Honorable Donna Mercado Kim
President of the Senate
Twenty-Seventh State Legislature
First Special Session of 2014
State of Hawaii

Madam:

Your Special Investigative Committee on the Hawaii State Hospital, which was established pursuant to S.R. No. 3 (2014), entitled:

"SENATE RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING A SENATE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE WORKPLACE SAFETY OF PSYCHIATRIC WORKERS AND ALLEGATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROPRIETIES AND FAILURE TO CONFORM TO ESTABLISHED EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES AT THE HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL,"

begs leave to report as follows:

The purpose of the Special Investigative Committee was to investigate the workplace safety of all Hawaii State Hospital (Hospital) psychiatric workers and alleged improprieties concerning administrative and employment matters at the Hospital, and submit its written findings and recommendations to the Legislature.

As part of its investigation, your Committee conducted ten hearings lasting over a total of nineteen hours and received testimony from fourteen testifiers. In addition, your Committee received in excess of twelve thousand pages of documents in response to subpoenas. In the course of its discussion and assessment of the documents and testimony it received, your Committee finds that the Hospital faces three main interrelated challenges:
(1) Maintaining a safe work environment for Hospital staff and patients;

(2) Meeting the current needs of Hospital patients and staff due to inefficient use of facilities and patient and staff safety practices; and

(3) Providing efficient and effective human resources practices.

Your Committee finds that the Hospital has longstanding problems maintaining a safe work environment for its staff and patients. The paramount workplace safety issue appears to be violent and unstable patients attacking staff and causing injuries. Your Committee is concerned that if this problem is not immediately addressed, a fatality will occur at the Hospital.

Your Committee further finds that the design, infrastructure, and technology of the Hospital no longer effectively meet the therapeutic mental health needs of its patients. Additionally, the Hospital's high patient census, which is entirely comprised of forensic mental health patients, poses a constant challenge for the Hospital to find enough beds as well as sufficient staffing to provide adequate patient care. However, the Hospital is forced to admit, accommodate, and treat patients with limited resources, which contributes to safety concerns for the patients, staff, and surrounding community. Your Committee is also concerned that the persistently high patient census forces the Hospital to stretch its limited resources to dangerously thin levels, which compromises patient and staff safety.

Lastly, your Committee finds that the Hospital's inefficient and ineffective human resources practices result in inefficiencies and high personnel costs. Furthermore, the lack of leadership in managing and ensuring fair and transparent Hospital human resources practices contributes to low employee morale, erodes employees' trust of and confidence in Hospital administrators and supervisors, and causes employees to fear retaliation by Hospital administrators and supervisors. Your Committee is concerned about the staffing and staff performance at the Hospital and how these issues ultimately impact patient care.
Based on its findings and conclusions, your Committee has set forth its recommendations in its report, which are summarized as follows:

(1) With regard to maintaining a safe work environment, your Committee believes that the Hospital should:

(A) Develop standardized recording procedures to accurately report assaults occurring at the Hospital;

(B) Educate and train all employees on workplace violence, especially with regard to the policies and procedures to report incidents of workplace violence and employees' options if they are the victim of such violence;

(C) Develop and implement a pervasive and appropriate training program for employees to handle forensic mental health patients; and

(D) Address and resolve the Hawaii Occupational Safety and Health Division violations cited on April 10, 2014, and collaborate with the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations to aid in strengthening its policies and procedures to create a safe workplace environment;

(2) With regard to using facilities and exercising safety practices efficiently, your Committee believes that the Hospital should:

(A) Develop and implement a patient classification system that is based on patient need;

(B) Consider options in designating Unit H solely for the purpose of admitting patients;

(C) Consider obtaining a forensic care designation or accreditation for the Hospital;

(D) Facilitate the transfer of high risk patients to out-of-state mental health facilities contracted with the State by selecting patients that may
qualify and benefit from being transferred per the Hospital’s newly adopted policies and procedures and determine whether such patients should be transferred;

(E) Address the safety concerns and closure of the Psychiatric Intensive Care Unit;

(F) Explore and develop short-term strategies for the physical improvement and renovation of the existing Hospital facility;

(G) Explore and develop long-term strategies for the design and construction of a new facility;

(H) Improve the monitoring and operation of the security cameras;

(I) Improve the personal mobile transmitter devices to ensure that the devices work properly at all times;

(J) Explore the feasibility of constructing a fence around the perimeter of the campus to ensure safety for the surrounding community and assist in preventing elopements; and

(K) Develop procedures to alert the community when a patient elopement occurs; and

(3) With regard to providing efficient and effective human resources practices, your Committee believes that the Hospital should:

(A) Streamline and consolidate the Hospital’s and Department of Health’s internal recruitment and hiring processes to expedite the filling of position vacancies at the Hospital;

(B) Develop policies and procedures regarding the recruitment of temporary agency workers;

(C) Strengthen the policies and procedures for interviewing and hiring employees to work at the Hospital;
(D) Develop and implement procedures for the assignment of overtime;

(E) Explore options to limit the number of overtime shifts or hours an employee may perform;

(F) Control the opportunities for employees to abuse sick leave and overtime benefits;

(G) Collaborate with the appropriate labor unions to address the impact that collective bargaining agreements have on overtime benefits; and

(H) Strengthen and implement policies and procedures regarding employee complaints and disciplinary actions.

Your Committee presents its findings and recommendations in the attached report.

Your Committee notes that on September 19, 2014, a class action lawsuit was filed in Circuit Court by Hospital employees claiming supervisors created an unsafe environment that fostered attacks by patients on Hospital workers. In light of this pending class action lawsuit, the Department of Health refrained from submitting a detailed response to your Committee's written report; however, the Department's brief response is attached as an appendix to your Committee's report.

Respectfully submitted on behalf of the members of the Senate Special Investigative Committee on the Hawaii State Hospital,

CLAYTON HEE, Co-Chair

JOSH GREEN, Co-Chair
The Senate
Twenty-Seventh Legislature
State of Hawai‘i

Record of Votes
Special Investigative Committee on the Hawaii State Hospital
HSH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Aye</th>
<th>Aye (WR)</th>
<th>Nay</th>
<th>Excused</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEE, Clayton (Co-Chair)</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>GREEN, Josh (Co-Chair)</td>
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<td>BAKER, Rosalyn H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHIMABUKURO, Maile S.L.</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>SLOM, Sam</td>
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T O T A L

Recommendation:

- [ ] Adopted
- [ ] Not Adopted

Chair’s or Designee’s Signature:

Distribution:
- Original
- Yellow File with Committee Report
- Pink Clerk’s Office
- Goldenrod Drafting Agency
- Committee File Copy

Revised: 10/22/14
PART I.
INTRODUCTION - HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL

A. PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL

The Hawaii State Hospital (Hospital) is the only publicly funded psychiatric hospital in the State that provides specialized inpatient psychiatric services to adults 24-hours a day, seven days a week. The Hospital is licensed by the Department of Health through the Office of Health Care Assurance and is accredited by The Joint Commission.

1. Mission and Purpose

The Director of Health is authorized under statute1 to operate a secure psychiatric rehabilitation program for individuals who require intensive therapeutic treatment and rehabilitation in a secure setting. The mission of the Hospital is "to provide safe, integrated, evidence-based psychiatric assessment, treatment and rehabilitation to individuals suffering from brain, medical and behavioral disorders who are primarily court ordered to Hawaii State Hospital." The Hospital's mission is carried out by a staff of over 600 individuals employed by the State and additional staff that are contracted for with temporary employee service agencies to provide direct and indirect psychiatric inpatient services for those cases diagnosed as seriously mentally ill, including those with a co-occurring diagnosis for whom psychiatric inpatient services is a medical necessity, and for those cases referred or committed pursuant to civil and penal statutes who otherwise cannot be diverted into community-based programs and services.

The Hospital offers services to assess, treat, and rehabilitate the patients.2 Patients at the Hospital receive psychiatric and non-psychiatric treatment to address various medical conditions, such as diabetes and hepatitis. Patients are also provided psychological services, including individual and group therapy, as well as cognitive or behavioral and educational intervention. Finally, patients receive social services to assist them in resolving legal issues; obtaining food, clothing, and shelter upon discharge from the Hospital;

1 See, §334-2.5(b), Hawaii Revised Statutes.
2 See, Department of Health, Report to the Twenty-Fourth Legislature Pursuant to S.C.R. No. 117, S.D. 1, H.D. 1 Regarding the Final Report of the Task Force Convened to Evaluate the Recommended Possible Procedural, Statutory, and Public Policy Changes to Minimize the Census at Hawaii State Hospital and Promote Community-Based Health Services for Forensic Patients, Appendix 4: Orientation to the Hawaii State Hospital (December 2007).
and engaging in community reintegration, including job training, education, and maintaining meaningful interpersonal relationships.

2. Organization

The Hospital is administered by the Department of Health with oversight provided by the Department's Adult Mental Health Division under the Behavioral Health Administration. The Deputy Director of Behavioral Health and the Adult Mental Health Administrator delegate their authority to the Hawaii State Hospital Administrator to plan, direct, and oversee the organizational structure and operations of the Hospital. As such, the Hospital Administrator works closely, cooperatively, and collaboratively with the Adult Mental Health Administrator and the administrative staff of the Adult Mental Health Division in identifying treatment and rehabilitation programming services and activities needs; problem solving; developing policy; implementing and coordinating effective corrective action; and redirecting and integrating public and private programs and services. The following organization chart displays a segment of the organization hierarchy within the Department of Health.

Figure 1.1
Abbreviated Department of Health Organization Chart

Source: Guide to State Government in Hawaii

The Hospital is organized into four sections, including the Administrative and Support Services, Affiliated Programs, Clinical Services, and Quality Management Services Sections, with the Hospital Administrator serving as the head of the Hawaii State Hospital Branch. An Associate Administrator who reports to the Hospital Administrator heads each section and each section is further divided into and supported by various units and offices. Figure 1.2 illustrates the four sections of the Hospital and the various units and offices of the Clinical Services Section.

Figure 1.2
Hawaii State Hospital Organization Chart

In terms of inpatient services, the Hospital operates five rehabilitation inpatient units that generally serve the longer-term needs of patients and two acute units with one of these units also serving as the admissions unit for the entire hospital. Furthermore, the Hospital campus also includes a State Operated Specialized Residential Program (SOSRP), which serves as a community residential resource for outpatient care. Most of the residents of this program are patients who are discharged from the Hospital and on conditional release.

Source: Department of Health

4 Department of Health Position Organization Chart, Functional Chart Nos. 1 and 8 dated April 16, 2014 (MAF_043014_05_B0001 and B0008).
5 The five rehabilitation units are Units E, I, S, T, and U.
6 The two acute units are Units F and H. Unit H also serves as the admissions unit.
3. Budget

The Hospital's operating budget is predominately financed by general funds.\(^7\) In FY2014, the appropriated budget was $52,895,657.\(^8\) According to the Department of Health, two-thirds ($35,343,719) of that appropriated sum\(^9\) was expended for personnel costs. The personnel costs take a majority of the Hospital's operating budget because the budget is based on a census of 168 patients, which is about 25-30 patients less than the actual daily census. A census that exceeds the budgeted number of patients requires the regular use of overtime or adjustments to increase staffing.

In addition to the 168 budgeted beds, the Hospital has a contract with Kahi Mohala Behavioral Health,\(^10\) a private psychiatric hospital owned by the not-for-profit corporation, Sutter Health, for 40 supplemental adult inpatient psychiatric beds or overflow beds. With these 40 overflow beds added to the average daily patient census, the Hospital routinely operates at approximately 70 patients, or 42%, over the budgeted patient census. Furthermore, the usage of the overflow beds at Kahi Mohala substantially increased during FY2012.\(^11\) The capacity of overflow beds increased from 16 beds in February 2012 to 32 beds in June 2012 and to 40 beds in July 2012.\(^12\) Accordingly, there is a high likelihood that the number of contracted overflow beds may increase in the future, thus increasing the Hospital's financial needs.

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\(^{7}\) An analysis of the Hospital's operating budget indicates an unsubstantial infusion of trust fund moneys comprised of donations or gifts. No awards of federal funds were reported for FY2014 or requested for FY2015.


\(^{9}\) See, PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR 01 0001-0027).

\(^{10}\) Department of Health, Report to the Twenty-Seventh Legislature Pursuant to the Hawaii Revised Statutes §334-16, Requiring the Department of Health to Submit an Annual Report on Forensic Patient Data Specific to Hawaii State Hospital (December 2013) (LR 01 0001-0027).

\(^{11}\) Department of Health, Report to the Twenty-Seventh Legislature Pursuant to the Hawaii Revised Statutes §334-16, Requiring the Department of Health to Submit an Annual Report on Forensic Patient Data Specific to Hawaii State Hospital (December 2013) (LR 01 0001-0027).

\(^{12}\) Department of Health, Report to the Twenty-Seventh Legislature Pursuant to the Hawaii Revised Statutes §334-16, Requiring the Department of Health to Submit an Annual Report on Forensic Patient Data Specific to Hawaii State Hospital (December 2013) (LR 01 0001-0027).
**Figure 1.3**  
*Hawaii State Hospital Operating Budget Appropriations, FY2011-2015*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program ID: HTH430 – Adult Mental Health – Inpatient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Funds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General and supplemental appropriations Acts, Session Laws of Hawaii 2010 to 2014

**B. PATIENTS AT THE HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL**

The patient census at the Hospital typically consists of almost 200 individuals. According to the Department of Health, the spectrum of patients admitted to the Hospital has changed over the years. Virtually all admissions to the Hospital are forensic mental health admissions in which individuals are committed to the custody of the Department of Health by state courts and sent to the Hospital.

1. **Spectrum of Patients**

Many of the individuals hospitalized at the Hospital do not require inpatient psychiatric services, do not have a bona fide mental illness, or remain in the Hospital much longer than is clinically necessary. Individuals are committed to the Hospital due to problems, including dementia, acquired and traumatic brain injuries, developmental delays, substance abuse, and general medical conditions, primarily because the court cannot require or identify a more appropriate placement. Furthermore, most patients have co-occurring substance abuse problems. According to the Special Action Team Report on the Revitalization of the Adult Mental Health System and Effective Management of the Hawaii State Hospital Census, patients of the Hospital experience significant inequities compared to people without mental illness or not committed to the Department of Health in gaining access to long-term care beds, medically necessary physical health care, and housing.

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Figure 1.4
Spectrum of Patients by Primary Diagnosis on December 01, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Diagnosis</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schizophrenia and Related Diagnoses</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bipolar, Major Depression, and Other Mood Disorders</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substance Use Disorders</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (both psychiatric and non-psychiatric diagnoses)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Diagnosis</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>198</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Health

2. Admissions from the Court System

The inpatient psychiatric services at the Hospital are provided to adults who are voluntarily or involuntarily hospitalized, committed to the custody of the Director of Health under chapter 704, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS), or appropriately hospitalized under chapter 704 or 706, HRS. However, the Department reported that virtually all of its admissions are court ordered.

The admission of forensic mental health patients to the Hospital has increased primarily due to the transfer timeframes mandated under the Clark permanent injunction. This permanent injunction applies to all state court orders to transfer persons to the custody of the Director of Health within 72 hours of an order declaring Acquittal on the Ground of Physical or Mental Disease, Disorder, or Defect Excluding Responsibility ("Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity") ($704-411(1)(a), HRS); Unfit to Proceed ($704-406, HRS); or Involuntary Civil Commitment ($706-607, HRS), and within 48 hours of an order declaring Revocation of Conditional Release ($704-413(4), HRS). Figure 1.5 illustrates the number of patients admitted to the Hospital during FY2013 by the legal status of the admission.

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14 See, PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR_01_0033-0061).

Figure 1.5
Spectrum of Patients by Type of Admission for FY2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Admission</th>
<th>No. of Patients</th>
<th>% of Total Admission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§704-411(1)(a), HRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquittal on the Ground of Physical or Mental Disease,</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorder, or Defect Excluding Responsibility (&quot;Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§704-413(4), HRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revocation of Conditional Release</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§704-413(1), HRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72 Hour Hold on a Motion to Revoke Conditional Release</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§704-404, HRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Fitness to Proceed</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§704-406, HRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfit to Proceed</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§§704-406(3) and (4) and 706-607, HRS</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary Civil Commitment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Commitments</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Health

As a result of the Clark permanent injunction and the increase in the admission of forensic mental health patients, the Hospital's ability to admit individuals subject to involuntary civil commitment by the Family Courts is hampered, and the voluntary commitment of persons who may require longer-term psychiatric rehabilitation is effectively precluded. Thus, forensic admissions have accounted for virtually all of its admissions, with the Department of Health reporting that its current patient census is comprised solely of forensic mental health patients.

According to the Department of Health, the number of admitted forensic mental health patients who are charged with a misdemeanor offense and patients who are charged with a felony

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16 Department of Health, Report to the Twenty-Seventh Legislature Pursuant to the Hawaii Revised Statutes §334-16, Requiring the Department of Health to Submit an Annual Report on Forensic Patient Data Specific to Hawaii State Hospital (December 2013) (LR_01_0001-0027).
17 See, Department of Health, Report to the Twenty-Fourth Legislature Pursuant to S.C.R. No. 117, S.D. 1, H.D. 1 Regarding the Final Report of the Task Force Convened to Evaluate the Recommended Possible Procedural, Statutory, and Public Policy Changes to Minimize the Census at Hawaii State Hospital and Promote Community-Based Health Services for Forensic Patients (December 2007).
18 See, §§706-640 and 706-663, HRS.
offense\textsuperscript{19} are approximately equal.\textsuperscript{20} In addition, most of the patients at the Hospital have not been found guilty of any charges, and 40\% of the criminal offense charges do not involve offenses against another person. Furthermore, patients with more serious charges generally have longer lengths of stay at the Hospital, with a small number of patients (all male) who are charged with class A felonies\textsuperscript{21} with lengths of stay longer than 20 years.

C. EMPLOYEES OF THE HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL

The Hospital employs over 600 employees who provide direct psychiatric inpatient services, such as psychiatrists, medical physicians, registered nurses, psychiatric technicians, para-medical assistants, psychologists, laboratory technicians, occupational therapists, recreational therapists, social workers, and dieticians. The Hospital is supported by staff to perform administrative duties, such as human resources, management information systems, telecommunication services, security, fiscal management and quality management; and a staff for plant and facilities management.

