was currently afoot (that defendant had drugs or drug paraphernalia in defendant's possession); the fact that defendant was a known drug dealer, when coupled with the fact that defendant had stolen an item that could have been used to smoke crystal methamphetamine, gave rise only to the inchoate suspicion that defendant might intend to engage in drug activity in the future. 111 H. 392, 141 P.3d 1039.
Officer's one-week-old knowledge that defendant's truck did not carry valid insurance—and that defendant had not acted to remedy the insurance violation in the preceding week-long interval—and officer's two-week-old knowledge that defendant was unlicensed were together sufficiently fresh to give rise to reasonable suspicion to execute the traffic stop. 116 H. 351, 173 P.3d 498.
Lack of "exigent circumstances" necessary to justify exception to search warrant requirement. 1 H. App. 3, 612 P.2d 119.
Failure to show that arresting officer knew that person providing information was an eyewitness results in lack of proof of probable cause. 1 H. App. 60, 613 P.2d 909.
Probable cause required before person can be detained for custodial interrogation. 1 H. App. 60, 613 P.2d 909.
Affidavit in support of search warrant was adequate. 2 H. App. 606, 638 P.2d 338.
Search or seizure need not be preceded by arrest in order to be "incident to" lawful arrest; conditions. Seizure valid under "plain feel" rule. 4 H. App. 143, 662 P.2d 517.
Search of receptacles on premises; seizure of property; when within scope of warrant. 5 H. App. 547, 705 P.2d 54.
Unconstitutional search of backpack where officer had exclusive control of backpack. 7 H. App. 261, 752 P.2d 598.
Suspicionless drug testing of firefighters by urinalysis in conjunction with annual physical examination is not an unreasonable search. 8 H. App. 571, 816 P.2d 306.
Officer's order for defendant to exit vehicle was unlawful; thus, subsequent plain view of, search for, and seizure of incriminating evidence was tainted and should have been suppressed. 80 H. 75 (App.), 905 P.2d 50.
Probable cause existed for issuance of warrant based on officer's affidavit that relied on police investigation as well as on informant's information. 81 H. 29 (App.), 911 P.2d 1101.
Where warrant only authorized search of specific room of business and another subsequently discovered room of business separated by a hallway and other numbered and unnumbered rooms were also searched, other room was not within scope of warrant and constituted illegal search. 82 H. 162 (App.), 920 P.2d 376.
Evidence found in defendant's living room illegally seized where no exigent circumstances or search warrant to enter living room and person consenting to police entering living room did not have "actual authority" to consent. 82 H. 394 (App.), 922 P.2d 1007.
Where private individual was not informed by police of discretionary nature of warrant issuing process and consequently assisted police by searching son's bedroom for evidence, individual became agent of police and individual's actions constituted improper warrantless search by government. 83 H. 209 (App.), 925 P.2d 379.
Where police had probable cause to arrest defendant without a warrant for fourth degree theft, a petty misdemeanor under §708-833, and simple trespass, a violation under §708-815, and §803-6 authorized them to cite, rather than arrest, defendant for those offenses if defendant did not have any outstanding arrest warrants, outstanding warrant check on defendant by police not unconstitutional. 91 H. 111 (App.), 979 P.2d 1137.
Right not violated where defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy on busy public street, defendant took no precautions to insure privacy by screening defendant's presence or defendant's drug dealing activity from public view, and no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy for persons, objects, or activities which were visible to the public and captured by non-intrusive video camera. 92 H. 454 (App.), 992 P.2d 723.
Feeling of the contents of defendant's fanny bag through its cover by officer was an intentional warrantless search of the interior of the fanny bag. 93 H. 314 (App.), 2 P.3d 718.
Defendant had a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy not only in the general premises of the house, but also in the specific area that was defendant's bedroom; defendant's lack of property interest in defendant's parents' house was not a bar to a claim that defendant had a protected privacy interest in that house. 96 H. 472 (App.), 32 P.3d 116.
Exigent circumstances did not exist to justify warrantless police entry into and search of house, where, by securing the house believed to hold their quarry, the police had eliminated the perceived threat posed by a free-roaming, allegedly armed suspect, and by closing off the street, the police were in control of the situation, thus having sufficient time to consider their options, plan and obtain a search warrant. 96 H. 472 (App.), 32 P.3d 116.
Where defendant exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in defendant's bedroom by keeping door locked at all times, and no other person had the key or access to the room, and as an adult child living with parents is not uncommon in this State, defendant's expectation was one that society was prepared to recognize as objectively "reasonable"; thus, defendant's privacy interests in common areas of parents' house and in defendant's bedroom were constitutionally protected. 96 H. 472 (App.), 32 P.3d 116.
