A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
Where plaintiff's application for a firearms permit was denied because of a conviction more than ten years earlier for misdemeanor domestic violence, and plaintiff had no subsequent convictions, plaintiff's argument that 18 U.S.C. §922 was unconstitutional was rejected by the court. Plaintiff failed to address substantial governmental interest or that it was not tailored sufficiently to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. 855 F.3d 1067 (2017).
Defendant police chief was entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff firearm permit applicant's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims for monetary damages for alleged violations of plaintiff's Second Amendment right to bear arms and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process right because a reasonable official in defendant's circumstances would not have understood that defendant's conduct violated a right that was clearly established at the time of the denial of plaintiff's permit; §134-7, on which the denial was based, had not been invalidated by case or legislative action. 869 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (2012).
Plaintiff firearm permit applicant's allegations that plaintiff was denied a permit and ordered to surrender plaintiff's weapons because of a conviction of harassment more than ten years before under §711-1106 and that the conviction was not a crime of violence under §134-7(b) or federal law for the purposes of prohibiting ownership or possession of firearms were sufficient to state a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for a violation of plaintiff's Second Amendment rights. 869 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (2012).
Plaintiff firearm permit applicant's allegations that plaintiff was deprived of plaintiff's fundamental constitutional right to bear operational firearms and ammunition as guaranteed by the Second Amendment and that plaintiff was wrongfully denied a permit under this section without being afforded minimal due process protection such as a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to have the decision reviewed, were sufficient to state a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for denial of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 869 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (2012).
Plaintiff did not have standing to challenge chapter 134 on the basis of an alleged deprivation of a Second Amendment right; plaintiff failed to show "injury" because the right to bear arms is a right held by the states. 548 F. Supp. 2d 1151.
Genuine issue of material fact existed regarding: (1) whether plaintiff had been under counseling for addiction to, abuse of, or dependence upon a drug or intoxicating liquor; and (2) whether plaintiff had been "medically documented to be no longer adversely affected" by drugs or intoxicating liquor. As a result, plaintiff had not established a right under this Amendment to possess firearms. 976 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).
Plaintiff did not establish that plaintiff had a liberty or property interest under this Amendment that would trigger due process protection. 976 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).
Section 134-7(b) did not disqualify plaintiff from exercising plaintiff's rights under this Amendment because the court could not conclude that plaintiff's convictions for harassment constituted a crime of violence. 976 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).
Because plaintiff could not establish a liberty or property interest under this Amendment, plaintiff could not establish that plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated. Consequently, plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims, predicated on Second and Fourteenth Amendment violations, failed as well. 49 F. Supp. 3d 727 (2014).
Plaintiff could receive a pardon for plaintiff's harassment convictions under §711-1106(1)(a) and the pardon would qualify plaintiff to possess a firearm under federal law and restore plaintiff's Second Amendment rights. 49 F. Supp. 3d 727 (2014).
The Lautenberg Amendment, 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9), was constitutional as applied to plaintiff and statutorily disqualified plaintiff from possessing firearms under federal law. Accordingly, plaintiff could not establish that plaintiff's Second Amendment rights were violated. 49 F. Supp. 3d 727 (2014).
Interpreting §134-2(d) to deny plaintiff the opportunity to apply for and to obtain, if otherwise qualified, a permit to acquire firearms solely because plaintiff was not a United States citizen, violated this Amendment. Assuming that §134-2(d)'s general permit requirement implemented an important government objective (intermediate scrutiny), or a compelling state interest (strict scrutiny), it was neither substantially related nor narrowly tailored to such interests. 54 F. Supp. 3d 1136 (2014).
Defendant could not claim that state firearms regulations infringed upon rights protected by Second Amendment. 82 H. 143, 920 P.2d 357.