As state employees, Hospital staff are civil servants unless specifically exempt and part of collective bargaining unless specifically excluded. Employees who are part of collective bargaining are represented by the Hawaii Government Employees Association, AFSCME Local 152, AFL-CIO (HGEA) or United Public Workers, AFSCME Local 646, AFL-CIO (UPW) and have certain employee rights and benefits negotiated under their respective collective bargaining agreements.

The average daily patient census for calendar year 2013 at the Hospital was 192 patients,\textsuperscript{22} which is 24 patients over the Hospital's budgeted census of 168 patients. As a result, in addition to the Hospital's payroll of over 600 employees, the Hospital contracts for registered nurses, psychiatric technicians, and para-medical technicians to provide appropriate staffing levels for the care for its over-census patient population.

\textsuperscript{19} See, §§706-640, 706-660, and 706-659, HRS.
\textsuperscript{20} See, PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR_01_0033-0061).
\textsuperscript{21} The violation of a class A felony is punishable by an indeterminate of imprisonment 20 years and a fine not exceeding $50,000. See, §§706-640 and 706-659.
\textsuperscript{22} See, PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR_01_0033-0061).
PART II.
SENATE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE
ON THE HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL

A. IMPETUS OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE

The Hawaii State Hospital has garnered regrettable attention on the federal and state levels over the past 20 years regarding the conditions, census, and quality of care at the Hospital. Despite numerous efforts, the Hospital continues to be a subject of concern.

1. Federal Intervention

In 1991, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit against the State of Hawaii for violations of the constitutional rights of patients of the Hospital pursuant to the federal Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997 et seq.). It was reported that care for patients was substandard, the buildings leaked, some patients were administered too much medication, patients were left unattended lying on concrete floors or were routinely restrained, staffing was inadequate, and conditions were unsafe and unsanitary. That same year, the State and the United States through the DOJ entered into a settlement agreement to correct the deficiencies at the Hospital, which became an order of the federal court.

In 1995, the court found the State in contempt of court for failure to achieve important requirements of the court order. As a result, the DOJ and State negotiated a stipulation and detailed remedial plan designed to address the violations and problems at the Hospital.

In 1999, the Federal District Court found that the Hospital was still grossly out of compliance with significant requirements of its orders, most notably the requirements that the State provide adequate treatment and treatment planning for all patients at the Hospital. Despite the court-ordered formation of a compliance committee to identify and implement

23 Ken Kobayashi, Feds to end oversight at state mental hospital, Honolulu Advertiser (November 13, 2004).
solutions to all outstanding issues of material significance for compliance, the State was unable to take adequate corrective action in accordance with the plans of the compliance committee.

Subsequently, the court appointed a special monitor to oversee compliance in 2000. The special monitor's report filed in 2001 cited that many operational problems continued at the Hospital, including overcrowding and staffing, safety, and morale problems. Furthermore, HGEA filed a grievance for the nurses about the conditions. As a result, the court appointed a special master in 2001 to oversee state compliance with federal laws at the Hospital.

In 2004, the special master recommended dismissing the federal civil rights lawsuit against the Hospital and terminating federal court oversight of the Hospital. The special master reported that state officials made "substantial progress and dramatic change" at the Hospital, with patients now being treated in "a different and successful way." Despite the recommendation to terminate the federal court oversight of the Hospital, the special master recommended that the federal court continue to monitor until June 30, 2006, the State's efforts in implementing a community plan for people with serious mental illnesses who are former patients or who will be released from the Hospital. On November 30, 2006, 15 years after the lawsuit was filed, the federal case was dismissed with prejudice.

2. Executive Intervention

After the federal court oversight, the Hospital continued to be an area of concern, especially with regard to patient census and community-based services for forensic mental health patients. As a result, the Governor's Administration engaged in efforts to identify problems at the Hospital, recommend solutions to address these problems, and prevent the Hospital from falling under federal oversight again.

a. Governor's Task Force Pursuant to S.C.R. No. 117

During the Regular Session of 2006, the Legislature passed S.C.R. No. 117, S.D. 1, H.D. 1, to request the Governor to convene a task force comprised of consumers of public mental health services, the Hospital staff members, and representatives

28 Ken Kobayashi, Feds to end oversight at state mental hospital, Honolulu Advertiser (November 13, 2004).
of state and county government agencies and advocacy agencies to evaluate and recommend possible procedural, statutory, and public policy changes to minimize the census of the Hospital as well as to promote development of community-based services for forensic mental health consumers. The task force was requested to consider a number of issues,\(^\text{30}\) including community-based mental health services for forensic patients conditionally released by the courts; mental health interventions and jail diversion programs to assist mentally ill individuals who come into contact with the criminal justice system; chapter 704, HRS; the Judiciary's Mental Health Court; forensic mental health examiners; and post-release after-care services for severely and persistently mentally ill incarcerated patients.

The task force convened in October 2006 and met monthly until concluding in November 2007. As a result of its yearlong effort, the task force made recommendations in three areas - chapter 704, HRS, timeframes; orders to treat (involuntary medication); and mental health examinations\(^\text{31}\) - and each area included recommendations for public policy, statutory, and procedural changes.

b. Governor's Special Action Team

On June 14, 2012, the Governor issued an Executive Memorandum\(^\text{32}\) to convene a Special Action Team to address the increasing census at the Hospital. In the memorandum, the Governor stated that in the last six months, the monthly number of admissions to the Hospital increased by 50% with no corresponding increase in the rate of discharge, which raised concerns that patient care may be compromised as a result. The Special Action Team was convened to conduct an analysis of the causes of the high census at the Hospital, consider options to address the causes, develop a priority list of recommendations for changes, propose short- and long-term solutions, and provide a summary report to the Governor.

Over a five-week period from July 17, 2012, to August 21, 2012, the Special Action Team focused its work on areas to recommend for action and consideration by the Governor’s

\(^{31}\) See, Department of Health, Report to the Twenty-Fourth Legislature Pursuant to S.C.R. No. 117, S.D. 1, H.D. 1 Regarding the Final Report of the Task Force Convened to Evaluate the Recommended Possible Procedural, Statutory, and Public Policy Changes to Minimize the Census at Hawaii State Hospital and Promote Community-Based Health Services for Forensic Patients (December 2007).
\(^{32}\) See, Department of Health, Special Action Team Report to the Governor on Revitalization of the Adult Mental Health System and Effective Management of the Hawaii Hospital Census (October 2012).
Administration for the 2013 legislative session and the biennium budget. The Special Action Team was comprised of three subcommittees covering the following areas: personnel, finance, and procurement; program capacity and clinical operations; and legal and judicial.

The Special Action Team identified several systemic factors, including the use of the Hospital to provide the majority of inpatient psychiatric treatment in the State, unlike most of the other states; the very high forensic use of the Hospital, unlike other states; and the unexplained increase in the rate of forensic evaluations ordered by Hawaii courts during FY2012. The recommendations of the Special Action Team were developed by the three subcommittees and were divided into short-term recommendations that would be substantially implemented in FY2013 and long-term recommendations that could be implemented in FY2014 and beyond. In general, these recommendations focused on developing community resources, which is more cost effective than inpatient hospitalization, and making the forensic process more efficient and effective.

3. Legislative Intervention

The Legislature also assisted in creating and improving the Hospital by implementing recommendations made by the task force established pursuant to S.C.R. No. 117 (Regular Session of 2006) and the Governor's Special Action Team. Furthermore, the Legislature also acted as an appropriate venue to receive information regarding the Hospital and address problems through legislation.

a. Reported Staff Assaults in 2007

In early August 2007, media coverage called attention to a January 2007 incident involving an injury to a Hospital nurse by one of her patients and the resignation of the staff psychiatrist on account of her safety concerns at the Hospital. Nurse Terry Evans, who suffered facial injuries, including a broken orbital bone around her left eye, claimed her injuries resulted from an unsafe workplace and that she continued to suffer from post-traumatic stress syndrome. Former staff psychiatrist, Dr. Karen Ritchie, stated, "I finally decided I couldn't continue to work there because I don't believe it's a safe environment," in commenting about her resignation.

34 Id.
As a result, the Legislature held a news conference to build awareness of the growing number of assaults by patients against staff at the Hospital. According to the media report,\textsuperscript{35} the Department of Health reported that during the first six months of 2007, there were 107 assaults by patients against staff members. In the years leading up to the legislative news conference it was reported that 187 assaults occurred in 2006, 133 assaults in 2005, and 170 assaults in 2004.\textsuperscript{36} The number of reported assaults has fluctuated over the past few years. The increased incidence of patients assaulting staff was attributed to an increase in the patient census, particularly due to the increase in the court-ordered forensic mental health patients. Legislators expressed concern that if these occurrences at the Hospital continued, a fatality would occur.

b. Act 100, Session Laws of Hawaii 2008

During the Regular Session of 2008, the Legislature passed Act 100 in response to the recommendations made by the task force pursuant to S.C.R. No. 117 (Regular Session of 2006) and to address the recent rise in incidence of patients assaulting staff at the Hospital. The purpose section of part II of Act 100, Session Laws of Hawaii 2008, noted that patient-to-staff assaults at the Hospital was an area of heightened organizational focus and public scrutiny. As a result, Act 100\textsuperscript{37} amended §707-711, HRS, to establish criminal charges against a person who intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a person employed in a state-operated or -contracted mental health facility as a class C felony. Prior to Act 100, such an assault would generally be a misdemeanor.

c. Informational Briefings in 2014

Since the enactment of Act 100,\textsuperscript{38} the Legislature has periodically received information on instances of Hospital staff injuries; failure or refusal to attend to, treat, or monitor instances of staff injuries caused by patients at the Hospital; and allegations of employment improprieties by administrative and supervisory personnel. On November 20, 2013, several Hospital employees reported at a press conference their concerns regarding workplace safety involving attacks on employees by patients, and alleged employment improprieties. At that time, Senators called for a probe into the assaults by patients on Hospital staff.

\textsuperscript{35} Id.
\textsuperscript{36} Id.
\textsuperscript{37} See, Part II, Act 100, Session Laws of Hawaii 2008, and §707-711, HRS.
\textsuperscript{38} Act 100, Session Laws of Hawaii 2008.
On January 7, 2014, the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor held an informational briefing to receive an update on the state of violence against Hospital workers, explore staffing patterns at the Hospital and plans to create a safe workplace, and receive information about the spectrum of patients, including violent offenders, at the Hospital. At this informational briefing, the Senate Committees received information from the Department of Health, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, Department of Public Safety, Judiciary, and several injured Hospital workers and a medical physician.

The Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor held a second informational briefing on January 27, 2014, to receive updated information from department heads, as requested during the previous informational briefing, and additional information on the state of workplace violence at the Hospital. The Senate Committees received information from the Department of Public Safety, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, Department of Human Resources Development, Department of the Attorney General, and Department of Health. At this informational briefing, it was noted by the Chairpersons of the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor that the Committee Chairpersons introduced S.R. No. 3 on January 17, 2014, for adoption by the Senate and that this resolution would establish a Senate Special Investigative Committee.

B. SENATE RESOLUTION NO. 3 (REGULAR SESSION OF 2014)

In light of the longstanding problems at the Hospital despite federal, executive, and legislative intervention, and due to the recent information regarding workplace violence at the Hospital and the allegations of employment improprieties, the Senate adopted S.R. No. 3 (Regular Session of 2014) to establish a Senate Special Investigative Committee pursuant to chapter 21, HRS.

1. Objectives and Powers of the Investigative Committee

Under S.R. No. 3, the objectives of the Senate Special Investigative Committee (Investigative Committee) included the following:

(1) Investigate the workplace safety of all Hospital psychiatric workers;

(2) Investigate the alleged Hospital administrative and employment improprieties; and
(3) Inquire into, gather, and analyze information, including the Hospital's personnel files, that may provide relevant information concerning worker safety and alleged administrative improprieties.

Under S.R. No. 3, the Investigative Committee was authorized every power and function allowed to an investigative committee specified under chapter 21, HRS, including without limitation the power to:

(1) Adopt rules for the conduct of its proceedings;

(2) Issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and subpoenas duces tecum requiring the production of books, documents, records, papers, or other evidence in any matter pending before the Investigative Committee;

(3) Hold hearings appropriate for the performance of its duties at such times and places as the Investigative Committee determines;

(4) Administer oaths and affirmations to witnesses at hearings of the Investigative Committee;

(5) Report or certify instances of contempt as provided under §21-14, HRS;

(6) Determine the means by which a record shall be made of its proceedings in which testimony or other evidence is demanded or adduced; and

(7) Provide for the submission, by a witness's own counsel and counsel for another individual or entity about whom the witness has devoted substantial or important portions of the witness's testimony, of written questions to be asked of the witness by the Chair.

2. Members of the Investigative Committee

As set forth in S.R. No. 3, the membership of the Investigative Committee comprised not less than five members, including the Chairpersons of the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor, appointed by the President of the Senate. The members of the Investigative Committee are Senator Clayton Hee, Co-Chair; Senator Josh Green, Co-Chair; Senator
3. Hearings and Subpoenas

In the course of its investigation the Investigative Committee held hearings to receive information from subpoenaed witnesses and also subpoenaed relevant documents. The testimony received was given subject to subpoena and made under oath, subject to the penalty for perjury, which includes a civil fine up to $1,000 or imprisonment up to one year.

As part of its investigation, the Investigative Committee conducted 10 hearings lasting over a total of 19 hours and received testimony from 14 witnesses. In addition, the Investigative Committee received in excess of 12,000 pages of documents in response to subpoenas. Unless otherwise noted, the written findings and recommendations of the Investigative Committee contained in this report relied upon the testimony heard by the Investigative Committee under oath or from documents received pursuant to a subpoena.
PART III.
FINDINGS OF THE SENATE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL

S.R. No. 3 notes that on November 20, 2013, several Hospital employees informed Senators about their concerns about workplace safety involving attacks on employees and of alleged administrative and employment improprieties at the Hospital. The Investigative Committee takes these concerns seriously and notes that its formation is credited to these Hospital employees stepping forward to shed light on longstanding problems at the Hospital.

In the course of its discussion and assessment of the documents and testimony it received, the Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital faces three main challenges. These challenges are related to each other and include:

A. Maintaining a safe work environment for Hospital staff and patients;

B. Meeting the current needs of Hospital patients and staff due to inefficient use of facilities and patient and staff safety practices; and

C. Providing efficient and effective human resources practices.

These challenges and their related findings are discussed in the following sections.

A. CHALLENGES IN MAINTAINING A SAFE WORK ENVIRONMENT FOR HOSPITAL STAFF AND PATIENTS

The Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital has longstanding problems maintaining a safe work environment for its staff and patients. The paramount workplace safety issue appears to be violent and unstable patients attacking staff and causing injuries.

1. Continued Reports of Patients Assaulting Staff

The Investigative Committee finds that despite legislative intervention, the Hospital continues to have reports of patients assaulting staff or other patients. The Hospital uses a broad and inclusive definition of assault to capture information about patient clinical progress or anticipate change in clinical
status prior to an extreme behavioral event. The Hospital defines assault as "any overt act (physical contact) upon the person of another that may or does result in physical injury and/or emotional distress. Examples include, but are not limited to hits, spits, sexual assaults, or any physical injury intentionally inflicted upon another person."\(^39\)

The Investigative Committee further finds that assaults on Hospital employees have resulted in some employees being out of work for months and even years, which contributes to staff shortages. For example, in January 2007, Nurse Terry Evans suffered facial injuries, including a broken orbital bone around her left eye.\(^40\) She claimed that her injuries resulted from an unsafe workplace and that she continued to suffer from post-traumatic stress syndrome.\(^41\) As a result of the assault, Ms. Evans no longer works at the Hospital. On December 3, 2009, former Unit T Psychiatric Technician, Emelinda Yarte sustained injuries to her head and jaw while she assisted her coworkers in controlling a violent and unstable patient.\(^42\) Since sustaining her injuries, Ms. Yarte has not returned to the Hospital.\(^43\) In December 2011, a Psychiatric Technician was attacked by a patient and sustained multiple unprovoked punches to the face, which resulted in a laceration over the employee's left eye.\(^44\) This employee was out of work for six months. The Investigative Committee notes that these are only a handful of incidents that have occurred at the Hospital. Figure 3.1 indicates the number of patient-to-staff assaults from years 2006 to 2013.

\(^40\) B.J. Reyes, State hospital staff labors in fear, Honolulu Star Bulletin (August 7, 2007).
\(^41\) B.J. Reyes, State hospital staff labors in fear, Honolulu Star Bulletin (August 7, 2007).
\(^42\) Testimony of Emelinda Yarte, May 14, 2014.
\(^43\) Testimony of Emelinda Yarte, May 14, 2014.
\(^44\) Department of Health, Documentation of a Psychiatric Technician Assaulted by Patient in the PICU (LR_07_091614_1-9).
The Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital is unable to adequately address this problem because the Hospital cannot accurately assess the breadth of the problem due to inconsistent reporting of assaults on staff. In addition, the Hospital has underutilized tools that could assist it in preventing assaults or mitigating the seriousness of assaults.

a. Inconsistent Reporting of Assaults on Staff

The Investigative Committee is deeply concerned regarding the number of assaults on staff but is unable to determine the breadth and pervasiveness of the problem. The Investigative Committee finds that the number of reports of patients assaulting staff are inaccurate due to inconsistent or lack of reporting. The Investigative Committee further finds that the inconsistent reporting of patient assaults on staff can be attributed to a number of factors, including conflicting data, staff failing to report assaults, and inefficient communication of patient assaults on staff up the chain of command in the Department of Health.

The Investigative Committee received conflicting data regarding assaults by patients. The Department of Health submitted to the Investigative Committee information and statistics regarding staff safety complaints, job-related injuries, and workers' compensation claims from 2009 to the present. While it appreciates the amount of information received from the Department, the Investigative Committee is

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45 Department of Health, Information Regarding the Accuracy of the Statistic that Assaults Occur Once Every Three Days (LR_01_011514_0006-0009 - Confidential).
46 Department of Health, Information and Statistics Regarding Staff Safety Complaints, Job-Related Injuries, and Workers' Compensation Claims from 2009 to the Present (LR_15_0001-0070 - Confidential).
unable to determine how the list of employee incident reports correlate with the list of staff injury reports because some employee incident reports, which indicate that an injury was sustained, are not documented under the list of staff injury reports and vice versa. Furthermore, under the list of staff injury reports, the number of assaults per year that were filed for records only or workers' compensation does not correlate with and is less than the number of patient-to-staff assaults per year reported by the Department under Figure 3.1. The Investigative Committee does not believe that the total number of assaults occurring at the Hospital can be less than the number of patient-to-staff assaults. Accordingly, the Investigative Committee does not understand how the Department of Health determined the number of patient-to-staff assaults at the Hospital and questions the accuracy of the numbers provided under Figure 3.1.