The federal and state regulatory schemes, which establish security and screening procedures at airports governed by both the Federal Aviation Administration and the state department of transportation, made private security employee's search of passenger's toolbox a governmental search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and article I, §7 of the Hawaii constitution. 97 H. 77 (App.), 34 P.3d 7.
Warrantless search of passenger's toolbox at airport by private security company employee was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and article I, §7 of the Hawaii constitution. 97 H. 77 (App.), 34 P.3d 7.
Where totality of circumstances clearly showed that store asset protection agent conducted a purely private search of defendant with no governmental involvement, trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence. 97 H. 247 (App.), 35 P.3d 764.
Right not violated where police officer's search of defendant's fanny pack found by hotel guest and already inventoried by hotel security fell under the lost property inventory exception to the warrant requirement. 101 H. 112 (App.), 63 P.3d 420.
Warrantless seizure of plaintiff's vehicle not unconstitutional where seizure was from a public place and officers had probable cause to believe it was forfeitable contraband. 101 H. 422 (App.), 70 P.3d 648.
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, trial court correctly determined that adult video store clerk was not acting as a "government agent"; clerk was not actively recruited, directed, or paid by the police, and clerk's actions were for a private purpose--to make sure defendant was complying with video store's no-smoking policy and not doing anything that would harm the store. 103 H. 11 (App.), 78 P.3d 1159.
Warrantless seizure of defendant's glass pipe and its contents justified where police had probable cause to arrest defendant after viewing defendant smoking glass pipe in video booth, and exigent circumstances existed as defendant was lawfully observed ingesting an illegal drug and any delay would allow more, if not all, of the drugs to be consumed, and as defendant rented video booth for only half an hour, defendant would likely have finished defendant's "business" long before police could have obtained a warrant. 103 H. 11 (App.), 78 P.3d 1159.
Where defendant took no steps to cover up "glory hole" in adult video preview booth, defendant could not have reasonably expected that defendant's conduct would not be viewed through the glory hole; thus, defendant could not have had a subjective expectation of privacy in the video preview booth that society would recognize as objectively reasonable. 103 H. 11 (App.), 78 P.3d 1159.
Defendant was not subject to a de facto arrest not supported by probable cause where officers' use or display of force was reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety, was in response to defendant's erratic and hostile behavior, and defendant's conduct made it reasonable for the officers to insist that defendant submit to a pat-down search for weapons. 107 H. 144 (App.), 111 P.3d 39.
When police officers encounter someone while lawfully at a residence to execute an arrest warrant, the officers may detain that person and perform a pat-down search for weapons if the officers have a reasonable and articulable basis to suspect that the person may possess a weapon and pose a danger; the officers may compel such person to submit to a pat-down search for weapons even if the officers have no reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity. 107 H. 144 (App.), 111 P.3d 39.
Authorization in search warrant to search any personal, rental, or borrowed vehicle that defendant was operating or occupying was not unconstitutionally overbroad, and was sufficiently particularized where authorization was based on probable cause that defendant would be in possession of ice, and would be transporting it in any number of different vehicles in which defendant was either the operator or an occupant. 108 H. 361 (App.), 120 P.3d 260.
Where defendant removed defendant's fanny pack from waist and attempted to discard it four different times, defendant did not exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy in the fanny pack; even assuming defendant did, defendant's expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable where defendant failed to establish that defendant had a privacy interest in the places defendant attempted to throw the fanny pack; thus, where defendant voluntarily threw the fanny pack onto a building roof top, defendant abandoned defendant's expectation of privacy. 116 H. 29 (App.), 169 P.3d 981.
Where defendant spontaneously denied ownership of nylon bag in response to a request to sign a consent to search form, rather than in response to police interrogation, defendant's unequivocal disclaimer of ownership showed defendant's intent to abandon the bag, thus relinquishing any expectation of privacy defendant had in the contents of the bag; thus, warrantless search of the bag by police did not violate this Amendment. 119 H. 15 (App.), 193 P.3d 1215.
Where officer approached defendant as a potential witness who might be able to assist in officer's investigation about the stolen car and asked for defendant's name and identifying information, and there was no evidence to suggest that officer drew officer's weapon, made any coercive displays of authority, or questioned defendant in an overbearing or harassing manner, defendant was not seized at that time; only after defendant had disclosed defendant's identity, officer realized who defendant was, and officer directed defendant to sit down did officer, by means of officer's show of authority, restrain defendant's liberty. 120 H. 363 (App.), 205 P.3d 628.
Where officer's knowledge that a computer check by dispatch had revealed an outstanding warrant for defendant was sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion, officer was authorized to detain defendant; thus, trial court properly determined that defendant's detention was lawful. 120 H. 363 (App.), 205 P.3d 628.