According to the Department of Health, the event reporting process assures that assaults are documented so that action may be taken, if appropriate, and ideally to prevent a severe event. However, the Investigative Committee finds that the policies and procedures for reporting incidents of assaults are not widely implemented by staff because staff view assaults by patients as part of their job. During the Investigative Committee's site visit of the Hospital in June 2014, employees disclosed incidents where they were assaulted by a patient, but did not file an employee incident report because they did not sustain any injuries, or if the assault resulted in an injury, they did not think the injury was serious enough to warrant a report, especially compared to serious injuries other employees previously sustained. The Investigative Committee finds that these comments are peculiar and concerning, and indicative of the culture of workplace violence at the Hospital. As such, the failure of staff to file reports contributes to the inaccurate reports of assaults by patients.

The Investigative Committee finds that delays in and problems with filing claims for workers' compensation and receiving workers' compensation benefits may delay injured staff from returning to work in a timely manner and result in greater costs for the State. Furthermore, a former Hospital employee testified that she did not receive workers' compensation

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47 Department of Health, Information Regarding the Accuracy of the Statistic that Assaults Occur Once Every Three Days (LR_01_011514_0006-0009 - Confidential).
48 Comments by Investigative Committee regarding Site Visit on June 11, 2014 (July 16, 2014).
49 Comments by Investigative Committee regarding Site Visit on June 11, 2014 (July 16, 2014).
payments for a period of five months. As a result, this employee hired an attorney to assist her in receiving her back payments. Although her workers' compensation claim was approved three days after she sustained her injuries, the employee testified that she knew injured coworkers who waited one to three months for their claims to be approved and receive treatments for their injuries. The Investigative Committee is concerned that delays in workers' compensation may discourage injured staff from reporting assaults to avoid being mired in the workers' compensation process, including having to hire an attorney to expedite the process.

The Investigative Committee finds that Department of Health administrators do not have an accurate number of assaults that occur at the Hospital because only certain information regarding assaults is reported up the chain of command. The Deputy Director of Behavioral Health, Lynn Fallin, testified that she receives reports of only serious assaults from the Administrator of the Adult Mental Health Division, Dr. Mark Fridovich. A serious assault is defined by Department and Hospital administrators as an assault that results in a serious injury that requires outside medical attention other than what the Hospital can provide, such as an injury that requires emergency room medical attention. Ms. Fallin testified that since she became Deputy Director in July 2011, she has received four alerts about serious assaults occurring at the Hospital. The Investigative Committee believes that being aware of only the serious assaults hinders the Department administration's ability to assess the breadth of the problem and develop and implement appropriate and effective recommendations for large-scale changes for the Hospital. Furthermore, the Investigative Committee has concerns that by reporting only the serious assaults to Ms. Fallin, Dr. Fridovich may be minimalizing the number of assaults that occur at the Hospital and contributing to the inaccurate number of reports of assaults by patients.

Furthermore, the Investigative Committee finds that while the Hospital has its own definitions for attempted assault and assault, it appears that Department of Health administrators do not have a clear understanding or consistent use of these definitions and how they are used to track and report assaults

50 Testimony, May 14, 2014.
51 Testimony, May 14, 2014.
52 Testimony, May 14, 2014.
53 Testimony of Lynn Fallin, March 27, 2014.
54 Testimony of Lynn Fallin, March 27, 2014; and Testimony of William Elliott, July 16, 2014.
55 Testimony of Lynn Fallin, March 27, 2014.
occurring at the Hospital. The Director of Health was unable to clearly articulate to the Investigative Committee the differences between the two acts and largely relied on whether any medical attention was sought by the assault victim or the level of medical care that was necessary to differentiate the two acts. The Investigative Committee believes that the tracking and reporting of assaults should be based on an established set of definitions with clear criteria setting out the type of action, and extent and type of injury necessary to constitute an attempted assault or assault rather than whether any medical attention or care was sought or needed. The Investigative Committee wonders whether the Hospital is tracking and reporting assaults to Department administrators according to its established definitions of assault, which the Investigative Committee finds lacking of clear criteria, or another set of criteria that is based on the extent of medical attention needed. Without a clear understanding of how assaults are defined and tracked, Department administrators are unable to develop and implement large-scale plans to address the problem of assaults occurring at the Hospital.

b. Underutilization of Act 100

In 2008, the Legislature noted under part II of Act 100, Session Laws of Hawaii 2008 (Act 100), that patient-to-staff assaults at the Hospital was an area of heightened organizational focus and public scrutiny. As a result, the Legislature amended §707-711, HRS, to establish criminal charges against a person who intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to a person employed in a state-operated or -contracted mental health facility as a class C felony. However, the Investigative Committee finds that Act 100 has not been used since it became effective on July 1, 2008.

According to the Department of Health, there have been "four instances of prosecutions advancing subsequent to the enactment of the revised statute in 2008." Also former Acting Administrator, William Elliot, sent a letter dated January 9, 2014, to the Honolulu Police Department (HPD) requesting a listing of assaults on Hospital staff reported to HPD, including HPD report numbers, assault event description, and date of incident from 2008 to the present. However, to date, the

57 Testimony of Dr. Linda Rosen, July 16, 2014.
60 Department of Health, Number of Times Act 100 was Used by Hospital Workers (LR_01_011514_0003-0005).
61 Department of Health, Number of Times Act 100 was Used by Hospital Workers (LR_01_011514_0003-0005).
Hospital has not received a response from HPD, even after a follow-up request was made by Associate Administrator for Clinical Services, Dr. William Sheehan, on September 11, 2014.62

The Investigative Committee has concerns regarding what appears to be an underutilization of Act 100. The meaning of "four instances of prosecutions advancing"63 is unclear to the Investigative Committee and the absence of a response from HPD fails to provide clarity. However, if the "four instances" is an accurate number of times that Act 100 has been used by Hospital staff, then the Investigative Committee questions why Act 100 has not been used more, especially in light of the number of assaults on staff that occurred at the Hospital, whether Hospital staff is aware of Act 100, and whether Hospital administration educates staff of their legal options if they are assaulted by a patient while at the Hospital.

c. Lack of Appropriate Training to Handle Violent Patients

In addition to the inconsistent reporting of assaults on staff, the Investigative Committee finds that employees are ill-prepared to handle violent patients due to a lack of appropriate training. Upon being hired, all Hospital staff are required to complete 10 hours of Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (CPMR) training on how to employ de-escalation techniques64 and receive annual training thereafter. However, the Hawaii Occupational Safety and Health Division of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (HIOSH) recently found that the CPMR training and practice drills were not realistic or practical enough to prepare employees for the real-life situations that they may encounter with violent, unstable patients.65 In light of the high patient census and the spectrum of forensic mental health patients at the Hospital, the Investigative Committee strongly believes that providing staff with the appropriate training to prevent assaults or de-escalate a situation will assist in decreasing the number of assaults on staff or other patients and the severity of assaults.

62 Department of Health, Documentation Regarding Response from HPD on Act 100 (LR_06_091614_1-2).
63 Department of Health, Number of Times Act 100 was Used by Hospital Workers (LR_01_011514_0003-0005).
64 PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR_01_0033-0061).
65 Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, Citation and Notification of Penalty, HIOSH Inspection Number 316273333 (April 10, 2014).
2. Recently Cited for Occupational Safety and Health Violations

The Investigative Committee finds that on April 10, 2014, HIOSH issued to the Hospital seven serious occupational safety and health citations with fines totaling $40,700. The Investigative Committee specifically notes the following findings from the HIOSH Citation and Notification of Penalty report:

"The employer did not furnish employment free from recognized hazards that were likely to cause death or serious physical harm in that their employees were exposed to the hazard of being physically assaulted by their own patients."

"Multiple employees did not know about, understand, or retain the knowledge to eliminate and control hazards associated with working in an environment with assaultive, unstable patients. More improved workplace violence training is needed to deal with the high incident rates of patient to staff assaults."

"Some employees are non-responsive in doing their job when PMT/Code 200 calls are made. Safety practices were not underscored through correction of unsafe performance."

The Investigative Committee notes that the Department of Health is currently in the process of contesting these citations and a hearing date has not been set yet. Dr. Rosen testified that the Department was contesting certain items under the HIOSH citation and the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR) had agreed to dismiss one of these items. However, the Investigative Committee subsequently discovered from DLIR that the entire HIOSH citation must be contested, not just certain items. Thus, none of the items were dismissed. Accordingly,
the Investigative Committee is concerned with the Director of Health's and Department of Health's lack of understanding of HIOSH violation procedures.

Furthermore, the Investigative Committee is deeply concerned regarding the HIOSH finding that employees did not know about, understand, or retain knowledge to eliminate and control hazards associated with working at the Hospital. This lack of knowledge and understanding is indicative of the Hospital administration's failure to develop and implement effective policies and procedures to ensure a safe work environment for its staff. The Investigative Committee strongly urges the Hospital to make a serious effort in addressing and resolving these HIOSH violations rather than on contesting and mitigating the violations and the associated penalties.

B. CHALLENGES IN MEETING THE CURRENT NEEDS OF HOSPITAL PATIENTS AND STAFF DUE TO INEFFICIENT USE OF FACILITIES AND PATIENT AND STAFF SAFETY PRACTICES

The Investigative Committee finds that the design, infrastructure, and technology of the Hospital no longer effectively meet the therapeutic mental health needs of its patients. Additionally, the Hospital's high patient census, which is entirely comprised of forensic mental health patients, poses a constant challenge for the Hospital to find enough beds as well as sufficient staffing to provide adequate patient care. However, the Hospital is forced to admit, accommodate, and treat patients with limited resources, which contributes to safety concerns for the patients, staff, and surrounding community.

1. Inefficient Use of Hospital Facilities

The Hospital is accredited as an acute care facility. The Hospital has 202 licensed beds and 40 additional supplemental adult inpatient psychiatric beds or overflow beds under contract with Kahi Mohala Behavioral Health. The average daily census at the hospital for calendar year 2013 was 192 patients. However, the per-day census typically reaches over 200 patients depending on the number of forensic admissions. Therefore, the Investigative Committee finds that the persistently high census and the legal requirements imposed by the Clark permanent

74 Department of Health, Accreditation Authorities, Requirements, and Cycles (LR 04_0001-0193).
75 PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR 01_0033-0061).
76 Id.
injunction\textsuperscript{77} place additional stress on Hospital facility use, which impacts patient care, and staffing needs.

\paragraph{a. High Patient Census and Facility Limitations} Impact Patient Unit Assignments

The Investigative Committee finds that a patient's unit placement can be based on bed availability or facility accommodations rather than on the patient's clinical need. The Hospital operates five rehabilitation inpatient units (Units E, I, S, T, and U) that generally serve the longer-term needs of patients and two acute psychiatric care units (Units F and H). Upon admission and stabilization, a patient is assigned to one of these units for treatment and rehabilitation. Except for the acute psychiatric care units and the all-male unit, the other units are not designated for any specific types of patients. Thus, each unit may accommodate a wide spectrum of patients with various clinical needs as long as there is a bed available and the unit infrastructure is able to accommodate the patient.

Upon admission to the Hospital, each patient is assigned to a treatment team comprised of a psychiatrist, psychologist, nurse, and other members who meet daily to create, review, and update, if necessary, a treatment plan for the patient.\textsuperscript{78} The treatment team collaborates with the Unit Nurse Managers to determine which unit is the most appropriate for the patient's clinical needs according to the patient's treatment plan. However, according to Unit U Nurse Manager, Vivian Cayetano, a patient's unit assignment is more likely to be based on bed availability rather than clinical need.\textsuperscript{79} She explained that because the Hospital is over census and beyond capacity, the Hospital is forced to move patients to other units to make room for newly admitted patients in Unit H and, if necessary, use classrooms and meeting rooms for patient rooms.\textsuperscript{80}

The Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital's design and infrastructure also have an impact on patient unit assignments. For example, patients who are medically compromised are generally assigned to units that do not have a lot of stairs or are closer to the Treatment Mall, which is located on the lower part of the Hospital campus.\textsuperscript{81} Furthermore, the Investigative Committee notes that Unit U is limited to only male patients. Although it accepts male patients with a wide

\begin{footnotes}
\item[78] Testimony of Vivian Cayetano, May 28, 2014.
\item[79] Testimony of Vivian Cayetano, May 28, 2014.
\item[80] Testimony of Vivian Cayetano, May 28, 2014.
\item[81] Testimony of Vivian Cayetano, May 28, 2014.
\end{footnotes}
spectrum of clinical needs, the unit tends to accommodate male patients who are charged with or convicted of sexual crimes or exhibit or have a history of inappropriate sexual behaviors. Unit U has additional limitations, such as size, one community bathroom, rooms with two to four patients, and stairs, which can impact patient assignments. Lastly, the use of classroom and meeting rooms for patient rooms also has its own limitations as these rooms are not designed as patient rooms and are usually more appropriate for low risk patients.

The Investigative Committee is concerned that the evident policy for patient assignments, which is based largely on bed availability, is not in the best interests of the patient or the other patients and staff on the assigned unit, and may result in an increase in patient and staff safety risks. As a result of the high patient census, the Investigative Committee has concerns regarding the pressure a treatment team is under to find an available bed when determining a patient's unit assignment. The Investigative Committee believes that classifying and assigning patients to units based on clinical need rather than other factors, such as bed availability, will assist in ensuring appropriate unit assignments as well as patient and staff safety.

b. Overutilization of Unit H to Serve Dual Purposes

Unit H serves as one of the two acute treatment units as well as the admission unit for all patients admitted to the Hospital. Due to the limited bed availability in Unit H, the Hospital moves patients to other units before the patients are stable and ready for transfer to make room for newly admitted patients who are ordered by the court for evaluation or treatment at the Hospital. The Investigative Committee is concerned that introducing unstable patients into stable patient populations before these unstable patients are clinically ready increases the safety risks for the patients and staff.

The problem of bed availability on Unit H is compounded by the number of patients admitted to the Hospital. The daily count of admitted patients is largely dependent on the Hospital's legal requirements of the Clark permanent injunction. According to the Department of Health, the number of forensic admissions has increased from 2009 to 2013. Figure 3.2 illustrates the number and type of admissions and the

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82 Testimony of Vivian Cayetano, May 28, 2014.
83 Department of Health, Documents Detailing the PICU (LR_08_091614_1-41).
84 Department of Health, Documents Detailing the PICU (LR_08_091614_1-41).
percentage increase from 2009 to 2013 as reported by the Department of Health.

Figure 3.2
Number of Admissions from 2009 to 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity</th>
<th>Evaluation of Fitness</th>
<th>Restoration of Fitness</th>
<th>72-Hour Hold/Conditional Release</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% Increase from 2009 to 2013 44% 72% 60% 36%

Source: Department of Health

The number of admitted forensic patients not only increases on a yearly basis, but also fluctuates on a daily basis as the Hospital fulfills its legal requirements by admitting court ordered patients. Therefore, the Investigative Committee finds that the increase and fluctuation of admitted patients poses a challenge for the Hospital to accurately plan and prepare for the number of beds that are needed to accommodate all of its admitted patients on Unit H in addition to the acute patients being treated on Unit H thereby increasing the need to move patients to other units.

The Investigative Committee has concerns regarding Unit H serving a dual purpose as an acute psychiatric care unit and as the admissions unit for the entire Hospital. While it recognizes that space is limited at the Hospital, the Investigative Committee believes that admitted patients and acute psychiatric patients can be better served and treated separately and that designating Unit H as an admissions-only unit will assist the Hospital in increasing the number of beds available for admitted patients and decreasing the need to transfer unstable patients to stable rehabilitation units. Accordingly, Unit H staff will be able to more effectively meet the care and treatment needs of its admitted patients while decreasing the safety risks.

86 PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR_01_0033-0061).
The Investigative Committee notes that the Hospital is accredited as an acute care facility. However, in light of the forensic patient admissions and census, the Investigative Committee offers for consideration the question of whether a forensic care designation and accreditation may better serve the purposes of the Hospital.

c. Underutilization of a Feasible Option to Address the Needs of High Risk or Violent Patients

The Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital underutilizes a feasible option that would provide for the transfer of certain high risk or violent patients to another mental health facility contracted by the State for appropriate treatment and rehabilitation. The Investigative Committee notes that there are currently two high risk patients who were transferred to GEO Care, Inc.'s Columbia Regional Care Center, a forensic mental health facility in South Carolina. The Hospital determined that these two patients needed to be cared for at a forensic hospital-type correctional facility that provided mental and physical health services rather than an acute psychiatric hospital-type clinical facility like the Hospital. The Hospital further determined that these patients and similar patients would be better managed at a facility outside of the State that is specifically designed to better meet the needs of the patients while creating a safer environment for other Hospital patients, Hospital staff, and the transferred patient. The Investigative Committee further notes that one of the patients who was transferred to the South Carolina facility had been institutionalized at the Halawa Correctional Facility after seriously assaulting a Hospital staff member.

The Investigative Committee finds that the transfer of patients to South Carolina for treatment is a cost-effective option that would provide the appropriate level of care for the transferred patient, assist in controlling patient census, and contribute to a safer work environment. Figure 3.3 illustrates the patient cost per day for a patient hospitalized at the

87 Department of Health, Accreditation Authorities, Requirements, and Cycles (LR 04 0001-0193).
88 Department of Health, Documentation Relating to the Contract with GEO Care, Inc., Columbia Regional Care Center (LR 03 071614 0001-0072).
89 Department of Health, Documentation Relating to the Contract with GEO Care, Inc., Columbia Regional Care Center (LR 03 071614 0001-0072).
90 Department of Health, Documentation Relating to the Contract with GEO Care, Inc., Columbia Regional Care Center (LR 03 071614 0001-0072).
91 Department of Health, Documentation Relating to the Contract with GEO Care, Inc., Columbia Regional Care Center (LR 03 071614 0001-0072).
Hospital, Kahi Mohala (for a contracted overflow bed), and GEO Care, Inc. facility in South Carolina.

Figure 3.3
Patient Cost per Day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Cost per Day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii State Hospital</td>
<td>$657.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kahi Mohala</td>
<td>$745.00 (for up to 40 beds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$800.00 (for acute care)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO Care, Inc.</td>
<td>$304.00 to $425.00 (three daily rates depending on level of acuity)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Health

The Investigative Committee notes that the Hospital realizes a cost savings of approximately $350 to $230 per day per patient to hospitalize a patient at the facility in South Carolina compared to the Hospital, thus saving the Hospital and State money.

In addition to the cost savings, the Investigative Committee notes that the number of violent assaults against Hospital patients and staff are committed by a small handful of patients. The Director of Health, Dr. Rosen, estimated that 5% of the patient population is responsible for a number of the violent assaults and poses a greater danger at the Hospital. Thus, for a patient population of 200 patients, approximately 10 patients are responsible for committing a number of Hospital assaults. However, the Administrator of the Adult Mental Health Division, Dr. Fridovich, clarified that this estimation may change from month-to-month or week-to-week depending on patient progress in treatment. However, the Investigative Committee believes that such estimate is too high considering the number of assaults that have occurred at the Hospital, especially when options are available to ensure that violent patients receive the appropriate and necessary level of care while ensuring workplace safety. The forensic mental health facility in South Carolina provides mental and physical health services that are

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92 Department of Health, Patient Cost per Day at HSH, Kahi Mohala, and GEO Care, Inc. (LR_01_071614_0001, LR_02_071614_0002, and LR_03_071614_0001).
93 Testimony of Dr. Linda Rosen, July 16, 2014.
94 Testimony of Dr. Mark Fridovich, July 16, 2014.
more appropriate than the services that the Hospital is able to provide for such patients. Furthermore, transferring high risk or violent patients will provide a safer environment for Hospital patients and staff and assist in controlling the persistently high patient census.

Despite the apparent benefits, the Investigative Committee finds that since 2010, the Hospital has transferred only two patients to South Carolina for treatment. The Investigative Committee notes that a third patient was considered for transfer in March 2014. However, Dr. Fridovich held the request for transfer because the "Hospital lacked a written policy and procedure that would govern and describe the criteria and the circumstances under which individuals should be considered for that kind of special treatment." The written policies and procedures would describe the considerations that must be taken into account in reviewing a patient for potential transfer, including clinical needs and alternatives, legal status and other considerations, internal and external consultation, and relative and other social support. Dr. Fridovich explained that for the other two patients who were transferred to the South Carolina facility without a written policy and procedure, these determinations were based on a case-specific review, not an occurrence involving the patient. The Associate Administrator for Clinical Services, Dr. Sheehan, further explained that the decisions to transfer the two patients were "done empirically, meaning that there were other factors that came into play on cases that resulted in the decision being made to transfer an individual to the mainland" and done with "heavy administrative evaluation, and maybe not quite as strong clinical evaluation."

As a result, Dr. Fridovich recommended that a set of policies and procedures be developed and implemented before any more patients were transferred to South Carolina for treatment. However, the Investigative Committee notes that Dr. Fridovich served as the Hospital Administrator when the first patient was transferred to the South Carolina facility. Thus, despite Dr. Sheehan's explanation, it is still unclear to the Investigative Committee why he held the third patient transfer request in March 2014, when Dr. Fridovich was partly responsible for transferring the first patient in 2010 when no policies and procedures to transfer patients out-of-state existed.

95 Testimony of Dr. Mark Fridovich, July 16, 2014.
96 Testimony of Dr. Mark Fridovich, July 16, 2014.
97 Testimony of Dr. Mark Fridovich, July 16, 2014.
98 Testimony of Dr. William Sheehan, July 30, 2014.
99 Testimony of Dr. Mark Fridovich, July 16, 2014.
The Investigative Committee further notes that as of August 20, 2014, the Hospital has made effective a new policy and procedure for the assessment of patients deemed unable to be safely treated at the Hospital to be transferred to a contracted out-of-state facility. However, the Investigative Committee contemplates how long it would take the Hospital to develop and implement these policies and procedures had it not been for the Investigative Committee's insistence that the Hospital expedite their efforts.

Dr. Rosen and new Hospital Administrator, William May, testified that the Hospital has a duty to care for its patients in Hawaii. However, the Investigative Committee strongly believes that the option of transferring high risk patients to the mainland is a cost-effective and feasible tool that the Hospital should have the latitude to use, especially when such patients pose a risk to themselves or others and can receive more appropriate treatment and rehabilitation that the Hospital is unable to provide. The Investigative Committee urges the Hospital to use this option when appropriate.

d. Safety Concerns Close a Psychiatric Unit

The Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital's efforts to control its high patient census and ensure a safe work environment are further hindered by the closing of the Psychiatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU). In 2011, Unit F was renovated at the cost of $530,000 to create the PICU, a four-bed suite off of the main unit, as part of a plan to combine the functions of Units F and H into an Acute Services Program. Under this program, the admission functions of Unit H would be divided whereby Unit F would take the light admissions and Unit H would continue to accept acute admissions, thus increasing the Hospital's admissions bed count. The PICU was intended to reduce risk on the acute services units (Units F and H) by assigning high risk patients to the PICU upon admission and as needed for care, treatment, and safety. This placement would prevent the introduction of unstable high risk patients into the unit populations before they are clinically ready, thereby

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100 Department of Health, Policy and Procedure on Transferring HSH Patients to Other Facilities Outside the State (LR-02-091614-1-6).
101 Testimony of Dr. Rosen, July 16, 2014.
102 Testimony of William May, July 30, 2014.
104 Department of Health, Documents Detailing the PICU (LR-08-091614-1-41).
105 Department of Health, Documents Detailing the PICU (LR-08-091614-1-41).
106 Department of Health, Documents Detailing the PICU (LR-08-091614-1-41).
creating a safer environment for patients and staff.\textsuperscript{107} PICU patients would be restricted from the admission areas until they were stabilized and ready to step down to the appropriate admission unit.\textsuperscript{108} However, the PICU was ill-designed and the structure was never ready to be properly implemented into the Hospital's operations. On December 1, 2011, a Psychiatric Technician (Psych Tech) was performing a 1:1 assignment with a patient who was admitted to the PICU.\textsuperscript{109} The Psych Tech was attacked by the patient and received multiple unprovoked punches to the face and head, which resulted in a laceration over the Psych Tech's left eye.\textsuperscript{110} Shortly thereafter, the PICU was closed for safety reasons and concerns raised by staff and labor union representatives.\textsuperscript{111}

While the Investigative Committee understands the important duty for the Hospital to ensure a safe work environment, it has concerns regarding the length of time that the PICU has been closed. The PICU was intended for high risk patients, and delays in addressing the safety problems result in the Hospital being forced to combine high risk patients with other acute patients in Units F and H, which may create a higher safety risk for these units. Since the PICU's closing, it has been used only a few times for low risk patients as required by patient census\textsuperscript{112} and not used for its intended purpose. The Investigative Committee notes that the Hospital has sent letters for consultation to HGEA and UPW\textsuperscript{113} and therefore strongly urges the Hospital and unions to address the safety concerns to enable use of the PICU as a resource for the safe management of patients who present behavioral changes.

2. Insufficient Security to Protect Patients, Staff, and Surrounding Community

While the Investigative Committee recognizes that the Hospital's purpose is to treat and rehabilitate rather than incarcerate individuals suffering from brain, medical, and behavioral disorders, it also recognizes that the Hospital is

\textsuperscript{107} Department of Health, Documents Detailing the PICU (LR_08_091614_1-41).
\textsuperscript{108} Department of Health, Documents Detailing the PICU (LR_08_091614_1-41).
\textsuperscript{109} Department of Health, Documentation of a Psychiatric Technician Assaulted by Patient in the PICU (LR_07_091614_1-9).
\textsuperscript{110} Department of Health, Documentation of a Psychiatric Technician Assaulted by Patient in the PICU (LR_07_091614_1-9).
\textsuperscript{111} PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR_01_0033-0061).
\textsuperscript{112} PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR_01_0033-0061).
\textsuperscript{113} Department of Health, Documents Detailing the PICU (LR_08_091614_1-41).
authorized by law\textsuperscript{114} to be a state-operated secure psychiatric rehabilitation program for individuals who require intensive therapeutic treatment and rehabilitation in a secure setting, including forensic mental health patients who are hospitalized pursuant to a court order. Accordingly, it is imperative for the Hospital to maintain a safe and secure facility. However, the Investigative Committee finds that certain areas of the Hospital's security need improvement and strengthening to ensure a safe environment for patients to receive treatment, staff to provide patient care, and the surrounding community to coexist with the Hospital.

\textbf{a. Inadequate Monitoring and Operation of Security Cameras}

There are over 140 security cameras throughout the entire Hospital campus, which are all monitored by one security officer stationed at the Hospital's Telecommunication Office.\textsuperscript{115} This officer is in charge of monitoring the lower level administration area and all exterior cameras during Treatment Mall hours and all upper and lower units during non-Treatment Mall hours. Moreover, this officer is responsible for positioning and monitoring all exterior cameras during a code 77 (response code for a patient elopement, elopement attempt, or absent without leave)\textsuperscript{116} to search for a patient, acknowledging all door alarms that become active or are left open by staff or a patient, and positioning the camera to the location of a code 200 (response code to mobilize staff to an area whether there is a risk for harm by a patient toward self, others, or property)\textsuperscript{117} to assist the response team in locating, assessing, and responding to the situation. The Investigative Committee has strong concerns regarding the assigned responsibility of monitoring over 140 security cameras to just one officer. The Investigative Committee finds that this is too large and important of a responsibility to place on only one individual because closed circuit video monitoring impacts emergency and security response times as well as efforts to prevent an emergency situation or security breach.

Furthermore, during the Investigative Committee's site visit of the Hospital in June 2014, it observed that not all of the cameras were constantly working. Hospital administrators

\textsuperscript{114} See, §334-2.5, HRS.
\textsuperscript{115} Department of Health, Information on the Monitoring of Closed Circuit Video at the HSH (LR_01_011514_1123-1138 - Confidential).
\textsuperscript{116} Department of Health, Elopement, Elopement Attempt, and AWOL Policy and Procedure No. 19.520 (LR_01_020714_0067-0082 - Confidential).
\textsuperscript{117} Department of Health, Code 200 and Backup Calls Policy and Procedure No. 09.030 (LR_01_121013_0028-0037 - Confidential).
explained that some of the cameras were off because no patients were currently in the camera's view range. The Investigative Committee does not understand this justification because it believes that all cameras should be on at all times. Furthermore, the Investigative Committee is concerned about how camera inactivity may affect emergency or security response times, especially when it was reported by Emelinda Yarte, a former Hospital Psychiatric Technician who was injured by a patient in December 2009, that not all of the security cameras were operating at the time she sustained her injuries. She testified that if all of the security cameras had been working, the cameras would have been able to better capture and record the incident for Hospital records. The Investigative Committee finds that ensuring that all security cameras are operating at all times better enables the Hospital to prevent or respond to emergencies as well as keep a record for the Hospital for risk management purposes.

b. **Issues Regarding the Personal Mobile Transmitter (PMT) Devices**

The Investigative Committee notes that there are issues regarding the PMT devices. The PMT device allows a person to summon for assistance quickly without the use of a telephone when duress or a harmful situation occurs. Code 200 is a response code to mobilize staff to an area whether there is a risk for harm by a patient toward self, others, or property. Therefore, the PMT devices are a vital piece of safety equipment for the protection of patients and staff from harm, and all employees are required to wear their devices at all times when on duty.

The Investigative Committee has serious concerns regarding an incident of an employee working at the PICU sustaining serious injuries to the head and face as a result of an unprovoked attack by a patient. It is reported that this employee's PMT device failed to work properly and thus, the

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120 PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR_01_0033-0061).
121 Department of Health, Code 200 and Backup Calls Policy and Procedure No. 09.030 (LR_01_121013_0028-0037 - Confidential).
122 Department of Health, Code 200 and Backup Calls Policy and Procedure No. 09.030 (LR_01_121013_0028-0037 - Confidential).
124 Department of Health, Documentation of a Psychiatric Technician Assaulted by Patient in the PICU (LR_07_091614_1-9).
response time for staff to render aid was delayed. Furthermore, there are reports that the PMTs fail to transmit the correct location of the code 200, thereby affecting emergency response times, or failure of staff to use the PMT during a code 200.\textsuperscript{125}

Lastly, in March 2013, HIOSH issued a citation with a penalty of $1,200 to the Hospital for violating §12-60-2(a)(3), Hawaii Administrative Rules, due to the lack of management accountability to ensure that each and every employee checks his or her PMT weekly to make sure that it is in working and functional condition.\textsuperscript{126} The Investigative Committee strongly urges the Hospital to immediately address any issues with the PMTs, including upgrading the technology if necessary.

c. Insufficient Fencing Around the Hospital Campus

During the Investigative Committee's site visit of the Hospital in June 2014, it observed that only units F and H and the State Operated Specialized Residential Program, commonly referred to as the cottages, were fenced, but the other units as well as the Treatment Mall that accommodate patients did not have fenced enclosures. While the Investigative Committee recognizes that the Hospital is not a correctional facility, it is concerned about the absence of fencing around the perimeter of the Hospital campus. The Hospital's patient census is predominately comprised of mental health forensic patients, some of whom have been acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity,\textsuperscript{127} or are admitted for mental health evaluations, or pursuant to the Clark permanent injunction.\textsuperscript{128} As such, some of these patients may pose a risk to the community surrounding the Hospital, especially students and staff at the Windward Community College, which is located adjacent to the Hospital. The Investigative Committee believes that the Hospital administrators should explore options and funding mechanisms to install fencing around the perimeter of the Hospital campus to ensure safety for the surrounding community.

d. Lack of Procedures to Notify the Police and Alert the Public of a Patient Elopement

Although the Department of Health reports that the number of patient elopements from the Hospital has decreased from 2010 to 2013 due to its improved policies and procedures and staff

\textsuperscript{125} Department of Health, Hospital Executive Meeting Minutes (LR 28 0622-0626).
\textsuperscript{126} Department of Health, Documents Related to HIOSH Inspection No. 316267160 (LR 20 0001-0010 - Confidential).
\textsuperscript{127} See, §704-411(1)(a), HRS.
diligence,\textsuperscript{129} the Investigative Committee is concerned that the Hospital lacks specific procedures to notify the police and alert the public when a patient escapes or elopes from the Hospital. The Hospital defines elopements as an event for any length of time in which a patient leaves the facility grounds or leaves from a community outing without authorization and without notifying the staff of an intention to do so.\textsuperscript{130}

The Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital's improved policies and procedures fail to prescribe who is responsible for giving notice and when the police should be notified of a patient elopement from the Hospital. The established procedures for patient elopements from the Hospital only indicate that the police should be notified or 911 be called when a patient is agitated and refusing verbal redirection by staff to return to the Hospital.\textsuperscript{131} The external notification procedures include calling the police with procedures for the Nursing Supervisor to provide information to the responding police officer,\textsuperscript{132} but do not indicate when the police should be called. While the Investigative Committee notes that patient elopements may only be for a short time, it believes that the police could further assist the Hospital's search efforts thereby reducing the amount of time that a patient is away from the Hospital grounds.

While there are procedures to notify Hospital administrators, patient family or significant others, case management workers, and social workers, there are no procedures to notify or alert the public, especially the students and staff at Windward Community College, of a patient elopement from the Hospital. The Windward Community College campus is adjacent to the Hospital campus with only a private road separating the two properties. Without a fence around the perimeter of the Hospital campus, it is possible for a Hospital patient to wander onto campus; if the patient is gone from the Hospital long enough, the patient may be able to wander into the surrounding community, including the residential neighborhoods and public park. In light of the Hospital's forensic mental health patient census, the Investigative Committee believes that the Hospital has an absolute responsibility and duty of care to the surrounding community in addition to its patients and staff. Accordingly, the Hospital should develop and implement

\textsuperscript{129} Department of Health, Data on the Number of Elopements Over the Years (LR_01_020714_0065-0066 - Confidential).
\textsuperscript{130} Department of Health, Elopement, Elopement Attempt, and AWOL Policy and Procedure No. 19.520 (LR_01_020714_0068-0082 - Confidential).
\textsuperscript{131} Department of Health, Elopement, Elopement Attempt, and AWOL Policy and Procedure No. 19.520 (LR_01_020714_0068-0082 - Confidential).
\textsuperscript{132} Department of Health, Elopement, Elopement Attempt, and AWOL Policy and Procedure No. 19.520 (LR_01_020714_0068-0082 - Confidential).
procedures to notify the public, especially Windward Community College, of a patient elopement to expedite the search efforts and ensure community safety.

C. CHALLENGES IN PROVIDING EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE HUMAN RESOURCES PRACTICES

S.R. No. 3 requested the Investigative Committee to investigate allegations of Hospital administrative and employment improprieties. The Investigative Committee finds that alleged improprieties, including favoritism, nepotism, and conflicts of interest, stem from inefficient and ineffective human resources practices.

Human resources has been a persistent challenge for the Hospital. One of the areas of concern that the Hospital needed to address under the 1991 federal settlement agreement and subsequent related stipulated orders and remedial plans was the employment and deployment of additional staff.

In 2012, the Governor's Special Action Team found that the existing allocation of human resources impedes maximal efficient use and that there are persistent staff vacancies that increase overtime costs and compromise the accomplishments of the Hospital's programmatic goals.\textsuperscript{133}

Despite federal and state intervention, the Hospital continues to face challenges in filling vacant positions, obtaining additional staff in the most cost-effective manner, and maintaining employee morale. The Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital's inefficient and ineffective human resources practices result in inefficiencies and high personnel costs. The Investigative Committee further finds that the lack of leadership in managing and ensuring fair and transparent Hospital human resources practices contributes to low employee morale, erodes employees' trust of and confidence in Hospital administrators and supervisors, and causes employees to fear retaliation by Hospital administrators and supervisors.