Cited: 56 H. 366, 537 P.2d 8.
Search incident to arrest.
Use of black light to detect presence of substance was a permissible search incident to arrest. 860 F.2d 911.
Contemporaneous arrest of defendant of search of automobile, discussed. 867 F.2d 561.
Defendant did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy once police opened address book. 871 F.2d 1497.
Search not unreasonable where, after defendant was handcuffed and seated in hallway, black bag within defendant's control was searched within three minutes of defendant's arrest. 3 F.3d 1239.
Search of defendant's handbag in vehicle valid where search made contemporaneous to arrest. 800 F. Supp. 892.
Because the initial search of defendant's cellular telephone was valid, the secondary search was also valid, where telephone remained in the custody of law enforcement after being taken from defendant's person and searched at the scene, and then searched again at the federal building. 895 F. Supp. 2d. 1011 (2012).
Search of defendant's black bag was a valid warrantless search where, among other things, the bag was within defendant's immediate control when defendant was detained and arrested, and no intervening events occurred between when defendant was detained and arrested and when agent initially searched the bag. 895 F. Supp. 2d. 1011 (2012).
Search of defendant's wallet about an hour after the wallet was taken from defendant's person when defendant was arrested was a reasonable search and fell squarely within the search incident to arrest exception. 895 F. Supp. 2d. 1011 (2012).
Search without warrant after a lawful arrest is not constitutionally interdicted. 45 H. 295, 367 P.2d 499.
Validity of search incidental to arrest as dependent upon probable cause for the arrest, whether probable cause may be based on hearsay. 50 H. 138, 433 P.2d 593.
In making search of handbag incidental to lawful arrest for being present at gambling game, officers may seize marijuana cigarettes though the evidence is of a different crime. 50 H. 275, 439 P.2d 212.
Search of automobile without warrant incident to arrest upon probable cause. 52 H. 226, 473 P.2d 567.
Warrantless search not made pursuant to valid arrest. 65 H. 104, 649 P.2d 366.
Where search of coin purse conducted for drugs two hours after arrest was not reasonably related either in time or to the circumstances which might have justified it (the shoplifting arrest and a search for evidence of that offense), search was not incident to the shoplifting arrest. 111 H. 392, 141 P.3d 1039.
Standing to invoke immunity.
Defendants occupying vehicle unlawfully had no standing to contest search of vehicle. 45 H. 295, 367 P.2d 499.
When property is seized in defendant's home, defendant may invoke protection without asserting ownership of property. 45 H. 622, 372 P.2d 365.
Overnight guest of tenant of apartment had right to privacy in premises of that apartment; a person has right to privacy wherever the person may legitimately be. 51 H. 62, 451 P.2d 257.
One who is the victim of search and seizure directed against oneself has standing to raise question of validity of search. 52 H. 100, 470 P.2d 510.
Stop and frisk.
For police officers to conduct valid stop and frisk, they must have observed conduct or have reliable information causing them to believe that criminal activity is afoot and that the person is armed and dangerous. 53 H. 593, 499 P.2d 657.
Sufficiency of informer's tip. 55 H. 601, 525 P.2d 580.
Self-protective search for weapons. 56 H. 374, 537 P.2d 14; 59 H. 305, 580 P.2d 847.
Investigatory stop, when justifiable. 58 H. 333, 568 P.2d 1207.
Scope of search incident to investigative stop. 58 H. 333, 568 P.2d 1207.
Was not improper under the circumstances. 61 H. 566, 606 P.2d 1329.
Basic guidelines. 62 H. 59, 610 P.2d 502.
Where valid investigative stop has been made, police may not order person to leave vehicle or conduct protective search unless specific conduct of defendant, reliable information or attendant circumstances indicate person is armed and dangerous. 62 H. 453, 617 P.2d 76; 62 H. 459, 617 P.2d 565.
Where informant's tip is specific as to time and place, firearms are involved, and police observations verify information received, investigatory stop is authorized. 62 H. 464, 616 P.2d 1374.
When justified; sufficiency of informer's tip. 63 H. 160, 622 P.2d 122.
Investigatory stop justified by circumstances. 63 H. 488, 630 P.2d 619.
Justified. 63 H. 553, 632 P.2d 1064.
Standard of review for search for concealed weapon. 64 H. 376, 641 P.2d 979.
Investigatory stop not justified by informers tip. 65 H. 261, 650 P.2d 1358.
Suppression of evidence.
Timely motion to suppress evidence prior to trial, or justification for interruption of trial, is necessary. 45 H. 295, 367 P.2d 499.
When pre-trial motion unnecessary. 45 H. 622, 372 P.2d 365.
Under HRCP 41(e), trial judge has discretion to entertain motion even if untimely made. 51 H. 62, 451 P.2d 257.