\textsuperscript{133} Department of Health, \textit{Special Action Team Report to the Governor on Revitalization of the Adult Mental Health System and Effective Management of the Hawaii Hospital Census} (October 2012).
1. Inefficient Hiring Practices Contribute to Persistent Vacancies

The Hospital has an overall vacancy rate of 12%,\(^\text{134}\) which is approximately 60 direct and non-direct care positions.\(^\text{135}\) The vacancy rate is 8% for direct care positions.\(^\text{136}\) Direct care positions are those directly assigned to patient units while support positions are commonly referred to as non-direct care positions. According to the Former Acting Hospital Administrator, William Elliott, the Hospital has the authorization to fill these vacant positions and is constantly in the process of hiring staff.\(^\text{137}\) Persistent vacant positions incur greater personnel expenses for overtime or temporary employee agency staffing and lead to concerns regarding patient care. Accordingly, it is vital for the Hospital to strengthen its ability to recruit staff. However, the Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital lacks efficient hiring processes and procedures to ensure that vacancies are filled in an expeditious and fair manner.

a. Inefficient Recruitment and Hiring Process

Mr. Elliott testified that a study conducted years ago found that it took the State approximately 66 working days, approximately over three months, to fill a vacant position.\(^\text{138}\) The hiring process at the Hospital currently takes longer than 66 working days. The Investigative Committee finds that one of the reasons the Hospital is unable to fill its vacant positions is due to an inefficient recruitment and hiring process, which requires numerous steps before applicants are hired. Figure 3.4 illustrates the multiple steps required to fill a vacant position. The Investigative Committee notes that Figure 3.4 highlights the main steps in the process and does not indicate any separate steps specific to a civil service, non-civil service, or exempt position.

\(^{134}\) PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR 01 0033-0061).
\(^{135}\) Testimony of William Elliott, April 9, 2014.
\(^{136}\) PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR 01 0033-0061).
\(^{137}\) Testimony of William Elliott, April 9, 2014.
\(^{138}\) Testimony of William Elliott, April 9, 2014.
Figure 3.4
Simplified Hiring Process to Fill a Hospital Vacant Position

Source: Department of Health

- Supervisor prepares a Request to Fill Form and routes to Business Office for review
- Associate Administrator of Administrative and Support Services receives request from Business Office for review and approval and submits to Personnel Office
- Personnel Office processes request and prepares forms to submit to the Adult Mental Health Division (AMHD) for review

- AMHD reviews request form and if no revisions are necessary, forwards request to the Administrative Services Office (ASO)
- ASO reviews request form and if no revisions are necessary, forwards to the Human Resources Office (HRO)

- HRO opens an Internal Vacancy Announcement, sends Announcement to Department programs via email, and posts on the Department's website for two weeks
- HRO screens internal applications after recruitment closes and requests an external list of applicants from the Department of Human Resources Development (DHRD) if there are no internal applicants

- Personnel receives a list of eligible applicants and records receipt of the list on a vacancy report
- Personnel assembles interview packets and sends to position's supervisor

- Supervisor receives packets and assembles interview panels to conduct interviews
- All individuals on the internal list must be interviewed and an attempt must be made to contact everyone on the external list
- Personnel review packets and enter results into vacancy report

- HRO receives the packets for review
- HRO determines whether a selection is valid then notifies the Hospital to make a conditional offer
- If no selection is made, then HRO will request another eligible list from DHRD

- Hospital makes a conditional offer to the applicant
- If applicant accepts offer, then applicant must clear background check and medical requirements
- Start date is set and applicant is placed into position
Under Figure 3.4, a request to fill a vacant position goes through five different individuals or offices at the Hospital or the Department of Health for review and approval before a vacancy announcement is posted and a list of eligible candidates to fill the position is created. Once a list of candidates is established, the interview process needs to be completed and approval from the Department of Health's Human Resources Office must be given before the Hospital is able to make a conditional offer to an applicant. The Investigative Committee notes that delays can happen at each of the multiple steps in the recruiting and hiring process that can result in further delays in recruiting and hiring Hospital staff. While the Hospital may view this process as a method to ensure that employees are carefully vetted and selected for a position, the Investigative Committee finds that the existing recruiting and hiring process can be streamlined without compromising integrity and fairness.

Despite this inefficient process, the Investigative Committee could not determine if anything has been done to improve the recruitment and hiring process. In 2012, the Governor's Special Action Team\textsuperscript{140} recommended that the Department of Health's Human Resources Office and Administrative Services Office, Department of Human Resources Development, and others work together to prioritize recruitment and obtain administrative approval for positions that may impact the patient census and provide diversion services. The Special Action Team also recommended that the Department of Health assist the Department of Human Resources Development in screening Hospital applications. However, Mr. Elliott informed the Investigative Committee that these recommendations did not produce any additional Hospital employees.\textsuperscript{141} Figure 3.5 indicates the number of hires the Hospital made in 2013.

\textsuperscript{139} Based on the material submitted by the Department of Health of a flowchart indicating the hiring process, hiring authority, and locations of each point of the hiring process (LR\textsubscript{12} 0001-0012 and LR\textsubscript{13} 0001-0012).

\textsuperscript{140} Department of Health, Special Action Team Report to the Governor on Revitalization of the Adult Mental Health System and Effective Management of the Hawaii Hospital Census (October 2012).

\textsuperscript{141} Testimony of William Elliott, April 9, 2014.
The number of hires in 2013 had a minimal impact on the Hospital's vacancy rate. Accordingly, the Investigative Committee strongly believes that the Hospital Administration must make a stronger effort to improve and streamline the recruitment and hiring process.

The Investigative Committee further finds that the inefficient recruiting and hiring process creates opportunities for individuals to obtain employment at the Hospital through temporary employment agencies thereby bypassing the established hiring process. The Hospital has 13-week contracts for additional staff from private sector temporary employment agencies to meet its appropriate staffing needs. The Director of Nursing, Leona Guest,\textsuperscript{143} and Associate Chief Nurse, Emma Evans,\textsuperscript{144} testified that, on behalf of the Hospital, they have provided referrals to these temporary employment agencies for these referred individuals to work at the Hospital. As a result, individuals who are referred by the Hospital are provided 13-week contracts to work at the Hospital without engaging in the Hospital's formal recruitment and hiring process.

Although the Investigative Committee recognizes the need for agency workers to meet staffing demands, it is concerned that contracts with agency workers with referrals from the Hospital can create the appearance of favoritism and have a negative impact on employee morale, especially when such individuals are relatives or friends of Hospital administrators or supervisors or are individuals who were not previously hired by the Hospital for a permanent position through the formal hiring process. Ms. Guest testified that she would have discouraged her daughter from working at the hospital via a

\textsuperscript{142} PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR_01_0033-0061).
\textsuperscript{143} Testimony of Leona Guest, June 18, 2014.
\textsuperscript{144} Testimony of Emma Evans, April 30, 2014.
temporary employment agency if she knew that this referral would cause staff to make allegations of favoritism.\textsuperscript{145}

Furthermore, the Investigative Committee finds that the formal recruitment and hiring process allows temporary employment agency workers to have an advantage in obtaining a permanent position at the Hospital. The Department of Health engages in an internal recruitment process, and agency staff have access to these vacancy postings.\textsuperscript{146} In addition, since these agency workers receive training while performing their 13-week contracts, they gain Hospital work experience.\textsuperscript{147} As a result, agency workers have an advantage over any eligible candidates without work experience at the Hospital.

While the Investigative Committee recognizes that agency workers still need to be interviewed and approved for hire, it is concerned that the hiring of certain agency workers for a permanent position at the Hospital may create the appearance of favoritism, especially if those agency workers were not previously hired for a Hospital permanent position or their names are repeatedly given to the temporary employment agencies to work at the Hospital on a 13-week contract. This can exacerbate low employee morale.

b. Lack of Internal Policies to Ensure a Fair Hiring Process

The Investigative Committee finds that there are a number of employees who are related to each other because there are no internal policies regarding the hiring of relatives of employees at the Hospital. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 illustrate the number of Hospital employees or agency workers related to the Associate Chief Nurse and Director of Nursing.

\textsuperscript{145} Testimony of Leona Guest, June 18, 2014.
\textsuperscript{146} Testimony of Emma Evans, April 30, 2014.
\textsuperscript{147} Testimony of Emma Evans, April 30, 2014.
Figure 3.6
Relatives of the Associate Chief Nurse Employed at the Hospital

Source: Department of Health\textsuperscript{148} and Emma Evans\textsuperscript{149}

Figure 3.7
Relatives of the Director of Nursing Employed at the Hospital

Source: Department of Health\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{148} Department of Health, Chart Identifying Staff Members who are Related to Each Other (LR\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ - Confidential)
\textsuperscript{149} Testimony of Emma Evans, April 30, 2014.
\textsuperscript{150} Department of Health, Chart Identifying Staff Members who are Related to Each Other (LR\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ - Confidential)
There are a number of employees, like Ms. Evans and Ms. Guest, who have more than one relative working at the Hospital. However, the Investigative Committee notes that Ms. Evans and Ms. Guest are Hospital administrators with five or more relatives working at the Hospital, which calls into question the appropriateness and necessity of having that many related individuals on the Hospital payroll. The Investigative Committee recognizes that employing relatives on staff may not affect work performance and notes that nepotism is not a violation of state law or the State's Code of Ethics. However, without internal policies regarding the employment of relatives on staff, the Investigative Committee finds that employing relatives on staff leads to allegations of favoritism and negatively impacts employee morale, which can, in turn, impact work performance.

Furthermore, the Investigative Committee is concerned about the lack of procedures to ensure that the interview process is free from conflicts of interest or even the appearance of conflicts of interest. Mr. Elliott testified that he would expect staff members to recuse themselves from participating on panels that will be interviewing applicants related to them. However, there are no internal policies or procedures to ensure that staff do not participate in interviewing their relatives and, as a result, it is possible that a relative of an applicant could serve on that applicant's interview panel.

The Investigative Committee is also deeply concerned about the number of supervisors or administrators who have relatives on staff at the Hospital and how their positions may influence the interview panel's recommendation for hire. For example, Ms. Evans, who is the Associate Chief Nurse in charge of the Nursing Office, testified that she notified certain individuals who served on an applicant's interview panel that she was related to the applicant. Since Ms. Evans serves in an administrative position, the Investigative Committee is concerned that her actions could be considered as using or attempting to use her official position to secure or grant unwarranted advantages or treatment for herself or others, which is a violation of the State's Code of Ethics. Without effective mechanisms in place to prevent favoritism, conflicts of interest, and undue influence or the appearance thereof, the integrity and fairness of the existing hiring process is compromised.

151 Testimony of William Elliott, April 9, 2014.
152 Testimony of Emma Evans, April 30, 2014.
153 See, §84-13, HRS.
2. Lack of Control of Overtime and Sick Leave Costs the State Money

The Hospital uses the Johnson Behavioral Model\textsuperscript{154} as the established methodology to assess a patient's clinical need (e.g., assess whether a patient requires a wheelchair or identify any challenging behaviors of the patient) and identify appropriate nurse staffing ratios to provide appropriate care for patients. In June 2013,\textsuperscript{155} the Hospital adjusted its nurse staffing matrix to include the number of patients located in any patient care area due to the Hospital's growing patient census. As a result, the nurse staffing levels of each unit are adjusted daily, and the assistance of additional nurse staff is routinely requested to meet each patient's care needs and the number of patients of each unit. Additional nurse staff may be obtained from Hospital nurse staff working overtime shifts in addition to their regularly scheduled shifts or through contracted workers from temporary employee service agencies.

Each Unit Nurse Manager is responsible for contacting a Nursing Shift Supervisor in the Nursing Office to provide a number of any additional staff that is needed for each shift to achieve the appropriate nurse staffing ratios for their respective units.\textsuperscript{156} The scheduling clerks in the Nursing Office maintain the shift schedules of the nurse staff\textsuperscript{157} and are responsible for contacting and obtaining any additional staff to fill shifts that are open due to nurse staff who are out on sick leave or vacation or shifts that are necessary to meet the nurse staffing matrix for a particular unit.\textsuperscript{158}

Overtime shifts are generally assigned on a rotating basis.\textsuperscript{159} Other factors affecting the assignment of overtime include unit assignments, terms in collective bargaining agreements, and whether the nurse staff is employed by the State or under contract with the temporary employee service agency.\textsuperscript{160} This system of assigning and using overtime is intended to be fair and in accordance with terms of collective bargaining.

\textsuperscript{154} PowerPoint materials submitted by the Department of Health to the Senate Committees on Health and Judiciary and Labor for the Informational Briefing on January 7, 2014 (LR 01 0033-0061).

\textsuperscript{155} Response dated January 15, 2014 from Department of Health to the Investigative Committee to the written questions and request for information (LR 01_011514_0049-0052 - Confidential).

\textsuperscript{156} Testimony of William Elliott, April 9, 2014.

\textsuperscript{157} Position Descriptions for Office Assistant III (Scheduling Clerks) (MAF 043014_07 0002-0026).

\textsuperscript{158} Testimony of Debra Ono, May 14, 2014.

\textsuperscript{159} Testimony of Leona Guest, June 18, 2014.

\textsuperscript{160} Testimony of Debra Ono, May 14, 2014; Testimony of Leona Gust, June 18, 2014; and Testimony of William Elliott, June 18, 2014.
However, the Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital lacks mechanisms to monitor and control the use of overtime and sick leave benefits, which results in inefficiencies in assigning overtime and high personnel overtime costs for the State; contributes to low employee morale; and raises concerns regarding the quality of care received by the patients.

a. Lack of a Standardized System to Assign Overtime

The Investigative Committee finds that the procedures in assigning overtime are not standardized. Debra Ono, a scheduling clerk at the Hospital, testified that when assigning overtime shifts to nurse staff, she refers to the master schedule to determine who is available according to the rotating system, creates a list of names of available staff, then proceeds to call these staff members until she is able to fill all open shift slots.\(^{161}\) She explained that she assigns overtime shifts according to the instructions and training she received by her coworkers because a written standardized procedures manual does not exist.\(^{162}\) As a result, Ms. Ono testified that each of the six scheduling clerks who work at the Nursing Office assigns overtime shifts differently depending on the training received from coworkers.\(^{163}\) Although the Director of Nursing, Leona Guest,\(^{164}\) and Associate Chief Nurse, Emma Evans,\(^{165}\) testified that written procedures for assigning overtime are part of the Nursing Office's standard operating procedures, the Investigative Committee believes that these standard operating procedures are not being widely and consistently implemented by the scheduling clerks in the Nursing Office.

The Investigative Committee finds that the absence of a standardized system to assign overtime shifts increases the risk of assignment discrepancies and may result in certain staff receiving more overtime shifts than others or overtime shifts that appear out of rotation. As a result, staff may file complaints that they were bypassed for an overtime shift opportunity. If a discrepancy is found, the Hospital routinely responds by providing the staff member two opportunities for overtime the next time the employee's name is next on the rotation.\(^{166}\) However, overtime shift assignment discrepancies or complaints are compounded by the appearance of favoritism. Ms. Evans testified that there is a perception among staff that the

\(^{161}\) Testimony of Debra Ono, May 14, 2014.
\(^{162}\) Testimony of Debra Ono, May 14, 2014.
\(^{163}\) Testimony of Debra Ono, May 14, 2014.
\(^{164}\) Testimony of Leona Guest, June 18, 2014.
\(^{165}\) Testimony of Emma Evans, April 30, 2014.
\(^{166}\) Testimony of Leona Guest, June 18, 2014.
Nursing Office has favorites when assigning overtime. While assignment discrepancies, if any, may be cured by providing an employee with two additional opportunities for overtime, the Investigative Committee finds that the appearance or perception of favoritism is not as easily resolved and has long-term effects on nurse staff morale. Therefore, it is incumbent on the Hospital to implement a standardized system for assigning overtime so that the process is fair and transparent.

The Investigative Committee notes that former Acting Hospital Administrator, William Elliott, testified in April 2014, that for the past nine months, the Hospital was in the process of procuring a computer scheduling system to assist with assigning overtime shifts and controlling favoritism. Named Kronos, the scheduling system is expected to align with collective bargaining requirements, adhere to Hospital policies and procedures, and meet staffing demands and scheduled changes to quickly identify qualified substitutes, automatically notify them, and fill the shift opening. The Investigative Committee believes that this computerized scheduling system will increase efficiency and assist in minimizing the perception of favoritism. The Investigative Committee urges the Hospital to expedite its plans to install the Kronos system.

b. No Limits on the Number of Overtime Shifts an Employee May Perform

Overtime is considered a necessary measure to meet appropriate nurse staffing ratios for each unit at the Hospital. However, the Investigative Committee finds that there are a number of employees who have performed amounts of overtime hours that significantly exceed a regular 40-hour work week because there are no limits to the number of overtime shifts an employee may perform. Figure 3.8 indicates the combined total number of overtime hours and amounts of the top six overtime Hospital employee earners.

167 Testimony of Emma Evans, April 30, 2014.
168 Testimony of William Elliott, April 9, 2014.
169 Response dated February 7, 2014 from the Department of Health to the Investigative Committee to the written questions and request for information (LR_01_020714_0001-0005 - Confidential).
Figure 3.8
Combined Totals of the Top Six Overtime Earners for FY2013 and 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY2014 (Up to January 31, 2014)</th>
<th>Total Overtime Hours</th>
<th>Total Overtime Amounts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,475.50</td>
<td>$159,977.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>Total Overtime Hours</th>
<th>Total Overtime Amounts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,396.80</td>
<td>$202,837.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Health

Permitting staff to accumulate indefinite amounts of overtime has a fiscal impact on the Hospital as well as the State. The Hospital's personnel budget is approximately $35 million per year with an additional $3 million for overtime costs. For FY2013, the combined total overtime costs for the six top overtime earners illustrated in Figure 3.8 was approximately 6.7% of the Hospital's $3 million overtime budget. Unlimited overtime shifts creates difficulties for the Hospital to accurately budget personnel costs, especially when the Hospital patient census regularly exceeds the budgeted census of 168 patients.

Overtime pay is calculated at 1.5 times the employee's base rate pay. This creates a short-term financial incentive for staff to work overtime shifts because employees are able to supplement their base salaries. Under Figure 3.8, the six top overtime earners for FY2013 averaged an approximate 64-hour work week, which is approximately 24 hours in addition to their 40-hour regularly scheduled paid work week. Thus, some employees who accumulate significant amounts of overtime hours are able to double their salary income with overtime pay. Furthermore, accumulating overtime pay has a long-term effect if the employee was hired by the State prior to July 1, 2012, because overtime pay is factored into the employee's retirement pension. Overtime is included in retirement compensation pursuant to §88-21.5(a), HRS, if the member became a member before July 1, 2012.
Furthermore, the Investigative Committee is concerned with how unlimited amounts of overtime performed by staff, especially back-to-back shifts, affect the standards of patient care, Hospital safety, and work performance. During a 12-month period from 2013 to 2014, the Hospital reported 173 employees who worked 16-hour shifts or longer.\textsuperscript{175} The Director of Nursing, Leona Guest, testified that the Hospital does not have data to indicate whether there is a correlation between overtime and work performance.\textsuperscript{176} Regardless of the lack of data, the Investigative Committee believes that stronger policies should be developed and implemented to control the amount of overtime that each employee may perform to maintain work performance and patient care standards.

The Department of Health's Deputy Director of Behavioral Health Administration, Lynn Fallin, testified that the Hospital has recently implemented a "wellness cap" that limits employees to 350 overtime hours per fiscal quarter.\textsuperscript{177} However, the Investigative Committee finds that this "wellness cap" fails to adequately control the amounts of overtime an employee is allowed to accumulate. A cap of 350 hours per fiscal quarter means that an employee could accumulate up to 1,400 hours of overtime per fiscal year. If this "wellness cap" was applied to the list of the top six highest overtime earners for FY2013,\textsuperscript{178} only the top two employees on that list would be affected by this cap. Thus, the Investigative Committee does not believe that this "limitation" substantially impacts or controls the amount of overtime, saves the Hospital and State money, or promotes wellness among staff.

c. Opportunities for Employees to Abuse Sick Leave and Overtime Benefits

Overtime shifts become available when the nurse staffing ratios require additional staff to care for a high patient census, meet the clinical needs of patients, or fill in for employees who are on sick leave or vacation. As state employees, each employee earns 14 hours of paid sick leave per month that can be accumulated. Furthermore, employees who are civil servants or included in collective bargaining will earn

\textsuperscript{175} Calculations based on list submitted by the Department of Health regarding employees working 16-hour shifts or longer over the last 12-months (LR_05_061814_0001-0004).
\textsuperscript{176} Testimony of Leona Guest, June 18, 2014.
\textsuperscript{177} Testimony of Lynn Fallin, March 27, 2014.
\textsuperscript{178} Department of Health, HSH - Top Six Overtime Hours (LR_25_0001 - Confidential).
overtime compensation for shifts in which those employees are not scheduled to work.\textsuperscript{179}

The Investigative Committee finds that the financial incentives of overtime combined with the employee benefits of paid sick leave creates an opportunity for employees to abuse these benefits for financial gain. When the Investigative Committee asked Ms. Guest whether she felt that the overtime system is being abused, she answered, "Yes, absolutely."\textsuperscript{180} However, the Hospital has done little to control the risks of overtime and sick leave abuse.

Figures 3.9 to 3.11 illustrate different ways employees could combine the use of their overtime and paid sick leave benefits to earn more compensation and, in some instances, work less than a 40-hour work week. These scenarios are based on examples provided and observations made by Ms. Ono\textsuperscript{181} and are not intended to implicate or represent an actual employee. Please note that "Reg. Shift" means a regular scheduled shift and "OT Shift" means an overtime shift.

**Figure 3.9**
**Employee A Using a Combination of Overtime and Sick Leave**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employee A's Regular Work Schedule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAY OFF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employee A's Amended Work Schedule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OT SHIFT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Days shaded gray indicate days Employee A is not present at work.

In the scenario illustrated in Figure 3.9, Employee A's regular work schedule is a 40-hour work week with two days off. If Employee A takes sick leave benefits during two regularly scheduled shifts and works overtime shifts during two regularly scheduled days off, Employee A will still perform a 40-hour work

\textsuperscript{179} Testimony of Debra Ono, May 14, 2014.
\textsuperscript{180} Testimony of Leona Guest, June 18, 2014.
\textsuperscript{181} Testimony of Debra Ono, May 14, 2014.
week, but be compensated more due to the two overtime shifts performed that week.

**Figure 3.10**

*Employee B Using a Combination of Overtime and Sick Leave*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employee B's Regular Work Schedule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAY OFF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employee B's Amended Work Schedule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OT SHIFT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Days shaded gray indicate days Employee B is not present at work.*

In the scenario illustrated in Figure 3.10, Employee B's regular work schedule is a 40-hour work week with two days off. If Employee B takes sick leave benefits during the five regularly scheduled shifts and works overtime shifts during the two regularly scheduled days off, Employee B will perform a 16-hour work week and be compensated for the five days of sick leave and two days of overtime. Thus, Employee B will receive greater compensation for working significantly fewer hours than Employee B's regular work schedule.

The Investigative Committee notes that an employee is required to submit a note from the employee's doctor for five or more consecutive days of paid sick leave, but is allowed to take five or more nonconsecutive days of paid sick leave or four or fewer consecutive days of paid sick leave as long as the employee has accumulated enough paid sick leave hours. In the scenario illustrated in Figure 3.10, a doctor's note is not required because Employee B's five total days of paid sick leave are composed of three consecutive days and two consecutive days with an overtime shift between the two periods of sick leave. The Investigative Committee further notes that Employee B's five days of paid sick leave create five additional opportunities for other employees to perform an overtime shift if these employees are eligible and available.

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In the scenario illustrated in Figure 3.11, Employee C is scheduled to work the evening shift from 3:00 to 11:00 p.m. and Employee D is scheduled to work the night shift from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. Employees C and D could cooperate so that Employee D calls the Nursing Office to take sick leave for the night shift. Shortly thereafter, Employee C could notify the Nursing Office of Employee C’s availability to work the night shift for which Employee D has taken sick leave, after Employee C’s regular scheduled evening shift. As a result, Employee C gains an overtime shift while Employee D is compensated for a shift due to paid sick leave benefits. The Investigative Committee notes that this scenario is only possible if Employee C is in the front of the rotation. However, Ms. Ono testified that she notices this type of concerted effort about two to three times per week and that there are some employees who coincidentally appear to gain overtime shifts similar to this scenario.\[163\]

Although the Investigative Committee recognizes that overtime and paid sick leave benefits are granted to the employees and negotiated for in their collective bargaining agreements, it believes that better mechanisms need to be implemented to control or reduce the risk of some employees taking advantage of their overtime and sick leave benefits for their own financial gain. Over time, such abuse has a financial impact to the Hospital's personnel budget and adds to the Hospital’s challenges in acquiring sufficient staff to care for and meet the clinical needs of patients.

The Investigative Committee finds that collective bargaining impacts the Hospital's ability to limit or control overtime. In 1996, the Hospital was ordered by the federal court to "adopt and implement a policy that no [Hospital] employee works voluntary overtime on consecutive days and that limits the number of voluntary overtime shifts for each employee to a maximum of three shifts per week." However, this order limiting overtime was evidently not implemented due to state collective bargaining laws. The Investigative Committee is concerned with and interested in the reconciliation of the federal court order and collective bargaining agreements.

According to the Department of the Attorney General, changes in overtime opportunities afforded to public sector employees in Hawaii are generally subject to mutual consent absent a judicial decree specifically suspending collective bargaining. The order directing the Hospital to implement an overtime policy did not contain a clause specifically suspending any aspect of the relative collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, the Department concluded that the affected public employee unions would take the position that the proposed overtime policy modifications under the order constituted material changes to hours, wages, and condition of work set forth in their collective bargaining agreements and that mutual consent was necessary to implement these overtime policies. The Hospital was not successful in obtaining consent from the United Public Workers union and accordingly, the overtime policies prescribed under the order were not implemented.

While the Investigative Committee notes the conclusions submitted by the Department of the Attorney General, it believes that this conclusion only applies to the 1996 order and should not apply to or prevent the implementation of any subsequent

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185 Testimony of Lynn Fallin, March 27, 2014.
186 Letter to Linda Rosen, Director of Health from James Halvorson, Deputy Attorney General of the Department of the Attorney General Employment Division, dated April 8, 2014 (LR_040914_0001-0003).
188 Letter to Linda Rosen, Director of Health from James Halvorson, Deputy Attorney General of the Department of the Attorney General Employment Division, dated April 8, 2014 (LR_040914_0001-0003).
189 Letter to Linda Rosen, Director of Health from James Halvorson, Deputy Attorney General of the Department of the Attorney General Employment Division, dated April 8, 2014 (LR_040914_0001-0003).
efforts by the Hospital to control overtime. Instead, the Hospital should consult and cooperate with the respective unions to develop and implement a solution that will decrease personnel costs and follow collective bargaining laws and agreements.

The Investigative Committee further notes that in August 2014, the City and County of Honolulu and the United Public Workers union reached an agreement that allows paramedics and emergency medical technicians to work longer shifts, but shorter weeks. This agreement is expected to reduce the amount of overtime of emergency medical service workers, save the City and County of Honolulu approximately $1.5 million annually in overtime, and maintain safe worker performance standards. Accordingly, the Hospital should make similar efforts to reach an agreement with the unions.

Furthermore, the Investigative Committee finds that collective bargaining affects the overtime assignments. In addition to the rotation, overtime assignments are affected by whether a nurse staff member is a civil servant or under contract with a private sector temporary employee service agency. Civil servants are first offered overtime opportunities. When the list of eligible and available civil servants is exhausted, the Hospital then offers these shifts to private sector temporary employee agency workers.

Mr. Elliott explained that this practice is based on the Konno decision. In Konno, the Hawaii Supreme Court noted that "the civil service, as defined by [§76-77, HRS], encompasses those services that have been customarily and historically provided by civil servants" and absent express legislative authority to obtain services from other sources, civil servants must provide these services. Since the Hospital provides services that are customarily and historically provided by civil servants, overtime opportunities must first be offered to civil servants before private sector agency employees.

However, the Investigative Committee finds that the system of assigning overtime shifts to civil servants before agency

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190 Gordon Y.K. Pang, Agreement reached on 12-hour shifts for paramedics, EMTs, Star-Advertiser (August 11, 2014).
191 Gordon Y.K. Pang, Agreement reached on 12-hour shifts for paramedics, EMTs, Star-Advertiser (August 11, 2014).
192 Testimony of Debra Ono, May 14, 2014; Testimony of Leona Guest, June 18, 2014; and Testimony of William Elliott, June 18, 2014.
193 Testimony of Leona Guest and William Elliott, June 18, 2014.
194 Testimony of Leona Guest and William Elliott, June 18, 2014.
195 Testimony of William Elliott, June 18, 2014.
workers can result in higher personnel costs for the Hospital. During the Investigative Committee's site visit to the Hospital in June 2014, it observed a Registered Nurse (RN) serving as a Psychiatric Technician (Psych Tech) for an overtime shift. Assuming that this RN's base pay is higher than a Psych Tech's base pay the RN is filling in for, the overtime costs for the RN are greater than having an agency worker serve as a Psych Tech for that overtime shift. The Investigative Committee is concerned that this priority system for assigning overtime creates a greater opportunity for civil servants with higher salaries to take advantage of the overtime system for financial gain. This is neither cost effective nor fair, especially when service contracts with private providers can enable the Hospital to obtain necessary additional staff and reduce personnel costs.

The Investigative Committee notes legislation proposed by the Department of the Attorney General to provide state institutions with 24 hours a day, seven days a week staffing responsibilities greater flexibility to effectively deal with staffing shortages, excessive use of overtime by civil service staff, and consequent health and safety issues arising therefrom by specifically allowing these state institutions to use private staffing contractors to alleviate day-to-day staffing shortages without first offering overtime opportunities to civil service staff. This type of exemption would provide a more cost-effective alternative to controlling overtime while enabling the Hospital to meet its staffing requirements.

3. The Handling of Employee Complaints and Disciplinary Actions Lacks Transparency and Due Process

From January 2009 to March 2014, there have been over 180 complaints filed regarding workplace violence, harassment, or discrimination at the Hospital. The complaints include but are not limited to inappropriate workplace behavior or the complainant feeling humiliated, targeted, or threatened. These complaints appear to be generally resolved by a discussion with the employee or a written reprimand, but there are outcomes indicating that the employee is no longer with the Hospital or was transferred to another unit. The Investigative Committee

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198 Proposed legislation submitted by the Department of the Attorney to the Investigative Committee in response to inquiries regarding how the Konno decision affects the assignment of overtime opportunities and ways to address the issue. See, Attachment A.
is concerned over the number of workplace violence, harassment, or discrimination complaints and notes the concerns raised by several Hospital employees who are not aware of the status of their complaints or the reasons for disciplinary actions taken against them. The Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital's handling of these complaints lacks transparency and due process.

a. Lack of Policies and Procedures to Assure that an Employee's Complaint is Handled in a Transparent and Fair Manner

While the Hospital has policies and procedures for filing and investigating employee complaints, the Investigative Committee finds a lack of procedures to ensure that the employee complainant is informed of the status and outcome of the complaint and to prescribe proper conduct of the employee complainant and the employee against whom the complaint is filed during the investigation. Such procedures will ensure that employee complaints and any resulting disciplinary actions are handled in a fair and transparent manner.

The Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital lacks policies and procedures to prescribe appropriate conduct during an ongoing investigation. For example, on November 4, 2013, Unit H Psychiatric Technician, Ryan Oyama, filed an employee incident report against his Unit H Nurse Manager Candace Sullivan.\(^\text{202}\) Mr. Oyama alleged that Ms. Sullivan threatened that she could create a sexual harassment case against Mr. Oyama and have him fired\(^\text{203}\) after he disclosed to her that he did a television news interview about the injuries he sustained while working at the Hospital.\(^\text{204}\) As a result, Mr. Oyama feared that he would lose his job and stated in the employee incident report, "being threatened by my supervisor was an uncomfortable and fearful situation."\(^\text{205}\) Subsequently, Mr. Oyama and his wife received voicemail messages on their personal cellular phones from Ms. Sullivan asking for Mr. Oyama to call her and clear up the situation.\(^\text{206}\) Mr. Oyama did not call Ms. Sullivan.\(^\text{207}\) Mr. Oyama testified that to his knowledge, his complaint is still ongoing and he has not received any updates from the Hospital.

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\(^{202}\) Employee Incident Report submitted by Ryan Oyama to the Investigative Committee on September 16, 2014 pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.

\(^{203}\) Employee Incident Report submitted by Ryan Oyama to the Investigative Committee on September 16, 2014 pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.

\(^{204}\) Testimony of Ryan Oyama, September 16, 2014.

\(^{205}\) Employee Incident Report submitted by Ryan Oyama to the Investigative Committee on September 16, 2014 pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.

\(^{206}\) Testimony of Ryan Oyama, September 16, 2014.

\(^{207}\) Testimony of Ryan Oyama, September 16, 2014.
regarding its status.\textsuperscript{208} However, the Investigative Committee discovered that Ms. Sullivan received a written reprimand as a result of Mr. Oyama's complaint.\textsuperscript{209}

The Investigative Committee has deep concerns regarding Ms. Sullivan's numerous attempts to contact Mr. Oyama while the complaint is still open. Ms. Sullivan testified that she repeatedly tried to contact Mr. Oyama because she did not understand why he would file a complaint against her due to their friendship.\textsuperscript{210} Finally, Ms. Sullivan was advised by Ms. Guest to stop contacting Mr. Oyama and to allow the process to take care of the situation.\textsuperscript{211} Ms. Guest testified that she is not aware of any policies or procedures that prohibit a person against whom a complaint was filed from making contact with the complainant while the complaint is still open.\textsuperscript{212} The Investigative Committee finds that Ms. Sullivan's attempts to contact Mr. Oyama may be considered a form of intimidation and has concerns that this conduct will discourage employees from filing a complaint. Specific Hospital procedures establishing permissible and prohibited conduct while a complaint is open assists in ensuring that the investigation and disposition of a complaint are completed in a fair manner.

Furthermore, the Investigative Committee finds that the Hospital lacks policies and procedures that ensure that the employee complainant is informed of the status and outcome of the complaint. For example, in December 2013, Unit H staff member, Jayling Fernandez, filed an employee incident report against Ms. Sullivan.\textsuperscript{213} Ms. Fernandez alleged that Ms. Sullivan accused her of writing an anonymous letter to Hospital administrators regarding Ms. Sullivan's behavior and remarks during a previous staff meeting.\textsuperscript{214} Subsequently, Ms. Fernandez was transferred to another unit while the investigation was ongoing.\textsuperscript{215} In June 2014, Ms. Fernandez received a copy of the employee incident report she submitted in December 2013, with handwritten comments from Ms. Guest to close the

\textsuperscript{208} Testimony of Ryan Oyama, September 16, 2014.
\textsuperscript{209} Department of Health, Documents relating to the closing of Employee Incident Report submitted by Jayling Fernandez (LR_092914_3_1-3 - Confidential).
\textsuperscript{210} Testimony of Candace Sullivan, September 16, 2014.
\textsuperscript{211} Testimony of Candace Sullivan and Leona Guest, September 16, 2014.
\textsuperscript{212} Testimony of Leona Guest, September 16, 2014.
\textsuperscript{213} Department of Health, Documents relating to Employee Incident Report filed by Jayling Fernandez (LR_092914_1_1-4 - Confidential).
\textsuperscript{214} Department of Health, Documents relating to Employee Incident Report filed by Jayling Fernandez (LR_092914_1_1-4 - Confidential).
\textsuperscript{215} Department of Health, Documents relating to Guidelines of Investigation into Employee Incident Report filed by Jayling Fernandez (LR_092914_9_1-5 - Confidential).
investigation.216 To date, Ms. Fernandez has not seen a copy of
the Attorney General's investigation report and does not know
the outcome, if any, of her complaint. However, the
Investigative Committee discovered that Ms. Sullivan received a
written reprimand as a result of Ms. Fernandez's complaint.217

While the Investigative Committee recognizes the importance
of ensuring that an employee against whom a complaint is filed
is provided due process, it finds that it is equally important
to keep the employee complainant informed of the status and
outcome of the investigation without violating any privacy laws.
In Ms. Fernandez's case, she was informed only that her
complaint was closed, while Mr. Oyama still assumes that his
case is still open even though Ms. Sullivan has received a
written reprimand and the case is closed.218 Policies and
procedures will ensure that the handling and investigation of
employee complaints are handled in a transparent manner. The
Investigative Committee is concerned that failure to inform
employees of the status and outcome of their complaints will
discourage other employees from filing complaints.

b. Weak Policies and Procedures to Ensure Due
Process for an Employee Against Whom a Complaint
is Filed

While the Hospital has policies and procedures for filing
and investigating employee complaints, the Investigative
Committee finds that these procedures need to be strengthened to
ensure that the employee against whom a complaint is filed is
provided due process. For example, four patient event reports
were filed against Unit H Psychiatric Technician, Kalford Keanu,
Jr., for four allegations during two incidents involving the
same patient that occurred on October 9, 2012.219 The patient
event reports allege that Mr. Keanu performed Controlled Patient
Management Resolution (CPMR) wall containment procedures on a
patient that resulted in patient injuries and he left his 1:1
assignment unattended to perform CPMR wall containment

216 Department of Health, Documents relating to Employee Incident Report filed
by Jayling Fernandez (LR_092914_1_1-4 - Confidential).
217 Department of Health, Documents relating to the closing of Employee
Incident Report submitted by Jayling Fernandez (LR_092914_3_1-3 -
confidential).
218 Department of Health, Documents relating to the closing of Employee
Incident Report submitted by Jayling Fernandez (LR_092914_3_1-3 -
confidential).
219 Investigation report and other related documents regarding Kalford Keanu,
Jr., submitted by Kalford Keanu, Jr. to the Investigative Committee on May
14, 2014.
procedures. Mr. Keanu was transferred out of Unit H and assigned to work in the Nursing Office while the Department of the Attorney General conducted its investigation. On April 23, 2013, Mr. Keanu received a letter during his meeting with Ms. Sullivan and Ms. Guest. The letter served as a written reprimand for patient abuse and neglect and unwarranted aggressive behavior, required Mr. Keanu to attend an anger management workshop, and offered him a job transfer from Unit H to another unit. Mr. Keanu testified that he refused to sign the letter, but attended the required anger management workshop and requested to be transferred to Unit U. Furthermore, Mr. Keanu testified that Ms. Sullivan and Ms. Guest denied his request for a union representative to be present during their meeting.

Subsequently, Mr. Keanu was able to read a copy of the Attorney General's investigation report, which he was previously denied access to view. UPW filed a grievance on behalf of Mr. Keanu that the Hospital failed to, among other items, establish just and proper cause before issuing a written reprimand and review and consider all evidence, data, and factors supporting Mr. Keanu before making a decision.

The Investigative Committee is deeply concerned that Mr. Keanu was disciplined without due process. The Hospital's policies and procedures generalize the rights and duties that are afforded to an accused employee, including the right to be represented by the employee's union and being provided the specific reasons for the disciplinary actions. In Mr. Keanu's case, he was provided a written reprimand without being allowed representation by his union upon his request. The written reprimand explained that he was being reprimanded for leaving his 1:1 assignment unattended to assist a co-worker with a patient and using excessive force that resulted in a patient

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220 Investigation report and other related documents regarding Kalford Keanu, Jr., submitted by Kalford Keanu, Jr. to the Investigative Committee on May 14, 2014.
221 Testimony of Kalford Keanu, Jr., May 14, 2014.
222 Investigation report and other related documents regarding Kalford Keanu, Jr., submitted by Kalford Keanu, Jr. to the Investigative Committee on May 14, 2014.
225 Investigation report and other related documents regarding Kalford Keanu, Jr., submitted by Kalford Keanu, Jr. to the Investigative Committee on May 14, 2014.
226 Investigation report and other related documents regarding Kalford Keanu, Jr., submitted by Kalford Keanu, Jr. to the Investigative Committee on May 14, 2014.
injury. However, the Attorney General's investigation did not substantiate that Mr. Keanu used excessive force or leave his 1:1 assignment unattended. The Investigative Committee does not understand how Mr. Keanu was reprimanded for those actions when the Attorney General found no wrongdoing.

The Investigative Committee is also concerned that Mr. Keanu was not allowed to see a copy of the Attorney General's investigation report. According to the Deputy Attorney General, James Halvorson, who is the Supervisor of the Department of the Attorney General's Employment Law Division, the Department generally advises other state departments and agencies to keep Attorney General investigation reports confidential if the state department or agency is not taking any adverse action. The Investigative Committee finds that because Mr. Keanu received a written reprimand, he should have been able to receive a copy of the investigation report in order to be informed of the allegations made against him and the evidence proving these allegations.

The Investigative Committee notes that Mr. Halvorson added that there may be a situation where an investigation concludes no wrongdoing, but that a state department takes an adverse position because based on the investigation, the state department finds a lesser degree of wrongdoing. In other words, the investigation substantiated a lesser degree of wrongdoing. However, the Investigative Committee finds that if the Hospital found that Mr. Keanu committed a lesser degree of wrongdoing, then he should have been informed of this. The written reprimand does not indicate this and instead informs Mr. Keanu of wrongdoing that the Attorney General's investigation report could not substantiate.

The Investigative Committee has serious concerns regarding the fairness and transparency with which the Hospital handled Mr. Keanu's case and Mr. Halvorson's reasons for keeping investigations confidential from the employee who was investigated. Employee complaints and any associated investigations could damage an employee's reputation and career. While the Investigative Committee recognizes the need to keep personnel matters confidential and notes the privacy laws under chapter 92F, HRS, it finds that Hospital policies and procedures

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227 Investigation report and other related documents regarding Kalford Keanu, Jr., submitted by Kalford Keanu, Jr. to the Investigative Committee on May 14, 2014.
228 Investigation report and other related documents regarding Kalford Keanu, Jr, submitted by Kalford Keanu, Jr. to the Investigative Committee on May 14, 2014.
229 Testimony of James Halvorson, on behalf of Mark Fridovich, July 16, 2014.
230 Testimony of James Halvorson, on behalf of Mark Fridovich, July 16, 2014.
need to be strengthened to ensure that employees who are alleged to have committed a wrongdoing are provided due process, while protecting employee privacy rights and preventing retaliation.

c. Employees Fear Retaliation by Hospital Administrators and Supervisors

It appears to the Investigative Committee that there is a history of retaliatory actions and acts of intimidation exercised by Hospital administrators and supervisors. For example, while their investigations were pending, Mr. Keanu and Ms. Fernandez were transferred out of Unit H and have not been transferred back to Unit H even after their investigations have been closed.\textsuperscript{231} The Investigative Committee notes that these transfers could be considered a form of retaliation by the Hospital administration especially when Ms. Sullivan was not transferred out of Unit H. Furthermore, it appears that the complaints filed by Mr. Oyama and Ms. Fernandez against Ms. Sullivan were based on allegations of harassment and intimidation. Mr. Oyama alleges that Ms. Sullivan threatened Mr. Oyama's job, while Ms. Fernandez alleges that Ms. Sullivan falsely accused her of writing an anonymous letter to Hospital administrators. The Investigative Committee considers these allegations, if true, as forms of intimidation by a supervisor and strongly believes that such acts as well as forms of retaliation are unacceptable, inexcusable, and detrimental to employee morale and work performance.

The Investigative Committee is deeply concerned that fears of retaliation discourage and prevent employees from coming forward with workplace safety or human resources issues. Failure to communicate problems up the chain of command prevents the Hospital from developing and implementing solutions to provide a better work environment for its employees and creates a greater divide between Hospital administrators and staff, which can negatively impact patient care.

Additionally, the Investigative Committee has serious concerns regarding the management skills of Ms. Sullivan. The Investigative Committee notes that all three incidents mentioned above directly or indirectly involved Ms. Sullivan. Unit H serves as an acute unit as well as the admissions unit for the Hospital. Thus, it is imperative for Ms. Sullivan, as the Nurse Manager for Unit H, to ensure that the staff assigned to Unit H are provided a safe work environment in order to properly care for the unit's wide spectrum of patients. However, when Unit H

\textsuperscript{231} Department of Health, Documents relating to Guidelines of Investigation into Employee Incident Report filed by Jayling Fernandez (LR 092914_9_1-4-5 - confidential) and Testimony of Kalford Keanu, Jr., May 14, 2014.
employees fear retaliation from or are intimidated by Ms. Sullivan, it erodes employee trust, which, in turn, impacts employee morale and work performance.

The Investigative Committee further notes that Ms. Sullivan received a letter dated July 1, 2014, that served as written reprimand for unprofessional conduct relating to her interactions with staff, which were investigated by the Department of the Attorney General.232 She was specifically reprimanded for her separate interactions with Mr. Oyama and Ms. Fernandez.233 As a result, she was required to attend the "Addressing Emotions at Work" training on September 19, 2014.234 The Investigative Committee notes that Ms. Sullivan refused to sign the letter235 and HGEA has filed a grievance on her behalf.236 With regard to the required class, the Investigative Committee discovered from Mr. May that due to a miscommunication, Ms. Sullivan was unable to register for the training and will be required to attend the next scheduled training in February 2015. Accordingly, the Investigative Committee has concerns regarding whether the written reprimand adequately or effectively remedies the complaints filed against Ms. Sullivan, especially when Mr. Oyama and Ms. Fernandez are unaware that Ms. Sullivan received a written reprimand, filed a grievance through her union, and that she will not be able to attend the "Addressing Emotions at Work" training until next year. In addition, the Investigative Committee is concerned that these circumstances may impact or discourage other employees from filing complaints when they experience retaliatory actions or acts of intimidation exercised by Hospital administrators and supervisors.

Lastly, the Investigative Committee notes that during its hearing on September 16, 2014, Ms. Sullivan made contradictory statements while under oath. Specifically, Ms. Sullivan testified that Mr. Oyama was the only employee to file a complaint against her, but then retracted her statement when the Investigative Committee brought up another complaint filed by Ms. Fernandez. Ms. Sullivan stated, "I apologize. I don't look at this committee as a real courthouse, and so therefore I

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232 Department of Health, Documents relating to Results of the Employee Incident Report filed by Jayling Fernandez (LR_092914_4_1-3 - Confidential).
233 Department of Health, Documents relating to Results of the Employee Incident Report filed by Jayling Fernandez (LR_092914_4_1-3 - Confidential).
234 Department of Health, Documents relating to Results of the Employee Incident Report filed by Jayling Fernandez (LR_092914_4_1-3 - Confidential).
235 Department of Health, Documents relating to Results of the Employee Incident Report filed by Jayling Fernandez (LR_092914_4_1-3 - Confidential).
236 Department of Health, Documents relating to the Current Status of the Employee Incident Report filed by Jayling Fernandez (LR_092914_5_1-4 - Confidential).
forgot that I was under oath."237 The Investigative Committee is extremely disappointed that Ms. Sullivan does not take the purpose of this investigation seriously and does not appreciate her dismissive attitude. The Investigative Committee contemplates whether she exercises this same attitude when carrying out her duties as a Nurse Manager and listening and appropriately responding to the needs her staff in a respectful, professional, and fair manner. Furthermore, the Investigative Committee wonders how many complaints would be filed against Ms. Sullivan if employees were not fearful of retaliation by her or other Hospital administrators.

PART IV.
CONCLUSIONS OF THE SENATE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE
ON THE HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL

The Hospital has a duty of care not only to its patients, but to their staff who care for the patients. It appears to the Investigative Committee that the Hospital faces longstanding challenges that impact the personal safety and work environment of Hospital employees. These challenges persist despite prior federal, executive, and legislative intervention.

After listening to many testifiers over the course of the investigation and after reviewing well over a thousand pages of subpoenaed documents, the Investigative Committee has deep concerns regarding reports of violent and unstable patients attacking staff and causing serious injuries to the staff. The Investigative Committee is concerned that if this problem is not immediately addressed, a fatality will occur at the Hospital. The Investigative Committee is also concerned that the persistently high patient census forces the Hospital to stretch its limited resources to dangerously thin levels, which compromises patient and staff safety. Lastly, the Investigative Committee is concerned about the staffing and staff performance at the Hospital and how these issues ultimately impact patient care.

In light of these longstanding challenges, the Hospital cannot continue to maintain operations at the status quo. The Hospital and the Department of Health would benefit from gaining a broader perspective and utilizing additional resources for information and guidance to make the necessary changes so that it can successfully achieve its mission.
PART V.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SENATE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE
ON THE HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL

The Investigative Committee has identified various shortcomings relating to the Hospital's efforts in maintaining a safe work environment, using its facilities, and implementing efficient and transparent human resources practices. In light of these longstanding challenges facing the Hospital, it is clear that further action is required to address the problems at the Hospital. The Department of Health and the Hospital must enact fundamental changes than have been discussed and recommended in the past.

The Investigative Committee notes that during the course of its investigation, a new Hospital Administrator, William May, has been hired and the Acting Administrator, William Elliott, retired. The Investigative Committee engaged in a thoughtful discussion with Mr. May regarding his experience and plans for the Hospital. During this discussion, Mr. May identified four problem areas that he has observed since coming on board on July 7, 2014: (1) the physical layout of the Hospital; (2) high patient census; (3) Hospital staffing; and (4) Hospital safety. Mr. May noted that these challenges are related to each other and can often be found nationwide in other mental health facilities. The Investigative Committee notes that its findings are similar and related to all four problem areas Mr. May identified, which provides the Investigative Committee with some assurance that fundamental changes may be possible.

Accordingly, the Investigative Committee provides the following recommendations to the Hospital and Department of Health in an effort to assist those entities in resolving the shortcomings faced by the Hospital. To foster a framework for change, the Investigative Committee requests that the Hospital submit a written report to the Legislature providing the status of its efforts in implementing the following recommendations no later than 20 days prior to the convening of Regular Session of 2015 and Regular Session of 2016.

With regard to maintaining a safe work environment, the Investigative Committee believes that the Hospital should:

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238 Testimony of William May, July 30, 2014.
239 Testimony of William May, July 30, 2014.
240 Testimony of William May, July 30, 2014.
1. Develop standardized recording procedures to accurately report assaults occurring at the Hospital. Specifically:

   a. Develop data gathering and analysis procedures that:

      i. Identify the perpetrator and victim of the assault;

      ii. Identify the patient event report number, employee incident report number, or accident report number;

      iii. Describe the assault;

      iv. Categorize any resulting injury of the assault;

      v. Indicate the disposition of the assault; and

      vi. Indicate any other information that will enable the Hospital to better track the number of assaults occurring at the Hospital;

   b. Develop and implement standard definitions and categories for attempted assault, assault, and serious assault that include and describe the level of any resulting injury;

   c. Develop and implement standard definitions and categories for the types of injuries that may result from an assault to assist in determining whether an assault is an attempted assault, assault, or serious assault;

   d. Revise and strengthen policies and procedures that mandate employees to file an employee incident report for every event that occurs and ensure that these policies and procedures are implemented by all employees;

   e. Revise and strengthen policies and procedures regarding workers' compensation and collaborate with the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations to expedite the filing, approval, and payment of workers' compensation claims; and
f. Improve communication between Hospital administrators and Department of Health administrators regarding reports of assaults occurring at the Hospital to ensure that Department administrators can obtain a full scope of the problem;

2. Educate and train all employees on workplace violence, especially with regard to the policies and procedures to report incidents of workplace violence and employees' options if they are the victim of such violence;

3. Develop and implement a pervasive and appropriate training program for employees to handle forensic mental health patients. Specifically:

a. Explore any best practices or employee training programs on handling forensic mental health patients from similar mental health facilities in other jurisdictions that treat forensic mental health patients;

b. Explore and determine the feasibility of incorporating any type of training programs that are similar to the training correctional officers receive in handling incarcerated individuals;

c. Offer and require employees to attend training programs on handling forensic mental health patients more than once a year; and

d. Explore the feasibility of hiring additional security officers on campus to assist with monitoring patients and responding to emergency situations and security breaches within the Hospital; and

4. Address and resolve the HIOSH violations\(^{241}\) cited on April 10, 2014, and collaborate with the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations to aid in strengthening its policies and procedures to create a safe workplace environment.

With regard to using facilities and exercising safety practices efficiently, the Investigative Committee believes that the Hospital should:

\(^{241}\) Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, Citation and Notification of Penalty, HIOSH’ Inspection Number 316273333 (April 10, 2014).
1. Develop and implement a patient classification system that is based on patient need. Specifically:
   a. Explore any patient classification systems that are used by similar mental health facilities in other jurisdictions, especially facilities with forensic mental health patients;
   b. Analyze and determine the impact a patient classification system may have on patient care and staff ratios;
   c. If necessary, consult with the applicable labor unions regarding how a patient classification system may impact collective bargaining agreements; and
   d. Analyze and determine the impact that a patient classification system may have on the existing Hospital facilities and the ability of the existing facilities in accommodating a patient classification system;

2. Consider options in designating Unit H solely for the purpose of admitting patients. Specifically:
   a. Explore best practices at similar mental health facilities regarding separating the admissions unit from other units;
   b. Determine the feasibility of sharing admission responsibilities with Unit F to increase the number of available beds for admitted patients and the impact the sharing of admission responsibilities between Units H and F will have on the other units;
   c. Consult with the applicable labor unions regarding how designating Unit H for admissions only or sharing admission responsibilities with Unit F may impact collective bargaining agreements; and
   d. Collaborate with the Department of Public Safety and the Judiciary to improve and strengthen communication and the sharing of information with respect to the status of patients who are transferred to the Hospital pursuant to a court
order to enable the Hospital to better plan, prepare, and provide for patients being transferred and admitted to the Hospital for evaluation and treatment;

3. Consider obtaining a forensic care designation or accreditation for the Hospital. Specifically:

   a. Explore mental health facilities in other jurisdictions that have a forensic mental health designation or accreditation to analyze the pros and cons of having such a designation and accreditation for the Hospital;

   b. Determine the impact that a forensic mental health designation or accreditation may have on the Hospital; and

   c. Collaborate with the Department of Public Safety to explore and develop long-term strategies for the Department of Public Safety to establish a forensic mental health unit at the prisons to reduce the number of forensic mental health patients being admitted to the Hospital;

4. Facilitate the transfer of high risk patients to out-of-state mental health facilities contracted with the State by selecting patients that may qualify and benefit from being transferred per the newly adopted policies and procedures and determine whether such patients should be transferred;

5. Address the safety concerns and closure of the PICU. Specifically:

   a. Address the safety concerns of the PICU by expediting the ongoing consultations with HGEA and UPW; and

   b. Explore and determine the feasibility of alternative uses for the PICU;

6. Explore and develop short-term strategies for the physical improvement and renovation of the existing Hospital facility. Specifically:

   a. Assess and prioritize the areas of the Hospital that need improvement, upgrade, repair, or
replacement, and establish a feasible timeline for the completion of these projects;

b. Explore design options by considering the designs of forensic mental health facilities in other jurisdictions to better meet the needs of forensic mental health patients and the staff who provide patient care, as well as to address the Hospital's security needs;

c. Explore additional funding mechanisms to support the repair and improvement of the existing facility, and request additional funding from the Legislature, if necessary;

d. Analyze and determine the impact of any repair and improvement projects on patient care and staff-to-patient ratios; and

e. If necessary, consult with the applicable labor unions regarding how any repair and improvement projects may impact collective bargaining agreements;

7. Explore and develop long-term strategies for the design and construction of a new facility. Specifically:

a. Determine the feasibility of building a new facility or renovating and upgrading the existing facility;

b. Explore additional funding mechanisms to support the demolition of the existing facility, if appropriate, and design, construction, and maintenance of a new facility; and

c. Explore design options by considering the designs of forensic mental health facilities in other jurisdictions to better meet the needs of forensic mental health patients and the staff who provide patient care, as well as to address the Hospital's security needs;

8. Improve the monitoring and operation of the security cameras. Specifically:

a. Revise policies and procedures to increase the number of security officers to divide the duties
associated with monitoring the security cameras; and

b. Ensure that all security cameras are operating at all times and develop policies and procedures to routinely check the operation of all cameras;

9. Improve the PMT devices to ensure that the devices work properly at all times. Specifically:

a. Upgrade the PMT devices to ensure that the devices work properly at all times and accurately transmit the location of a Code 200;

b. Strengthen and implement policies and procedures to ensure that staff respond when a Code 200 is transmitted; and

c. Require that all PMT devices are routinely inspected for proper operation;

10. Explore the feasibility of constructing a fence around the perimeter of the campus to ensure safety for the surrounding community and assist in preventing elopements. Specifically:

a. Explore different types of fencing options to enclose the entire campus or parts of the campus; and

b. Request additional funding from the Legislature, if necessary, for construction; and

11. Develop procedures to alert the community when a patient elopement occurs. Specifically:

a. Revise policies and procedures to establish when HPD is to be notified of a patient elopement so that HPD may assist in the search efforts; and

b. Develop and implement policies and procedures to alert the students and staff at Windward Community College of a patient elopement.

With regard to providing efficient and effective human resources practices, the Investigative Committee believes that the Hospital should:
1. Streamline and consolidate the Hospital's and Department of Health's internal recruitment and hiring processes to expedite the filling of position vacancies at the Hospital. Specifically:

   a. Determine which steps in the Hospital's and Department's internal recruitment and hiring processes may be streamlined or consolidated to create a more efficient and expeditious process;

   b. Collaborate with the Department of Human Resources Development in streamlining and consolidating the steps in the internal recruitment and hiring processes to ensure adherence to all applicable hiring laws and rules; and

   c. Explore options in improving the internal recruitment and hiring processes to expedite the filling of position vacancies at the Hospital;

2. Develop policies and procedures regarding the recruitment of temporary agency workers. Specifically:

   a. Collaborate with the Department of Human Resources Development to ensure such policies adhere to applicable laws and rules; and

   b. Establish a policy to prohibit the Hospital from providing names of individuals to the temporary employment agencies to work at the Hospital;

3. Strengthen the policies and procedures for interviewing and hiring employees to work at the Hospital. Specifically:

   a. Develop and implement a policy and procedure regarding the employment of relatives of current staff to reduce allegations of favoritism and nepotism;

   b. Develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure that the interview process is free from conflicts of interest and require disclosure and recusal of interview panelists if a conflict of interest exists;
c. Collaborate with the Department of Human Resources Development to ensure that such policies and procedures adhere to applicable laws and rules; and

d. Consult with the Hawaii State Ethics Commission to ensure that such policies and procedures adhere to and are consistent with the State's Code of Ethics;

4. Develop and implement procedures for the assignment of overtime. Specifically:

a. Establish written policies and procedures regarding the assignment of overtime and ensure that such procedures are consistently followed;

b. Expedite the installation of the Kronos computer system to assist in the assignment of overtime; and

c. If necessary, consult with the applicable labor unions regarding how the assignment of overtime may impact collective bargaining agreements;

5. Explore options to limit the number of overtime shifts or hours an employee may perform. Specifically:

a. Explore how other state agencies or similar mental health facilities in other jurisdictions have successfully reduced or limited overtime; and

b. Develop and implement policies and procedures regarding performing back-to-back shifts;

6. Control the opportunities for employees to abuse sick leave and overtime benefits. Specifically:

a. Explore the options to reduce the number of consecutive days of sick leave after which an employee is required to submit a doctor's note or require a 24-hour waiting period before an employee who is back from sick leave may perform an overtime shift; and

b. Consult with the applicable labor unions to ensure that collective bargaining agreements are followed;
7. Collaborate with the appropriate labor unions to address the impact that collective bargaining agreements have on overtime benefits;

a. Discuss and develop alternative options to amend collective bargaining agreements to place limits on the amount of overtime an employee may perform;

b. Discuss and develop options to address the Konno decision and the impact that it has on assigning overtime shifts to civil service employees; and

c. Introduce legislation proposed by the Department of the Attorney General that provides an exemption from the applicability of Konno for state institutions with 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week staffing responsibilities by using private staffing contractors to alleviate day-to-day staffing shortages without having to first offer overtime opportunities to civil service staff (See, Attachment A); and

8. Strengthen and implement policies and procedures regarding employee complaints and disciplinary actions. Specifically:

a. Develop and implement policies and procedures to assure that an employee complaint is handled in a fair and transparent manner, including keeping the complaining employee informed of the status and outcome of the complaint;

b. Develop and implement policies and procedures regarding permissible and prohibited conduct while a complaint is open and under investigation;

c. Strengthen policies and procedures to ensure that an employee against whom a complaint is filed is provided due process;

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242 Proposed legislation submitted by the Department of the Attorney to the Investigative Committee in response to inquiries regarding how the Konno decision affects the assignment of overtime opportunities and ways to address the issue. See, Attachment A.

d. Consult with the applicable labor unions to ensure that any policies and procedures regarding employee investigations adhere to collective bargaining agreements; and

e. Collaborate with the Department of the Attorney General to ensure that any policies and procedures regarding employee investigations adhere to privacy laws and applicable employment practices.

The Investigative Committee recommends the Legislature take the following action on during the Regular Session of 2015:

1. Introduce legislation requesting the State Auditor conduct a management audit of the Hospital;

2. Introduce legislation proposed by the Department of the Attorney General\textsuperscript{244} that provides an exemption from the applicability of \textit{Konno}\textsuperscript{245} for state institutions with 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week staffing responsibilities by using private staffing contractors to alleviate day-to-day staffing shortages without having to first offer overtime opportunities to civil service staff (See, Attachment A); and

3. Consider the infusion of additional funds and additional funding resources to assist the Hospital in its efforts to address and resolve the problem areas identified in this Report by the Investigative Committee.

\textsuperscript{244} Proposed legislation submitted by the Department of the Attorney to the Investigative Committee in response to inquiries regarding how the Konno decision affects the assignment of overtime opportunities and ways to address the issue. See, Attachment A.

\textsuperscript{245} \textit{Konno v. County of Hawaii}, 85 Haw. 61, 937 P.2d 397 (1997).
SECTION 1. The legislature finds that those state institutions which have 24/7 operational responsibilities caring for or watching over patients, wards, inmates or detainees, such as Hawaii State Hospital, Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility, Hawaii Health Systems Corporation, the Department of Public Safety, and the Judiciary, have longstanding and intractable problems with maintaining adequate daily staffing ratios due to absences caused by sick leave, vacation leave, industrial injuries and vacancies.

The legislature also finds that these chronic staffing shortages lead to excessive use of overtime, which not only imposes unacceptable costs, but gives rise to potentially serious safety issues for both staff and wards.

In this regard, the State and counties have long used the private sector to provide public services to Hawaii's citizens, and in fact, certain of the above referenced institutions have traditionally utilized the services of private staffing contractors as a last resort in attempting to fill day-to-day staffing shortages only after first offering overtime opportunities to civil service staff.

However, the legislature finds that even those institutions which have been able to rely upon the services of private staffing contractors as a last resort nevertheless continue to suffer from chronic day-to-day staffing shortages, excessive use of overtime by civil service staff, and consequent health and safety issues arising therefrom.

Accordingly, the legislature finds that all of the state institutions which have such 24/7 staffing responsibilities are in need of additional flexibility in dealing with staffing shortages by the most efficient, safe and expeditious means possible.

Because of the Hawaii supreme court's decision in the consolidated cases Konno v. County of Hawaii, 85 Haw. 61 (1997) and other occurrences, the basic authority of state and county government to deliver public services through the private sector has been called into question.
In Konno, the Hawaii supreme court invalidated a contract between the county of Hawaii and a private landfill developer and operator after concluding that under the State's civil service laws, only civil servants could perform the services and fill the positions historically and customarily provided or filled by civil servants. While the supreme court in Konno "emphasize[d] that nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as passing judgment, one way or the other, on the wisdom of privatization," and acknowledged that "[w]hether or not, as a policy matter, private entities should be allowed to provide public services entails a judgment ordinarily consigned to the legislature", it also noted that "the civil service encompasses those services that have been customarily and historically provided by civil servants", and concluded that, absent express legislative authority to obtain services from other sources, civil servants must provide these services.

Consequently, state and county agencies, in some instances, were precluded from entering into service contracts with private providers to obtain the services they needed, reduce direct labor, material, and equipment costs, and take advantage of indirect savings through contractual provisions for insurance and indemnification against third-party and regulatory liability claims.

Recognizing the negative fiscal impact the Konno decision would have on government, in 2001 the legislature enacted Act 90, Part II of which specifically provided that privatization could be included as a management tool to assist government in remaining fluid in its ability to effectively provide services for the ever changing needs of its constituency. However, Act 90 provided that Part II of the Act would sunset on June 30, 2007 and no action was subsequently taken by the legislature to extend Part II.

The purpose of this Act is to provide those state institutions which have such 24/7 staffing responsibilities with greater flexibility to effectively deal with staffing shortages, excessive use of overtime by civil service staff, and consequent health and safety issues arising therefrom, by specifically allowing them to utilize private staffing contractors to alleviate day-to-day staffing shortages without regard to first offering overtime opportunities to civil service staff.

Part II "CHAPTER PRIVATIZATION"
§ -1 Scope and application. This chapter preempts and supersedes all other state law with regard to determining the manner in which state institutions which have 24/7 staffing responsibilities caring for or watching over patients, wards, inmates or detainees, are permitted to effectively deal with chronic staffing shortages, excessive use of overtime by civil service staff, and consequent health and safety issues arising therefrom, if need be by utilizing private staffing contractors without regard to first offering overtime opportunities to civil service staff. Procurement laws shall be applied, as appropriate, if a determination is made pursuant to this chapter that a service should be obtained by contract from the private sector.

§ -2 Determination; standards. (a) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, including but not limited to chapters 46, 76, 77, 78, 89, and 89A, any other applicable civil service law, customary or historical past practices, or the fact that the services hereinafter described may have been performed by persons or positions in civil service, any state official of any state institution which has 24/7 staffing responsibilities in whom procurement authority, or his designee may contact a private entity to obtain day-to-day on-call services to relieve staffing shortages without first offering overtime opportunities to civil service staff, when there is a reasonable basis to believe that the service is necessary to fill a staffing shortage efficiently, safely and expeditiously.

(b) For purposes of this chapter, a "private staffing contractor" is any individual, company, or organization that offers day-to-day on-call staffing services, and is not an employee or agency within the federal, state, or county government.

(c) For purposes of this chapter, "any state institution which has 24/7 staffing responsibilities caring for or watching over patients, wards, inmates or detainees" means those state facilities which are manned by staff 24 hours every day of every week, 12 months a year.

(d) In the determination made pursuant to this chapter, before utilizing a private staffing contractor to fill a staffing shortage without first offering overtime opportunities to civil service staff, the state official shall first consider whether doing so is in fact reasonable and necessary to effectively address present staffing shortages, excessive use of overtime by
civil service staff, and consequent health and safety issues arising therefrom.
APPENDIX B
October 20, 2014

The Honorable Senator Josh Green
Co-Chair, Committee on Health
State Capitol
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

The Honorable Senator Clayton Hee
Co-Chair, Committee on Judiciary and Labor
State Capitol
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

Dear Senator Green and Senator Hee:

In regards to the Draft Report on the Findings and Recommendations of the Senate Special Investigative Committee on the Hawaii State Hospital (HSH), please accept this as the Department of Health’s response to the report dated October 6, 2014.

There is a class action civil suit that has been filed which contains allegations which closely resemble many of the conclusory findings, assertions and concerns contained in the report involving individual defendants which the Department of the Attorney General (AG) is currently reviewing. Upon the advice of the Department of the Attorney General, we have been asked to refrain from a detailed response to these matters at this time. Accordingly, we will focus our response on the recommendations in the report and our efforts to move forward and implement improvements in our operations.

Many of the recommendations contained in Part V of the report fall within one of the following categories: items with which we concur and are either completed or action is being taken; items with which we concur but cannot be addressed without additional funding; and finally, items with which we do not concur or that are out of our control. In accordance with guidance from the AG to refrain from a detailed response, although there are several recommendations which fall into each category, one example will be provided for each.
1. Recommendations with which we concur and are either complete or action is being taken.

Item #4 on page 70 recommends that HSH select patients that may qualify and benefit from transfer to an out-of-state facility and determine whether a transfer should occur.

The policy for this process has been written and approved and is ready to be utilized when patients appropriate for transfer are identified.

2. Recommendations with which we concur but that cannot be addressed without additional funding.

Item #10 on page 72 recommends that the hospital explore the feasibility of constructing a fence around the campus.

Depending on scope, this project will be expensive, and as the committee points out, will need financial support from the Legislature.

3. Recommendations with which we do not concur or that are out of our control.

Item #3 (a) on page 70 recommends pursuing a forensic mental health accreditation for HSH.

We do not concur, as our research on this subject indicates that there is no special forensic accreditation available for hospital facilities.

We thank the committee for the opportunity to respond to the report and, moving forward, we look forward to partnering with the entire Legislature as we seek to develop innovative solutions to provide our specialized services in the most appropriate setting possible.

Sincerely,

Linda Rosen, M.D., M.P.H.
Director of Health
October 17, 2014

The Honorable Senator Josh Green  
Chair, Committee on Health  
State Capitol  
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

The Honorable Senator Clayton Hee  
Chair, Committee on Judiciary and Labor  
State Capitol  
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

Dear Senator Green and Senator Hee:

Thank you for the opportunity to make a written response to the draft report of the Senate Investigative Committee.

There is a class action civil suit that has been filed which contains allegations resembling closely many of the conclusory findings, assertions and concerns contained in the report involving individual defendants. The Department of the Attorney General is currently reviewing this class action civil suit. Upon advice of the Department of the Attorney General I have been asked to refrain from a detailed response to the report at this time.

I will not be commenting on the conclusions and recommendations contained in Part V of the report, some of which were previously part of or have already been incorporated into Hawaii State Hospital (HSH) policies and procedures. Instead, my response is focused on the larger context that influences issues contained in this report and related HSH operations.

Thirty two years ago, the Hawaii Crime Commission, on behalf of the Legislature, completed a study to address the functioning of the insanity defense and to make recommendations regarding its implementation and made a report to the Legislature. The report was titled: *The Mentally Ill and the Criminal Justice System* (April 1982). Among its recommendations: **Create a Hawaii State Forensic Center** that would centralize responsibility for the examination, treatment, and custody of those persons raising mental illness as an issue pursuant to HRS 704 including the administration of a maximum security component of HSH. The proposed Center would collect and maintain data, provide training, and monitor those persons on conditional release status. The authors of the report noted that the creation of a Hawaii State Forensic Center was the primary recommendation of the Governor's State Commission on Mental Health and Justice in 1980 and was intended to improve administration of the law and foster public safety. There have been many analogous efforts in the more than three decades since this report, some of which efforts the Senate Investigational Committee report documents.

It may be worthwhile for decision makers and those involved in policy development in this area to reflect on why, since 1980, it has been so difficult to sustain a focus on the need for statutory and structural changes in addressing the needs of individuals with mental illness involved with the Criminal Justice
System in Hawaii. Now these issues are being re-visited, again, through the lens of workplace safety considerations.

I am very concerned that the report might be read as oversimplifying the issues that the citizens of Hawaii face with regards to our state hospital. The matter of workplace safety at HSH, and the role of the Department of Health (DOH) and HSH administration in maintaining it, are inextricably bound to other, broad issues, affecting many departments, indeed all three branches of government, which decision makers and those involved in policy development have grappled with for over 30 years.

A partial list of related issues:

- Behaviors which are symptomatic of mental illness or non-adherence with treatment plans are frequently addressed through the criminal justice system and in the process are criminalized.

- The criminal justice apparatus which commits individuals to HSH frequently effects a social outcome for individuals through force of law (for instance, removal from home island, removal from the community in general, and avoidance of a criminal sentence).

- There are insufficient numbers of non-forensic hospitalization alternatives for those who require inpatient treatment.

- Once placed at HSH, a change in commitment status is often driven by legal consideration (e.g. timing of court hearings and change in attorneys) rather than clinical need, and these legal considerations can result in extended continuations of hospitalizations.

- Health Care and Psychiatric Health Care will always involve inherent risk, and this is particularly so for Psychiatric Inpatient Treatment for forensically committed adults. This last requires a need to balance patient rights/self-determination with organizational and worker concerns for safety; this balancing effort is impacted by compelled confinement and, in some cases, compelled treatment over the person’s objection.

As we move forward, it is critically important to focus on actively addressing the need for the statutory and structural changes in how the needs of individuals with mental illness involved with the Criminal Justice System are addressed in Hawaii. A significant amount of time and resources have been spent over the last thirty years generating recommended solutions to address these needs. The proposed solutions by each successive body have been remarkably similar and when taken in total, represent a consensus on the need to develop innovative solutions. I welcome the Investigative Committee’s recommendation for the Legislature to partner with concerned parties and take action to address the needs of the mentally ill in the Criminal Justice System including the infusion of additional funds to assist DOH, the Adult Mental Health Division, and HSH in their efforts to do so.

I affirm my commitment to continuing to work together with others to improve services, to staff, patient and public safety, for advocating for improvements to the HSH campus and to assuring that HSH continues to be a place where workers can be proud of the work they do and where their concerns are heard and addressed properly.

Very Truly Yours,

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